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Abstract
Over the last decades, the Internet has grown from a small-
scale academic network linking few universities, to a large-
scale complex system, reaching out to billions of people and
enabling communications and computing worldwide. While
the number of persons connected to the Internet 24/7 is grow-
ing exponentially, particularly through smartphones, most
of them are unaware of the real Internet infrastructure. Re-
cently, researchers have attempted to discover details about
the characteristics of the Internet in order to create a model
of its infrastructure, which could be exploited both to im-
prove the performances and to identify and address possible
weaknesses of the network. Despite several efforts in this di-
rection, currently no model is known to represent the Internet
effectively, especially due to the lack of understanding of the
true driving forces behind the Internet evolution, and the ex-
cessively coarse granularity applied by the studies done to
date. This thesis seeks to scientifically understand the driving
forces lying behind the exponential growth of the “network
of networks”, through a fine-grained analysis of the available
topological data. In the first instance, we show that the large-
scale Internet can be broken down into a not-so-large core,
which captures the most important structural properties of the
Internet, and a periphery, representing the “tendrils” of the
topology. The proposed decomposition technique is general
and can be extended to other networks: multi-layer network
analysis, a hot topic in the area of complex networks, can
benefit from it as well. We point out the key role of Internet
eXchange Points within the core of the Internet, and reveal
through an economic analysis the emerging competition be-
xxi
tween them and the classical Network Service Providers. This
analysis serves as ground truth to devise a network model
able to represent the Internet’s core effectively and potentially
forecast its evolution. The model takes into account multi-
layer interaction mechanisms, and can be further extended to
the whole Internet, by devising simple attaching mechanisms
for the periphery. Since the prediction properties of the model
are based on data from real measurements, it is important to
remove the biases introduced by the measuring infrastructure,
in order to predict the future evolution of the real Internet
topology. In the end, we show through a meaningful set of
metrics, how the model is able to successfully capture the In-
ternet’s statistical and structural properties, outperforming
existing topology generators in the literature.
xxii
Part I
Introductory Part
1

Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the area of investigation, the motivation behind
this work and its contributions. At the end it presents an overview of the
thesis’ structure.
1.1 Research Area
The Internet has become more and more part of the everyday life of
billions of people. The spreading of smartphones, together with the
deployment of high-speed wireless data networks such as LTE [STB09;
AAMS13; AAMS12], allowed the pervasive growth of a huge variety of
Internet-related services. Nowadays, wherever he is and with just few
clicks, a person can perform a broad variety of tasks, such as sending
an email, paying a bill or watching the last episode of some definitely
unmissable tv show. Nevertheless, very little is known, by the majority
of people, about what happens through their clicks, and how data flows
through the network to and from their computer. In order to enlighten
this aspect, we need to grasp the real meaning of the word “Internet”, and
its underlying physical infrastructure.
The Internet is a global system of interconnected computer networks.
A computer network is a collection of computers (hosts) and dedicated
3
Figure 1.1.1: Basic internetwork
hardware components (NICs1, switches, etc..) interconnected by com-
munication channels that allow sharing of resources and information. A
special device called router allows internetworking by forwarding packets
between different computer networks. Two routers form an IP2 [Pos81]
connection to exchange data between them, and in such case are said to be
adjacent. An Autonomous System (AS) [HB96] is a set of IP networks and
routers, which operates under control of a single and well-defined admin-
istrative authority. Actually, the number of operators running inside an
AS might be more than one, however from the perspective of an external
observer, they must act as one, exhibiting a unique routing policy. Two
ASes form a connection between them if they agree to exchange traffic
and routing information through two or more directly connected routers.
Figure 1.1.1 shows a small-scale example of how all these building blocks
are linked to each other.
This “network of networks” is growing on a daily basis through the
addition of new computer networks and new connection lines, however,
since ASes are independently administered, this growth is not controlled
1NIC: Network Interface Card, used to connect a computer to a network
2IP: Internet Protocol, part of the TCP/IP protocol suite
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by any central authority and thus the Internet can be considered as a
self-organizing complex system. This phenomenon can result in major
issues, since structure affects functioning, and a lack of knowledge of
the former, can result in several unforeseen problems for the latter, like
misfunctioning or even outages. Several researchers started to analyze
the Internet in the hope of understanding its topological structure and
evolutionary principles.
The first task carried out by researchers consists of measuring and
mapping the Internet topology. This is accomplished by inferring a graph3,
which represents how the different entities interconnect to each other
within the global Internet. Depending on the building block used, studies
and ongoing projects focus on different level of abstractions, at least four:
IP interface-level: each node is represented by an IP interface, while
edges are IP connections between pair of interfaces. Data is typically
gathered via Traceroute probes [cai; Dim; Ipl; Por].
Router-level: each node is represented by a router, while edges are IP con-
nections between pair of routers. Data is typically gathered by ap-
plying an heuristic to aggregate IP interfaces on the IP interface-level
graph [GS06; Key10], by setting peculiar IP options in Traceroute
probes [SBS08], by exploiting ad-hoc probes [GT00] and analyzing
the IP ID values of the probes sent [BSS08; KYLC].
PoP-level: each node is represented by a collection of routers located in
the same points of presence (PoPs), while edges are connections be-
tween pairs of PoPs. Data is typically gathered by applying reverse
DNS4 lookups [SMW02] or by looking for peculiar characteristics in
the IP interface-level graph [FS08].
AS-level: each node is represented by an Autonomous System, while
edges are connections between pairs of ASes, established via Border
3Graph: abstract representation of a set of objects where some object pairs are connected
by links
4DNS: Domain Name System, translates domain names to numerical IP addresses
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Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)5 [RLH06]. Data is typically gathered via
Route Collectors (see Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2) or by applying IP-
to-AS techniques to infer an AS-level topology from the IP interface-
level graph [CSW01; MRWK03; MJR+04].
Once the Internet has been mapped through one of the above method-
ologies, the second task consists of analyzing and modeling the inferred
topology. Indeed, a proper understanding of the Internet properties and
the laws governing its growth, can result in a model able to foresee the net-
work evolution, and tackle most of the problems shown above. The task of
Internet modeling is made difficult by several problems [CHK+09; OW10],
here we list the three identified key problems:
1. The Internet is exponentially growing and so is the number of its
components. Moreover, being a “network of networks”, the Internet
is highly heterogeneous, so such components can be very different
from each other, in sizes, purposes, policies, etc.
2. The network evolution is not dictated by a central authority, but is
mainly the outcome of local economic and technical constraints.
3. Information about the structure and interconnections of an AS is
not public, because publishing it might favor competitors, and cur-
rent techniques used for data gathering are incomplete and often
unreliable.
The first two problems are specific for the modeling part, while the last
one is more related to the task of Internet mapping. Nevertheless, it is
important to keep in mind this problem when analyzing data or validat-
ing models with data, because scientific discoveries might be biased by
incorrect data and need to be rethought as our knowledge of it becomes
more accurate.
Several studies have been made in the field of Internet modeling,
at each of the level of abstractions previously shown (e.g. [ZLWX09]).
Although it represents the Internet at a coarser level, the AS level of
5BGP: Exterior gateway protocol designed to propagate routing information between
ASes
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abstraction is probably the most interesting to study. On the one hand, it
represents real-life interactions between organizations; on the other hand,
available data tends to be more reliable than in the other cases. Despite
of this, currently developed models (see Section 2.3 of Chapter 2) are
rather crude, fail in properly considering such interactions as the driving
forces behind the Internet evolution, and are becoming more and more
questioned as data gets more accurate [RWM+11].
1.2 Contribution
The final goal of this thesis is a deeper understanding of the driving forces
that are governing the growth of the Internet at the Autonomous System
level. The path towards this goal is hindered by the three key problems
which have been outlined in the previous section, and which are tackled
throughout the work.
The first contribution of the thesis is a novel methodology to partition
the Internet topology into two distinct blocks: the core and the periph-
ery. The former is a small, densely connected component, which collects
together the most important nodes of the network and captures the under-
lying community structure of the Internet. The latter is made up of most
of the Internet nodes, and represents “tendrils” of the topology, outside of
the central network backbone. This method uses one side of key problem
#1 against the other, as it tackles the large-scale nature of the Internet
by exploiting its heterogeneity. By showing that most of the interesting,
structural aspects of the Internet are captured by the core, we achieve a
huge complexity reduction for subsequent analyses.
The second contribution is an economic analysis of the different in-
teractions between the agents taking part into the core, using a game
theoretical framework to tackle key problem #2. More specifically, we fo-
cus on the dichotomy between the peering6 and transit7 interconnection
6Peering: interconnection policy through which two ASes agree to mutually exchange
traffic for free
7Transit: interconnection policy through which a customer AS pays is upstream provider
to access the Internet
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policies and point out the key role of Internet eXchange Points8 and the
emerging competition between them and Network Service Providers9 (all
these concepts will be detailedly introduced in Chapter 2).
The main achievement of the thesis combines the above results, which
are used as ground truth to devise a novel model for the Internet’s core.
The model embodies an innovative dynamic which reflects the driving
forces behind the evolution of the core, and is able to capture both statis-
tical and structural characteristics of the Internet’s core. Moreover, the
model is versatile and capable of accurately predicting the evolution of
the Internet’s core as long as we are able to foresee the growth of the
modeling parameters. As will be shown later, key problem #3 becomes
of crucial importance for this aspect: since the prediction properties are
based on data from real measurements, it is important to remove the
biases introduced by data incompleteness, in order to accurately predict
the future evolution of the Internet topology.
In the last part, the model is extended to the whole Internet by devising
simple attaching mechanisms for the periphery, and it is shown how it
outperforms existing topology generators.
1.3 Motivation
In a continuously growing environment, modeling and understanding
the Internet topology is a fundamental task from which many areas can
benefit:
1. The performance of algorithms and protocols is often influenced
by the underlying physical structure of the network. A better un-
derstanding of the Internet topology could help in the design of
structure-aware algorithms, exploiting the topology knowledge for
their advantage. Content Delivery Networks (CDN), for example,
are distributed computer networks that spread contents (especially
multimedia contents) to other users. Since these contents can ac-
8IXP: physical facility that allows ASes to interconnect directly
9NSP: high-level Internet Service Provider, part of the backbone
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count for thousands of Gigabytes, a CDN exploits proxies10 dis-
tributed around the globe to optimize data spreading. A better
understanding of the Internet structure could help in the optimal
placement of these proxies and boost the performances for final
users (for example by reducing the hop distance).
2. Since networks are supposed to perform reasonably well even in the
face of occasional malfunction of some components, fault-tolerant
network design is a very important task. This issue is particularly
difficult in the Internet environment, since there is no central au-
thority overseeing its growth but it is instead the reflection of local
efforts performed by individual ASes. A proper understanding of
the Internet topology could therefore give a huge insight to engi-
neers, helping them in the task of optimizing the Internet’s fault
tolerance.
3. As any other communication network, the Internet is subject to
the spreading of infections by malicious programs that replicate
and propagate themselves (worms11). An effective approach in
facing this kind of epidemics is the containment strategy, obtained
by placing firewalls12 in strategic network points. It is obviously
much easier to identify the optimal placement for these defense
mechanisms if the structure of the network is accurately known.
4. Internet Traffic Engineering deals with the issue of performance eval-
uation and performance optimization of operational IP networks. A
proper understanding of the network topology could help engineers
in many tasks: reaching the highest level of capacity in the Internet
backbone by optimizing link utilization, load balancing, manage-
ment of SLAs13 for granting and delivering the desired Quality of
10Proxy: server that acts as an intermediary for requests from clients seeking resources
from other servers
11Worm: self-replicating malware computer program
12Firewall: device designed to permit or deny network transmissions based upon a set of
rules
13SLA: Service Level Agreement, a service contract defining an agreement between a
customer and one or more service providers
9
Service (QoS).
5. While new mechanisms (algorithms, protocols, firewalls, etc..) and
services are deployed, it is important to ensure that current mecha-
nisms and services will continue to operate. The ability to provide
such guarantees can heavily rely on the knowledge of the under-
lying topology. For example, CDN services cannot be envisioned,
made feasible, evaluated and optimized without intimate under-
standing of the topology.
To sum up, knowing the Internet structure is a very important point be-
cause structure affects functionality. Nevertheless, a point that is possibly
even more important is that of foreseeing network growth. As a matter
of fact, the Internet has an ever-changing topology. The ability to foresee
network growth is the only way to predict if both currently operating and
newly deployed mechanisms and services will continue to operate in the
future.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 describes the Internet structure and its evolution up to now,
highlights the tools commonly used to analyze the topology and the
state of the art in Internet topology modeling.
Chapter 3 illustrates our first contribution, a novel methodology to par-
tition the Internet topology into core and periphery. Moreover, it
highlights the growing importance of exchange points within the
core. The Chapter is based on [AGL13].
Chapter 4 describes our second contribution: an economic analysis of
the different interactions between the agents taking part into the
core, using a game theoretical framework. This Chapter is based on
[AAGL14b; AAGL14a].
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Chapter 5 gives our evolving model for the Internet’s core, analyzes its
prediction capabilities and the biases introduced by the measuring
infrastructure. The Chapter is based on [AGL14b].
Chapter 6 extends the core model to the whole Internet, and compares
results obtained through it with existing topology generators. This
Chapter is partly based on [AGL14a].
Chapter 7 concludes, summarizing important results obtained and giv-
ing an overview of the future works.
11
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter is split in three sections. In the first one we describe how
the Internet evolved through time to reach its current structure. In the
second section we illustrate how the network is being measured, and
current techniques used for the analysis of the Internet topology. In the
last section we describe the state of the art in Internet topology modeling,
taking into account static, dynamic and agent-based models.
2.1 The Global Internet Ecosystem
The Internet ecosystem is made of tens of thousands Autonomous Sys-
tems, interconnected together in a complex and dynamic manner. In this
section we illustrate how the Internet evolved through time to reach its
current structure, and who are the entities involved in such evolution.
2.1.1 The birth of the Internet
The Internet originated in the late 1960s when the United States Defense
Department developed ARPAnet (Advanced Research Projects Agency
network), the first experimental network of computers and the progen-
itor of what was to become the global Internet. ARPAnet was the first
successful experiment of a packet switching network, to which many
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others followed (NPL, CYCLADES, Merit, etc.). With so many different
networks, something was needed to unify them: in 1974, the TCP proto-
col was proposed [VCDS74], containing the first attested use of the term
internet, as a shorthand for internetworking. At that time, an internet was
any network using TCP/IP.
In 1986, the National Science Foundation (NSF) created the NSFnet
backbone network to allow access to supercomputer sites in the U.S. from
geographically spread organizations for research and education. It was
around the time when ARPAnet was interlinked with NSFNET in the late
1980s, that the term “Internet” was first used as the name of the large
and global TCP/IP network. By 1990, ARPAnet had been phased out,
while NSFnet continued to grow, and more and more countries around
the world connected to this Internet backbone [LCC+09].
The Autonomous Systems operating within the Internet at the NSFnet
epoch can be distinguished in the following categories [Nor11]:
Transit ASes, that provide connectivity through themselves to other net-
works. These ASes typically correspond to large backbones and
service providers, allowing Internet access to smaller ASes.
Stub/Multihomed ASes, that do not allow external traffic to pass through
them. While stub ASes are connected to only one other AS, multi-
homed ASes can be connected to multiple of them, so as to increase
fault-tolerance.
This paradigm produces as output a tree-like hierarchical structure for
the Internet topology [PSV04], shown in Figure 2.1.1.
2.1.2 From NSFnet to the beginning of 21th century
Around 1992 the government-funded NSF determined that the Internet
could and should be operated by the private sector, and devised a model
composed of a set of competing commercial backbones. The progressive
dismantlement of NSFnet gave rise to an early version of the commer-
cial Internet model as we know it, with the emergence of economical
relationships between ASes.
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Figure 2.1.1: NSFnet-like hierarchical structure
The late twentieth-century Internet ecosystem was largely dominated
by a hierarchical structure made of customer and provider Autonomous
Systems. The customer AS pays its upstream provider for the traffic
flowing on the link, both incoming and outgoing; in return, the provider
grants to all its customer access to the entire Internet. This “customer-
to-provider” relationship is also known as “transit”: the upstream AS is
called “transit provider”, and the resulting interconnection between the
ASes is known as transit link [Nor11].
The beginning of twenty-first century brought a new paradigm into
the environment, since more andmore ASes found it beneficial to establish
“settlement-free” interconnections. This agreement envisages that neither
party pays the other for accessing its customers. In this case the two ASes
mutually agree to exchange traffic for free between them, and the only
cost they incur is that of laying out the physical link. The relationship is
also known as “peering”, and the two ASes establishing the peering link
are known as peers. Note however that, by exploiting a peering link, an
AS cannot reach all the Internet routes, but just the customers of its peer
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[GIL+11; Nor10a].
It is worth noting that there exists a third kind of relationship between
ASes, denoted as “sibling-to-sibling” [Gao00]. This type of connection is
typically applied between ASes owned by the same organization, there-
fore, from an economic standpoint, it is the same as peering. However,
differently from peering, two sibling ASes may use each other to reach
their respective providers (and therefore all the Internet routes). The focus
of this study is the relationship between organizations, and this kind of
connection does not capture this phenomenon. A possible way of dealing
with sibling-to-sibling connections could be grouping the involved ASes
in a single one, resulting in an AS that is under control of a single organi-
zation. Unfortunately, many times sibling tags are detected even if two
ASes are not part of the same organization. This could happen if one AS is
the customer of another AS but is also used as a transit backup, in case of
BGP misconfigurations, and many others [MWA02]. Therefore, applying
the grouping procedure described above could introduce more errors
than benefits. Since the number of sibling connections in the measured
Internet graph is very low, it is not expected to impact the obtained results,
thus we are not dealing with sibling relationships in this thesis.
The primordial hierarchical structure, together with the emerging
economical relationships, led to a decomposition of the Internet into tiers1.
Although there is no authority that defines tiers of networks participating
in the Internet, the most common definitions are the following [Nor11;
Wikb]:
Tier-1 ASes, standing at the highest level in the hierarchy. They form an
“elite club” of ASes able to reach the whole Internet without paying
any other Autonomous System. To reach this goal, Tier-1 ASes are
interconnected to each other through a full-mesh2 of peering links.
While this definition of Tier-1 can be separately applied to smaller
Internet regions (e.g. Europe, America, and so on), we will always
refer to the global Internet. In this context, the number of Tier-1
1Tier: level of a network
2Full-Mesh: interconnection such that each node is connected to any other node in the
network
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ASes is quite small (15-20) compared to the total number of ASes
[Wikb].
Tier-2 ASes, which buy transit from higher-level ASes (typically Tier-1).
Differently from Tier-1 ASes, they can engage in peering to reach
a portion of the network, but they still have to purchase transit to
reach the entire Internet. With a little abuse of terminology, in the
following we equivalently refer to Tier-2 ASes as Internet Service
Providers (ISP). For Tier-3 ISPs see the keyword Access Provider.
Tier-3 ASes, which solely purchase transit from other networks in order
to reach the Internet.
Depending on the belonging organization and the offered services, ASes
can be further categorized into [pee]:
Network Service Providers (NSP): high-level transit providers [Nor10b],
located in either Tier-1 or Tier-2. While all Tier-1 ASes can be consid-
ered NSPs, this is true for Tier-2 only if the AS sells transit to lower
level ASes. Like Tier-1 ASes, NSPs typically span several geographic
regions, and can be reached by smaller, regional ASes through their
Points of Presence (PoPs).
Access Providers (AP): low-level regional providers, giving eyeballs (i.e.
the end users) access to the Internet and its contents. They are
typically located in Tier-3. An access provider AS wishing to grant
Internet access to its users, needs to establish a link with a transit
provider, and pay for the traffic flowing on this link. For the sake of
conciseness, we use the term AP also to refer to all other kinds of
Tier-3 ISPs (Mailbox Providers, Hosting Providers, etc.), since many
APs provide these services themselves.
Content Providers (CP): responsible for the creation and management
of contents, and the relationships with those who use, enhance, or
support this content. Content providers are typically located in
Tier-3, since network operations are outside the objectives of their
mission. As shown in the next section, this is changing nowadays.
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Figure 2.1.2: The 20th century Internet
Research Networks (EDU): used by universities and/or other research
institutes.
The structure resulting from this new economic model, together with the
above categorization, is illustrated in Figure 2.1.2.
2.1.3 Towards a Flat Structure
Recent years have shown an exponential growth of peering links, with its
number approaching if not overtaking the number of transit links. The
introduction of peering meshes, as reported in [DD10], is responsible for
the evolution of the Internet from its previous, hierarchical structure, to a
flatter one. The emergence of such phenomenon has to be sought after the
birth of a new interconnection paradigm known as “public peering”, as
opposed to the classical one, referred to as “private peering”. In particular,
we have that [Nor11]:
Private Peering is the direct interconnection between the two parties
establishing the settlement-free agreement. The involved ASes lay
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out a point-to-point link to connect to each other. Tier-1 ASes use
this kind of agreement.
Public Peering is, again, a settlement-free interconnection between the
two parties, however in this case the involved ASes utilize a multi-
party shared switch fabric. The public, physical facilities provid-
ing this technology are known as Internet eXchange Points (IXPs)
[Eur].
The main benefit of establishing peering links, is that peer ASes can reach
each other without passing through their respective upstream providers,
thus saving transit money. However, since peers can only reach each
other’s customers, reaching multiple destinations requires the establish-
ment of many peering links. For example, if hundreds of ASes want to
exchange traffic between themselves without buying transit, they need
to establish a full-mesh of peering links. Under private peering, each
Autonomous System has to lay out physical interconnections one by one,
therefore establishing the peering mesh requires it to build hundreds of
links. This can result in high costs, possibly worse than establishing few
transit links.
The growth of IXPs, in number and in size, made it easy to establish
more and more peering meshes. In fact, when one AS joins an IXP, it can
publicly peer with all (usually a subset) of the other ASes connected to the
same IXP. This allows the Autonomous System to connect with hundreds
of ASes at a cost given only by a single public peering link, plus the
cost for joining the IXP. This last cost is related to hardware maintenance
and shared by all the parties, as will be shown after. Therefore, the
establishment of peering meshes through IXPs is an effective way of
reaching many other participants without passing through upstream
providers, thus saving lots of money. Moreover, this shortcut can also be
an effective way of shortening the path between two ASes, thus increasing
the overall network performances [Nor10c].
All these advantages are making the presence of IXPs a dominant
factor inside the Internet’s structure, transforming its past hierarchical
structure into a flatter one [GILO11; ACF+12; AG10]. As shown in Figure
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Figure 2.1.3: The 21th century Internet
2.1.3, large-scale Content Providers (e.g. Google) benefited from this
architecture as well, since by establishing peering sessions over IXPs, they
can effectively reduce the amount of traffic sent through costly transit
connections [Nor11].
2.2 Internet as a Complex System
2.2.1 Measuring the Internet Topology
There are two main measurement techniques for gathering information
about the Internet AS-level topology, based on active or passive probing.
The former, exploits a tool named traceroute to inject into the network
special packets able to discover the path between two endpoints. Active
probing is typically used when inferring router-level maps [GS06; Key10;
SBS08; GT00; BSS08; KYLC], while there are several drawbacks when
trying to obtain the AS-level topology, mainly due to dealiasing and
router-to-AS mapping issues [CSW01; MRWK03; MJR+04]. Moreover,
currently available datasets are incapable of giving an accurate view of
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Figure 2.2.1: Measuring infrastructure
the topology evolution, something which is needed for this research work
[cai; Dim; Ipl; Por].
The passive probing method consists in collecting inter-AS routing
information (i.e. BGP messages) from the routers composing the Internet
itself. The most common data sources exploited in this latter technique
are provided by several research projects [rip; Rou; PCH; BGP] which
deployed a set of route-collectors (RC) around the world aimed at collect-
ing as much information as possible about the Internet routing. A Route
Collector is a device that behaves like a BGP router, with the purpose of
gathering BGP messages from cooperating ASes, refereed to as feeders.
These projects make publicly available dumps of the BGP messages re-
ceived by their RCs. Themain source of information in BGP data about the
AS-level topology is represented by the well-known mandatory AS PATH
attribute, which contains the sequence of ASes that the traffic crosses to
reach some destination [RLH06]. Figure 2.2.1 shows a RC receiving a BGP
message from the feeder AS 3549, highlighting the AS PATH attribute
contained in the message.
Since each feeder provides a representation of the network from its spe-
cific point of view, collected data has to be aggregated to obtain the com-
plete Internet topology. The ISOLARIO dataset [Iso], created by a team
of researchers at IIT-CNR, is generated using data collected by the RIS
[rip], RouteViews [Rou], BGPmon [BGP] and PCH [PCH] route collector
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projects. The data gathered is processed in order to obtain monthly-based
AS-Level topology graphs [CGJ+02]. The routing information gathered
by this methodology is considered reliable since it is collected directly
from devices that are effectively participating in the inter-domain routing,
and represents the result of the BGP decision process of each feeder. It
is known that, due to the limited number of feeders, the inferred AS-
level topology is incomplete [OW10]. Nevertheless it is a useful source
of information, that can be used provided that one takes into account the
incompleteness of available data when drawing any inference.
2.2.1.1 The Enriched Internet Graph
The dataset provided by ISOLARIO consists of several (one per month)
AS-level Internet topology graphs, where nodes represent ASes, and
edges are the BGP connections between them. Furthermore, the dataset is
enriched through the following additional information:
Node Type: each node, as shown in Section 2.1.2, can be either a Network
Service Provider, an Internet Service Provider, an Access Provider, a
Content Provider (CP) or something else (Non-Profit, Educational,
Research, etc..) [pee].
Node Peering Policy: each node has a specific peering inclination, or
policy, indicating its willingness to participate in peering agreement.
Each node publishes its peering policy, which can fall into one of
the following categories: open, selective or restrictive. An “Open”
peering inclination is a willingness to peer with any other AS in
the ecosystem, while a “Selective” peering inclination reflects the
existence of requirements for establishing peering sessions. Finally,
a “Restrictive” peering inclination reflects a desire not to peer with
anyone other than existing peers. As an example, Tier-1 ASes all
have restrictive peering policies, because they peer with each other
but refrain from doing so with any other AS [Nor10a].
IXP Participation Lists: each IXP provides through its website a publicly
available list of ASes participating into the IXP. Therefore, for each
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node, we can infer the IXPs it is participating into.
Link Type: as shown in Section 2.1.2, relationships between ASes can be
either transit or peering. Unfortunately, this kind of information
is typically hidden by network operators, due to its key role in
economic agreements. Despite this, researchers have developed
algorithms aimed at capturing such relationships [GIL+11; Gao00].
Thanks to this, the dataset can be enriched by “tagging” each edge
in the graph with the appropriate relationship, either transit or
peering.
Please note that while the first three piece of information are publicly
available and collected on websites, such as [pee], the last one is the
result of an a posteriori analysis, since network operators are typically
reluctant to publicly reveal such information, and thus it is far less reliable.
Nonetheless, when looking at the network from a high-level perspective,
it is still a valid and useful piece of information.
2.2.2 Understanding the Internet Topology
With over forty-thousand nodes and hundreds of thousands links, it is
definitely impossible to study the Internet AS-level topology via direct
graphical representation. It is however feasible to obtain a statistical and
structural description of it, using topological measures. Here we review
the topological measures used for Internet topology analysis, typically
borrowed from the framework of graph theory [PSV04; SLH06].
2.2.2.1 Graph Measures
Formally, we represent the AS-level Internet topology as a graph G =
(N,E). N is the set of nodes and E ⊆ N × N is the set of edges in
the graph. As previously said, in the graph (or network) a node (or
vertex) represents an Autonomous System, while edges (or links) are
BGP connections between ASes: all these terms are used interchangeably
through the thesis. We indicate with |N | the number of nodes in the
graph, and with |E| its number of edges. Two nodes of the graph, say
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i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are said to be adjacent if they are linked by an edge, that
is if (i, j) ∈ E. In this case the edge is said to be incident to the nodes it
joins. If G is an undirected graph, than edges (i, j) are unordered pairs,
meaning that (i, j) is identical to (j, i). If G is directed, than (i, j) are
ordered pairs, and represent the “from i to j” relationship.
Unless otherwise stated, in the following we will always refer to
undirected graphs, therefore, when we say that (i, j) ∈ E, we implicitly
say that so does (j, i). As any undirected graph, G can be represented by
means of an adjacency matrix A, such that:
aij =
{
1 if (i, j) ∈ E
0 otherwise
The number of node pairs in the graph can be written using Newton’s
Binomial coefficient as:
(
|N |
2
)
=
|N |(|N | − 1)
2
.
Please note that this is also the maximum possible number of edges in
the graph, representing a full-mesh. The global network density d is given
by the ratio of the number of edges in the network, and its maximum
possible number, therefore:
d =
|E|
1/2 · |N |(|N | − 1) .
A clique is a subset of nodes in a graph such that each node is adjacent
to any other node. The clique is a full-mesh structure, since it has an edge
for any node pair. Therefore, using the previous formula, a clique of k
nodes has k(k − 1)/2 edges.
The topological measures typically used in this field, can be divided
in two groups, namely: local and global measures.
a) Local Measures A topological measure is local if it takes into account
only node interconnections and interconnections between node neighbors.
The set of neighbors of a node n can be formally expressed as:
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N(n) = {j s.t. (n, j) ∈ E}
Therefore, given a node n, a local measure only considers pairs of
edges (i, j) ∈ E such that either i or j belong to n ∪ N(n) . The most
common local measures are:
Degree The degree kn of the n− th node of the graph is the total number
of edges incident to it, therefore it is also equal to its number of
neighbors |N(n)|. The interpretation of the degree is immediate, as
it tells the propensity of a node to establish relationships with others.
For directed graphs, it is possible to obtain two different degrees
for each node: the in-degree is the number of links “terminating”
in node n (from N(n) to n), the out-degree is the number of links
“originating” in node n (from n to N(n)).
Average neighbor degree The average degree of the neighbors of node
n, written knn(n), is formally defined as:
knn(n) =
1
kn
∑
j
Anjkj =
1
kn
∑
j∈N(n)
kj .
A high (low) value of knn indicates that the neighbors of a node
are high (low) degree nodes. Therefore, this measure can be inter-
preted as the attitude of nodes to establish connections with highly
connected zones, i.e. hubs of the network.
Clustering The clustering coefficient cn of the n− th node of the graph
is defined as the ratio of the number of edges between its neighbors
to its maximum possible number, similarly to the network density.
Formally, we write:
cn =
|E(n)|
1/2 · kn(kn − 1) .
where E(n) = {(i, j) s.t. i, j ∈ N(n)} is the set of edges between the
neighbors of n, and kn is its node degree. Please note that cn ∈ [0, 1]:
when cn = 0, the topology is a star, and the neighbors of n are
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Figure 2.2.2: Local properties of a graph
all disconnected from each other; when cn = 1, all the neighbors
are interacting with each other in full-mesh, thus forming a clique.
Therefore, this measure can be interpreted as the attitude of nodes
to form densely connected groups, i.e. clusters.
Figure 2.2.2 illustrates an example of computation for the described local
measures. Please note that {A,B,C,D} is a full-mesh (the clustering of B
is 1), while node E is the hub of a star topology (its clustering is 0).
b) Global Measures A topological measure is global if it takes into
account all the possible nodes and interconnections of the graph.
Shortest Path Length The shortest path length (or geodesic) lij is equal
to the number of edges forming the shortest path from node i to
node j. The higher the shortest path length, the higher the number
of hops between two nodes of the graph, therefore this measure
can be immediately interpreted as indicator of the distance between
any two nodes of the graph. Shortest paths are the “best” paths
that can be used by two nodes to reach each other. Even if it is
not always the case (due to economic and technical constraints
[Gao00]), they are typically interpreted as the paths actually used
by the nodes, therefore it is reasonable to think that a node crossed
by many shortest paths is highly utilized, and therefore “central” in
the network.
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Figure 2.2.3: Global properties of a graph
Betweenness Centrality The betweenness centrality bn of the n−th node
of the graph is the number of shortest paths passing through it
among all possible ones. Since a high (low) value of betweenness,
indicates that many (few) geodesics pass through a given node, this
metric can be interpreted as the “centrality” of such node. Another
betweenness measure is the edge betweenness, which counts the
number of shortest paths passing through a given link.
Closeness Centrality Another centrality measure is the closeness central-
ity ccn, which measures the average distance of of the n− th node
of the graph, to all the other nodes. Both betweenness and closeness
can be normalized to represent values between zero and one.
Coreness [AHDBV06] The coreness of a node is defined as the highest
k-core to which the node belongs. A k-core is a maximal connected
subgraph in which all nodes have degree at least k, where maximal
means that we cannot include another node to the subgraph without
violating the minimum degree property (see Figure 2.2.4 in the next
section). Coreness is a global measure similar to clustering, as it
reveals the existence of densely connected zones in the network.
Figure 2.2.3 shows an example of computation for the described global
measures. Note that the betweenness centrality of E is zero, as it is
not crossed by any shortest path, however its closeness centrality is not
infinity, as it is connected to the topology.
The topological measures just outlined, both local and global, can be
used to statistically describe the graph at different levels of granularity.
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Specifically, we use the following classification [RFT13]:
Coarse-grained Measures are those that concisely represent the graph
with a unique scalar value. The average degree, knn, clustering
coefficient, shortest path, betweenness and closeness, are all coarse-
grained measures, obtained by averaging results obtained for a
single node (or node pairs), to the whole graph. We use the notation
〈·〉 to denote average values, e.g. 〈k〉 is the average degree of the
network. Another coarse-grained measure typically used is the
network diameterD, indicating the maximum geodesic considering
all possible node pairs.
Medium-grained Measures are those that represent the graph using dis-
tributions of values. For example, the degree distribution P (k) is
the probability distribution of the degree measure over the whole
network. The probability of observing a given degree k can be ex-
pressed as the ratio of the number of nodes with degree k, to the
total number of nodes in the network. If the network has |N | nodes
and nk of them have degree k, then we have:
P (k) =
nk
|N | .
We can apply the same reasoning to the shortest path length. In this
case, P (l) is the probability distribution of the geodesic measures
over the whole network. If the network has |N | nodes and nl of
them have geodesic l, we have:
P (l) =
nl
1/2 · |N |(|N | − 1) .
In the same way, we can define probability distributions for all the
other local and global measures of the graph.
As will be shown later on, both coarse and medium-grained graph met-
rics have been extensively used for analyzing and modeling the Internet
topology [PSV04], due to their ability to compactly represent its statistical
characteristics. Nevertheless, they show several limitations, like the im-
possibility to study through them the existence of tiers and the interaction
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between different network tiers. These aspects are crucial for a proper
understanding of many real networks such as the Internet.
In order to tackle this problem, new fine-grained measures were in-
troduced. The goal of this class of measures is capturing the structural
characteristics of the network through the identification of their underly-
ing community organization.
2.2.2.2 Community Structure
Most real networks typically contain parts in which the nodes are more
tightly connected to each other than to the rest of the network. Although
there is no unique definition, the sets of such nodes are usually called
clusters or communities. They are a signature of the hierarchical nature of
the system. Community detection has attracted much attention in recent
years, and the literature on community detection is huge [For10]. Probably,
themost famousmethod for community detection is based onmodularity3
maximization [New04]. However, this method has several drawbacks
which bring to degeneracy for networks with highly hierarchical structure
[GMC10], such as the Internet. Therefore, here we focus only on the most
important methods which have been successfully applied to the Internet
AS-level graph.
There are two main categories of community detection methods, pro-
viding either a partition or a cover of the network. A partition is a division
of the graph in clusters, such that each node belongs to only one clus-
ter, while a cover is a division of the graph into overlapping (or fuzzy)
communities [For10].
Partition Methods divide the graph in clusters, such that each node be-
longs to only one cluster. The most important methods in this class
are the k-core decomposition [CHK+07] and the k-dense method
[GLO11b; SYK09]. The former relies on the previously defined
concept of k-core, while the latter uses the concept of k-dense. A
k-dense is a maximal connected subgraph in which each pair of
3Modularity: benefit function that measures the quality of a particular division of a
network into communities
29
adjacent nodes has at least k common adjacent nodes. Both methods
define nested communities, i.e. a k-core (k-dense) community is
contained in a (k − 1)-core ((k − 1)-dense), and it is not possible for
communities at the same k level to overlap.
Cover methods divide the graph into a set of overlapping communities.
The most important methods in this class are the Clique Percolation
Method (CPM) [PDFV05], the Greedy Clique Expansion (GCE) al-
gorithm [LRMH10] and the agglomerativE hierarchicAl clusterinG
based on maximaL cliquE (EAGLE) algorithm [SCCH09]. All of
them detect communities starting from maximal cliques, and com-
bine them to form communities using chains (CPM), fitness-based
expansions (GCE) or clique-based modularity measure (EAGLE).
Anyways, the basic building block for these methods are maximal
cliques: a clique is maximal if it is not a subgraph of a larger clique,
that is, it cannot be extended by including an adjacent vertex.
Figure 2.2.4 shows examples of k-cores, k-denses and maximal cliques
according to above definitions. Please note how the granularity becomes
finer as we go from k-core to cliques. Note also that while {A,B,C},
{A,B,D}, {A,C,D}, {B,C,D} are cliques of size 3, they are not maximal
since we can always add one more adjacent node and obtain a maximal
clique of size 4.
2.2.2.3 State of the Art for the Internet Topology Analysis
The topological measures outlined in Section 2.2.2.1, both coarse and
medium-grained, have been extensively used for analyzing the statistical
characteristics of the Internet topology. Table 2.1 shows the behavior of
coarse-grained topological measures for the Internet AS-level graph as a
function of time.
Indeed, we observe that most of the average values do not show large
fluctuations and seem to be more or less stable in time. The first feature
that can be inferred through this table is the so called “Small-World”
property, first observed in [WS98]. This characteristic, to be precise, refers
to networks in which:
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Figure 2.2.4: k-cores, k-denses and maximal cliques
Average Values 2006 2008 2011 2013
Nodes 22,634 27,896 37,278 44,900
Edges 65,268 85,185 122,799 179,770
Degree 5.77 6.11 6.58 8.00
Clustering 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.32
Knn 506.61 542.73 567.67 695.25
Shortest Path 3.71 3.72 3.76 3.72
Betweenness 30731.6 38003.8 51616.0 61141.9
Closeness 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27
Coreness 3.00 3.17 3.40 4.15
Table 2.1: Internet average graph metrics
i. the average shortest path length 〈l〉 scales logarithmically (or slower)
with the number of nodes, despite of the low global network density;
ii. the average clustering coefficient 〈c〉 is several orders of magnitude
larger than the corresponding value for a graph where nodes are
randomly interconnected (see next section).
Figure 2.2.5 shows the shortest path length frequencies observed for
31
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
 3000
 3500
 4000
 4500
 2  3  4  5  6  7
#
S
h
o
rt
e
s
t 
P
a
th
s
l
Figure 2.2.5: Internet shortest path frequencies - 2013
the Internet in April 2013. We observe that not only the average shortest
path length is very small, even smaller than the logarithm of the number
of nodes, but also the network diameter is pretty small, indicating that
even in the worst-case scenario, each two nodes of the network can com-
municate in few steps. The small-world property can be interpreted as
follows. The Internet has a low number of edges compared to its number
of nodes; despite of this aspect, it is well connected, in the sense that two
nodes of the network can reach each other in few hops, and there is a
non-negligible presence of local clusters.
The second feature of the Internet topology, first observed in [FFF99], is
the “Scale-Free” property. This property is based on the observation that
some medium-grained measures, mainly the degree, are characterized
by a heavy-tailed probability distribution, that can be reasonably approx-
imated by power-law forms. In practice, heavy tail means that there is
a non-negligible probability of getting very large values. A Gaussian
distribution, for example, does not exhibit the heavy tail property, since
the probability of obtaining large values becomes exponentially small as
we leave the mean value. In this sense, heavy tail distributions typically
represent wild as opposed to mild randomness. A power-law form, is a
specific type of heavy-tailed distribution, whose density function follows
the law:
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Figure 2.2.6: Internet degree ccdf - 2013
P (k) ∼ k−γ
where γ > 1 is the power-law exponent. As typically done in the
literature, we study the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion (CCDF), which has the advantage of dealing with cumulative values,
therefore it is considered much less noisy [PSV04]. We recall that the
CCDF of a continuous random variable (e.g. the degree) can be expressed
as the integral of its probability density function P (k) as follows:
Pc(k) = 1− Pcdf (k) = 1−
kˆ
−∞
P (k′)dk′ =
∞ˆ
k
P (k′)dk′
where Pcdf (k) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF). The
CCDF is also known as the tail distribution, since its value at point k
represents the probability that a random variable (e.g. the degree) has
value greater than k. For power-law forms, it is easy to find that:
Pc(k) ∼ k1−γ
With a little abuse of terminology, in the following we will sometimes
refer to the degree CCDF as “degree distribution”. Figure 2.2.6 shows the
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CCDF of the degree observed for the Internet in April 2013. The scale-
free property can be observed by visualizing the plot in a log-log scale4,
where the power-law becomes a straight line, and the measured degree
distribution approximately follows this line. Please note that while the
exact definition of scale-free property refers to networks whose degree
distribution follows, at least asymptotically, a power law, the term scale-
free informally refers to the fact that the degree distribution maintains the
same shape at all scales.
The small-world and the scale-free properties just outlined have been
deeply investigated, and researchers exploited them in order to build
models exhibiting such properties (see next section). However, several
works have shown that they are incapable of accurately representing
the most important properties of the Internet. First of all, we have to
consider that more recent arguments made in [CGWJ02; WGJ+02], state
that the power law behavior observed in [FFF99] is only evocative. This
theory is also supported by the evidence that today, with data getting
more accurate, the heavy-tailed degree distribution deviates substantially
from an ideal power law. Second, but probably most important, these
topological measures are inadequate to describe the hierarchical structure
of the Internet [HRI+08], made of tiers and communities.
In order to understand the structural and functional properties of
the Internet, it is fundamental to interpret the overall organization of
the graph as the coexistence of different building blocks. Community
detection methods have been applied to the Internet AS-level graph with
the purpose of discovering such building blocks, or communities. There
are many studies on the structural properties of the Internet’s graph which
partition the network into communities with techniques such as k-core
decomposition [CHK+07] and the k-dense method [GLO11b; SYK09].
However, we believe that, within the Internet environment, each com-
munity shall identify dense subgraphs, and overlapping communities
should be allowed. Take, for example, an AS participating into multiple,
different, Internet eXchange Points. If we can represent each IXP with a
community, it is obvious that such communities will overlap. Therefore,
4Log-Log: vertical and horizontal axis of the plot are logarithmically scaled
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Figure 2.2.7: Internet maximal cliques distribution - 2013
cover methods better fit the topology under consideration. In this context,
Internet-related works typically refer to the CPM method or to its vari-
ations [PDFV05; GLO11a; GLM12; LRMH10; SCCH09]. Anyways, as we
have shown in the previous section, the most important cover methods
detect communities starting from maximal cliques.
Cliques are a useful fine-grained tool to identify communities, because
they identify full-mesh structures (e.g. peering meshes generated by IXPs)
in the network, typically indicating the presence of high cohesion between
the nodes. Figure 2.2.7 shows the maximal clique frequencies for the Inter-
net topology as of April 2013. Each dot in the plot represents the number
of maximal cliques of size k. With a little abuse of terminology, in the
following we will also refer to this plot as “maximal clique distribution”,
even if it is not normalized. The high number of large cliques is an im-
portant, quantitative indicator of the underlying community structure
of the Internet. In particular, the figure compares the clique distribution
of the Internet topology, with that observed for a graph of the same size
whose nodes are randomly interconnected, revealing how much the two
structures differ. Although this distribution is highly sensitive to the
addition/deletion of a small part of the network, we believe that a mo-
del aimed at representing the Internet realistically must take cliques into
account, if it wants to properly grasp structural properties of the Internet.
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2.3 The Art (and State) of Internet Modeling
The modeling of the Internet focuses, at the large-scale level, on the con-
struction of graphs that reproduce the topological properties observed in
the Internet AS-level map. Here we review the models known in the liter-
ature, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. We divide the models
in two main classes, depending on the used approach: complex networks
based models, rooted in statistical physics, and strategic optimization
based models, rooted in game theory [Wika].
2.3.1 Static and Dynamic Models
The simplest conceivable model for any complex network is that of static
random graph, where nodes of a fixed size network are randomly con-
nected with some probability. This model is characterized by a complete
lack of knowledge of the principles guiding the creation of edges between
nodes. The availability of the data and results shown in previous sections,
led researchers to propose models better capturing the statistical charac-
teristics of the Internet. Complex networks based models can be further
divided in two classes: static models, which consider a graph of fixed size,
and dynamic models, which focus more on the evolution, by dynamically
adding new nodes to an initially small network [PSV04].
2.3.1.1 Random Graph Models
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi The first theoretical model for random networks was pro-
posed by Erdo˝s and Re´nyi [ER60; Gil59]. This static model has been
commonly used to describe complex networks with no apparent regulari-
ties, and was applied to the Internet as well. The random graph model
assumes that the graph G = (N,E) has a fixed set of |N | different nodes
and each of the possible |N |(|N |−1)2 edges is present with probability p.
In order for the model to be an accurate representation of the Internet,
the first thing to do is to check if it reproduces the small-world and the
scale-free properties observed for the measured topology. To this end, we
can compute:
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Degree: the average number of edges in the graph is given by:
〈|E|〉 = 1
2
|N |(|N | − 1)p.
Since each edge contributes to the total network degree by 2, we can
obtain the average degree as:
〈k〉 = 2 〈|E|〉|N | ≃ |N |p
In order to obtain the degree distribution, we observe that each node
has degree k if it is connected to k other nodes and not connected
to the N − 1− k others. Given that the wiring probability p is fixed
and independent for each edge, the degree distribution is binomial:
P (k) =
(
N − 1
k
)
pk(1− p)N−1−k.
Clustering: for any node, the probability that two of its neighbors are
connected to each other is given by the wiring probability, therefore
the average clustering is p. Using above formulas we can rewrite
the clustering as a function of the network size:
c = p =
〈k〉
|N |
note that at fixed values of the degree, as the network grows in size
the clustering coefficient becomes increasingly smaller.
Shortest Path: Given the random position of edges and neglecting cycles,
starting from node iwe can reach, on average in one step, 〈k〉 nodes.
Since each of these nodes is connected on average to other 〈k〉 nodes,
we can reach in two steps 〈k〉2 nodes, therefore in l steps, we can
reach on average 〈k〉l nodes. In order to reach the whole graph in l
steps we require that 〈k〉l = N , therefore the average shortest path
length is [New03]:
l =
log |N |
log 〈k〉
note that this quantity grows logarithmically with respect to the size
of the graph.
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These results show how the random graph model exhibits one side of the
small-world property, namely the “small” shortest path length, but fails
to reproduce both the high clustering levels and the scale-free property
observed for the Internet.
Watts-Strogratz The empirical observation of large and stationary clus-
tering coefficient in real world networks, led to the construction of models
that allow a tuning of this parameter. The Watts-Strogratz [WS98] mo-
del starts with a set of |N | nodes placed on a ring, where each node is
connected to its 2m nearest neighbors5, half on the clockwise sense and
the other half on the counterclockwise sense. For each node, each edge
connected to a clockwise neighbor is preserved with probability 1− p and
randomly rewired6 with probability p. The following model exhibits the
following properties [BW08]:
Degree: the degree distribution is binomial, similar to that of the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graph:
P (k) =
min(k−m,m)∑
n=0
(1− p)npm−n (pm)
k−m−n
(k −m− n)!e
−pm k ≥ m
Clustering: the clustering coefficient takes advantage of the regular struc-
ture of the initial graph, and can be tuned by adjusting parameters
p andm. It is possible to compute:
〈c〉 ≃ 3m(m− 1)
2m(m− 1)(1− p)
3
note that, for p≪ 1, the clustering coefficient is finite and indepen-
dent of the network size.
Shortest Path: the initial network of this model is similar to a regular
grid, therefore it can be shown that the shortest path length grows
linearly with the network size. Thanks to the shortcuts introduced
5The “near” property refers to the euclidean distance between the nodes
6Rewire: delete the link and generate a new link between different node pairs
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by the rewiring steps, the average shortest path length reduces dra-
matically. In particular, for a sufficiently large rewiring probability
p≫ 1/|N | it can be shown that:
l ∼ log |N |
therefore the average shortest path length has values similar to that
of random graphs.
These results show that, at least in the interval 1/|N |≪ p≪ 1, the Watts-
Strogratz model yields both sides of the small-world property, as it is
able to produce high values of clustering. Unfortunately, even this model
is unable to produce the scale-free degree distribution observed for the
Internet and many other complex networks.
2.3.1.2 Evolving Network Models
Baraba´si-Albert Model As we said before, dynamic models focus more
on modeling network growth rather than statically reproducing the graph.
The first growing network model is due to Baraba´si and Albert [AB99;
AB02], and is also known as BA-model. Following its introduction, many
different models have been proposed, based on the same intuition. Ba-
sically, the network grows from an initial core of m0 nodes to its final
size |N | by a sequence of time steps. Each time step t = m0, .., |N | a new
node is added, and establishes connections with pre-existing nodes. This
means that the “age” t of a network is equal to the number of vertices
in the graph, and each vertex is uniquely identified by the time of its
appearance. The system can be described by means of a “master equation”
that dictates the time evolution of p(k, s, t), the probability that node s has
degree k at time t. In the large size limit, the stationary degree distribution
can be obtained as:
P (k) = lim
t→∞
P (k, t)
where P (k, t) is the degree distribution at time t, obtained by averag-
ing p(k, s, t) over all the nodes:
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P (k, t) =
1
t
t∑
s=0
p(k, s, t).
The Baraba´si-Albert model uses a mechanism known as “preferential
attachment” (PA)7. According to this mechanism, at each time step t a
new node appears in the network, and is linked to older nodes with a
probability proportional to their degrees. Note that if m0 = 0 then the
total network degree is 2t. The connectivity distribution of sites obeys to
the master equation:
p(k, s, t+ 1) =
[
k − 1
2t
]
p(k − 1, s, t) +
[
1− k
2t
]
p(k, s, t)
In [DM03] it is shown that, given the proper boundary conditions8, the
equation above can be rewritten, after transition to the continuous-time
approximation, as:
P (k) +
1
2
[kP (k)-(k − 1)P (k − 1)] = 0
whose solution is:
P (k) =
4
k(k + 1)(k + 2)
Interestingly enough, this distribution is scale-free. In particular it
follows a power-law with exponent 3:
P (k) ∼ k−γ γ = 3
Starting from this basic model, many othermodels have been proposed
by varying the attachment mechanism. Interestingly enough, the power-
law degree distribution is retained only in the case of linear preferential
attachment, and the addition of constants leads to a modification of the
exponent. In [DMS00] the authors generalize the BA-model with the
following assumptions:
7Preferential attachment is also known in literature as the rich-get-richer phenomenon
8i) the initial degree of nodes and ii) the initial network size
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Figure 2.3.1: Generalized preferential attachment
i. Node s has an attractiveness proportional to its in-degree, and given
by: As = A
(0) + qs.
ii. At each time step t a new node appears and links to otherm nodes
with a probability proportional to their attractiveness.
iii. If we define a = A(0)/m and m0 = 0, then the total network attrac-
tiveness at time t is AΣ = (m+A0)t = (1 + a)m.
Figure 2.3.1 shows the generalized PA mechanism.
The connectivity distribution p(q, s, t) obeys to this master equation:
p(q, s, t+ 1) =
m∑
l=0
P(m,l)s p(q − l, s, t)
where P(m,l)s is the probability that node s of starting in-degree q − l
receives exactly l links out of a total ofm added in the time step (therefore
obtaining in-degree q):
P(ml)s =
(
m
l
)[
As
AΣ
]l [
1− As
AΣ
]m−l
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Note that the probability that a node receives more than 1 link for each
new node entering the network is vanishingly low for t → ∞. Given
the proper boundary conditions, after transition to the continuous-time
approximation, the above equation can be solved and yields the following
degree distribution:
P (q) ∼ q−γ γ = 2 + a
As with previous models, in [KE02] and [CH03] the authors tackle the
problem of measuring the average shortest path length and the clustering
coefficient of the BA-model, with the following results:
Clustering The clustering coefficient can be computed, in the continuous
approximation, by integrating the probability that any two nodes
are connected over all the neighbors of a given node. The result
states that:
c =
m
8|N | (log |N |)
2
Shortest Path The power law degree distribution implies that there are
nodes in the network with a very large degree. These nodes act as
hubs, therefore it is natural to expect a small shortest path length. It
has been proven analytically that the average shortest path length
of the Baraba´si-Albert network scales as:
l ∼ log |N |
log log |N |
The strength of this model is that of yielding, with simple dynamical rules,
the scale-free property observed for the Internet topology. In particular,
with an accurate choice of the power-law exponent 2 < γ < 3, the model
is able to reproduce the degree distribution observed in many real world
networks. However, as far as the small-world property is concerned, the
model is only able to reproduce the small shortest path length. In fact,
these results reveal that the clustering coefficient decreases as the network
size grows, which is an evident weakness of the model.
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Newer Models Since both the Baraba´si-Albert model and the Watts-
Strogratz model achieve good results with respect to some metrics but
lack in others, more recent attempts in modeling the Internet focused on
the extension of one or the other, in order to achieve themissing properties.
The author of [New03] highlights a technique to generalize the random
graph model by plugging inside it a specific degree distribution. This
technique has been extended in [CZH07] to obtain a Watts-Strogratz
model with tunable degree distribution. This technique is rather crude, as
it simply reproduces observed properties without actually understanding
the principles that lie behind them, therefore it is useless if we want to
grasp the principles driving the growth of the Internet.
In [HK02], the BA-model is extended by the addition of a “triad forma-
tion step” in order to achieve higher and tunable clustering. The method
is based upon the realization that in many real networks the probability
of linking two nodes grows with the number of their common neighbors,
as shown in [New01]: basically “friends of my friends tend to become my
friends as well”. An analytical formulation of this property and deriving
consequences is described in [V0´3]. The realization of this phenomenon
led to the construction of many other models based on the same consid-
erations, like Community Guided Attachment [LKF05] and the Forest
Fire Model [LKF05]. A new research branch intends to model the evo-
lution of the Internet by taking advantage of existing economic models.
The Wealth-based Internet Topology model (WIT) [WL10] captures the
dynamics of open market competition between ASes by using a wealth
function and forms new links by increasing the degree of ASes on the
basis of their wealth. By using different wealth-exchange models, WIT
can construct graphs with various degree distributions (among which
the power law) and reproduce both the small-world effect and a high
clustering.
While trying to reproduce coarse and medium-grained measures ob-
served for the AS-level topology via reasonable considerations, all these
models lack in explaining the driving forces responsible of the Internet’s
structure. As observed in Section 2.1.2, and further shown through the
fine-grained measures of Section 2.2.2.3, the Internet has a hierarchical
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structure made of tiers and communities [HRI+08]. Nevertheless, none of
the proposed models generates this kind of structure. The importance of
it can be understood through an enlightening story. Based on the preferen-
tial attachment mechanism, researchers claimed that the Internet displays
a high degree of tolerance against random failures, but is extremely vul-
nerable to targeted attacks due to the presence of important hub nodes in
the network [AJB00]. Reality is that Internet is extremely robust by design
thanks to its multi-tiered structure and the ability to re-route traffic in case
of failures [WAD09]. Moreover, a critical examination of the principles on
which new ASes attach to old ones reveals that the mechanism is quite
different from a preferential attachment [RWM+11], and the observed
power law behavior is only evocative.
An interesting suggestion on the topic of modeling with communi-
ties comes from [LJKL09], where the authors try to obtain a community
structure by exploiting the social similarity of nodes. The work however
only hints at how this parameter should be set without giving a gen-
eral definition. Moreover, the resulting community structure is tested
using modularity measures that, as we have explained, poorly fit the data
observed for the Internet’s topology.
To sum up, empirical evidence shows that hierarchy and structure
play a fundamental role in the shaping of the Internet, therefore, any
realistic attempt to model this network has to deal with such features
[PSV04; HRI+08]. This is a difficult but fundamental step if we want to
avoid wrong inferences like the ones which have been made in the past.
2.3.2 Network Formation for the Internet
Static and dynamic models analyzed so far seek to model the network
using approaches rooted in statistical physics. Network formation seeks
to model how a network evolves by identifying mechanisms upon which
nodes interact using strategic optimization. This kind of models where
pioneered by Jackson and Wolinsky [JW96]. Basically, at the beginning
of time, a network with a fixed number of nodes, also called agents or
players in this context, is created. Every agent has a utility function,
44
which represents the benefits and costs of interconnecting with another
player. Usually, forming or maintaining a link will have a cost, but having
connections to other nodes will have benefits, such as the decreased
distance to them. Each agent tries to maximize, in a myopic and selfish
manner, its utility function. Since this utility function does not depend
exclusively on himself, but also on the behavior of the other players, this
task is classified as a game theoretical problem. The method seeks to
understand, given some initial setting (parameters and utility functions),
what kind of network structure will emerge as an equilibrium of this
game.
Models based on this intuition where enhanced to take into account
dynamic settings and evolution [CAAP06; Jac10]. An Internet model
that finds its root in this kind of intuition is the heuristically optimized
trade-off (HOT) model [FKP02], which shows how power-law forms can
emerge as the result of trade-off mechanisms, i.e. the optimization of
conflicting objectives for the different nodes.
Network formation models can be divided in two sub-classes, depend-
ing on their objectives and the tools used for the analysis: agent-based
and game theory-based models.
Agent-Based Approach This approach typically relies on simulations to
understand the dynamic of network formation and the resulting structure
of the network. The main advantage of this method, is that it is possible
to drastically reduce analytical considerations for the model, and once the
initial setting and the utility function of each agent have been established,
the outcome of the game can be found by simulating their behavior.
Several agent-based computational models have been applied to the
Internet, such as GENESIS [LDD12]. Despite of its interesting advantages,
this approach has several drawbacks. First of all, in general it is not
guaranteed that the simulation will converge, and it not known “where”
it will converge: the simulation goes on in the hope of finding one of the
possibly many equilibria. Second, even if it is possible to include more
realistic considerations, this impacts on the analytical tractability of the
model. As a matter of fact, analytical analysis can yield more interesting
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results on the dynamic and the laws governing the interaction between
the agents, something that is typically hidden by pure simulation.
Game Theoretical Approach The realm of network formation games
(see [Jac10; Goy07]) investigates existence and properties of equilibria in a
network created by rational players, each one with their costs and utility
functions. Unfortunately these models can rarely be applied to study the
Internet or any other real life network, due to the simplifications needed
for mathematical tractability. An interesting advancement on this field
comes from [MMO13], where it is shown that even very simple rules are
able to provide properties which were measured on the topology and
are not captured by notable models such as the BA-model. Despite of
the impossibility to reproduce the whole Internet topology, this approach
is very interesting since it makes it possible to deal with economic and
technical constraints which are usually ignored by classical dynamic mod-
els. Thanks to this aspect, it is possible to model and capture important
interaction mechanisms between the players that are typically hidden by
other models, as we will do later (see Chapter 4).
2.3.3 Topology Generation
As already stressed in the introduction, one of the main goals for which
a proper modeling of the Internet topology is important, is the ability to
design topology-aware algorithms and routing protocols. To this end, it is
fundamental that the graphs constructed by the models correctly repro-
duce the topological properties observed for the Internet. The computer
science community has developed a series of Internet Topology Generators,
which are based on the models previously described. Since the hier-
archical nature of the Internet has been shown to play a fundamental
importance, some of them try to embed structural properties based on
this aspect. The most famous topology generators are:
ORBIS [MHK+07] is a topology generator which exploits the concept
of dK degree distributions to construct the network. The 1K dis-
tribution corresponds to the degree distribution, while the 2K dis-
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tribution is known as the joint degree distribution: P (k1, k2). This
distribution represents the probability that a randomly selected
edge will be between nodes of degree k1 and k2. The maximum
implemented mode is the 2K, which constructs the topology using
as input the joint degree distribution. As the number d increases,
the generated topology is more similar to the original one, however
the input distribution size becomes impossible to manage.
GT-ITM [ZCD97] is the Georgia Tech Internetwork Topology Model. It
is a hierarchical generator which uses the concepts of transit and
stub so as to generate a topology made up of multiple levels, which
can be either transit or stub domains. There are multiple attachment
mechanisms (Random, Waxman, Exponential) dictating how to gen-
erate links within each domain, and it is possible to configure the
number of transit-stub and stub-stub links. While this generator is
unable to produce the scale-free Internet property, it is still inter-
esting as it is one of the most configurable ones when it comes to
reproducing hierarchical structures.
INET [WJ02] is an Autonomous System level topology generator devel-
oped by the University of Michigan. It uses a technique to combine
the benefits of generalized random graphs, such as the small-world
property, with a pre-built, tunable, degree distribution to also pro-
vide the scale-free property. Despite of this, it is unable to properly
capture the hierarchical, community-structure of the Internet.
BRITE [MLMB01] is the Boston university Representative Internet Topol-
ogy gEnerator. It is based on the Baraba´si-Albert model and, as such,
it is able to reproduce the scale-free property.
The ORBIS generator is the most recent and complex, since it reconstructs
the topology by exploiting a large amount of input data. The other three
generators were presented around ten years ago, however, as reported
by Haddai et Al. in their more recent survey [HRI+08], they are still the
reference generators in the literature.
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The main goal of the thesis, as already stressed, is developing a mo-
del which reflects the driving forces responsible for the structure of the
Internet. The goodness of the model has to be validated, and we will do
so by showing that it is able to both capture the statistical measures of
the Internet topology, its community structure (in the form of maximal
cliques) and outperforms the existing topology generators (see Chapter
6).
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Part II
The Internet Core:
Structure, Agents,
Relationships
49

Chapter 3
The Twofold Internet
Structure: Defining a Core
We tackle here the first problem stressed in the introduction: the large-
scale heterogeneous nature of the Internet. Due to the high heterogeneity
of the Internet topology, any model relying on a uniform class of nodes
which all exhibit the same behavior is deemed to fail. Therefore, the first
step that needs to be carried out is a deeper analysis of the topology,
using concepts such as communities to identify and discover the different
building blocks of the network.
We propose a technique that partitions the network topology into
two distinct blocks: the core, which captures the underlying community
structure of the Internet, and the periphery, representing the “tendrils” of
the topology. The benefits of this innovative technique are twofold. First,
it deals with the high heterogeneity of the Internet by highlighting a small
yet well-structured core. This leads to a huge reduction in complexity and
shows that the core of the large-scale Internet is not that large, and can
further be broken down into a two-layer graph. Second, thanks to the
simplifications introduced by the topology layering, it gives us the ability
to deeply analyze the core, in order to discover statistical, structural and
behavioral properties of its participating nodes. This second step will lay
the groundwork for the subsequent chapters and for defining a proper
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network model, first at the core level and then for the whole Internet
[AGL13; AGL14a].
3.1 Introduction and Related Work
The Internet topology at the Autonomous System level, as stressed in
Chapter 2, has been deeply analyzed in the past using several graph met-
rics to capture its statistical characteristics. The most important features
observed as a result, are the small-world and scale-free properties. While
these metrics have been widely used due to their ability to compactly
represent statistical characteristics of the topology, they are unable to
capture the structural characteristics of the network, such as the existence
of tiers or the presence of communities.
Works dealing with the heterogeneity of the Internet using a
community-based approach are the “jellyfish” and the “medusa” model
[STF06; CHK+07]. Using different approaches, both models break down
the full Internet map into different components exhibiting different be-
haviors, highlighting the existence of a central, strongly connected, com-
ponent. The jellyfish model defines the core as a full-mesh, and then
partitions the topology into layers by checking how far a node is w.r.t. the
core. The medusamodel uses instead the concept of k-core communities
to define the “nucleus” of the network and separate it from the other
components.
The methodology proposed here provides as well a partition of the
Internet topology, dividing it into two main blocks. This is accomplished
through two main steps. First of all we use real data to extract a small part
of the topology which well represents what we call the “core”, separating
it from the rest of the network which we call the “periphery”. Thanks to
the extraction procedure, we show that although at first glance the Internet
can be thought of as a large-scale complex system, its true nature is
different, given that it is possible to extract a small core network exhibiting
its most important structural properties. In the second step, the core is
split into two layers, by observing that the emergence of cliques lies in
the presence of two differently dense zones, and exploiting these different
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densities.
The aims and tools used for this decomposition are quite different
from the medusa and jellyfishmethodologies which were described above.
In particular, the main aims of that methodologies were to quantify the
importance of nodes and checking if network models (e.g. the BA-model)
produce the different levels highlighted for their model. Our purpose
instead, is to understand which agents are responsible for the evolution of
the Internet’s core, and discover their statistical, structural and behavioral
properties. In fact, with these in mind, it is possible to study the possi-
ble interactions between these agents and define mechanisms reflecting
the driving forces of the Internet’s growth, thus producing an accurate
model for the Internet evolution. In addition, the main tool used for
our partitioning are the maximal cliques, which have been shown to be
more representative of the other techniques when applied to the Internet
topology, due to the admitted overlaps (see Section 2.2.2.3 of Chapter 2).
Last, but not least, the power of our decomposition is also shown in
[AGL13], where even a simple, data-driven analysis, is able to provide a
fairly good model of the core. We skip that model here, since our main
interest throughout the thesis is the proper understanding of the true
driving forces behind the Internet’s evolution.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.2 we
present our core definition, its extraction and decomposition techniques.
Section 3.3 presents an in-depth analysis of the core, highlighting the
importance of IXPs in its flat, community structure.
3.2 Topology Decomposition
In this section we provide our definition of the core of the Internet, in
terms of the properties which it is assumed to fit. We then describe our
extraction procedure, and decompose the core network into two layers by
observing their different natures.
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3.2.1 Core Extraction
Given our claims at the end of Section 2.2.2.3 in Chapter 2, here our aim is
to identify the component of the Internet’s topology that best represents
its structure in the form of maximal cliques. We identify this component, a
preferably small, densely connected subgraph, as the core of the Internet.
Our core is thus made up of the minimum number of “important nodes”
that grant a good fit for the maximal clique distribution of the graph of
the whole Internet, according to the χ2 test. The importance of a node is
assigned through a weight, which depends on the number and size of the
maximal cliques it participates in.
We extract the core of the Internet’s measured graph using the dataset
provided by ISOLARIO [Iso]. As already stressed, this dataset gathers
data by several route collectors and processes it so as to obtain monthly-
based AS-Level topology graphs. Our analysis covers almost eight years,
from January 2006 to June 2013. Unless stated otherwise, for the sake of
conciseness, we will refer to the time step of April 2013. However, the
analysis was actually carried out for all of the time steps, and the results
presented here are valid for the whole time span considered.
The extraction heuristic builds a graph Gˆ starting from an empty graph.
It then makes it grow month by month in order to fit the maximal clique
distribution of the graph of the Internet through the steps described in
Algorithm 3.1. For each monthm, the procedure starts by building a list L
of nodes ordered by weight. We preserve the nodes of the previous graph
Gˆ by putting them in the list with the highest possible weight (lines 3-5).
Then, we observe the current (i.e. at monthm) Internet graph and build
a matrix Cnum[k][i]which reports the number of maximal cliques of size
k for each node i. This matrix is used to assign a weight w to each node
before inserting it into L (lines 6-14). We then perform a binary search
on L to determine the minimum number of nodes h which provides
a good fit for the maximal clique distribution, where the goodness of
the fit is evaluated via Pearson’s chi-squared test (lines 18-28). The test
compares the maximal clique distribution of the Internet graph with the
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Algorithm 3.1 Core Extraction
1: Gˆ = ∅
2: for allm ∈Months do
3: for all i ∈ nodes(Gˆ) do
4: insert(L, < i,∞ >)
5: end for
6: G = get topology(m) ⊲ AS map/monthm
7: Cnum = get maximal cliques(G)
8: kmax = sizeof(Cnum) ⊲ Largest Clique Size
9: for all i ∈ nodes(G) do
10: wi =
∑kmax
k=2 k ∗ Cnum[k][i] ⊲Weight
11: if i /∈ L then
12: insert(L, < i,wi >)
13: end if
14: end for
15: C =maximal clique distribution(G)
16: order descending(L,w)
17: inf = 0; sup = sizeof(L)
18: while sup 6= inf do
19: h = inf + sup−inf2
20: Gh = tag subgraph(G, get subset(L,h))
21: Ch= maximal clique distribution(Gh)
22: chi = chi test(C, Ch, kmax/2, kmax)
23: if chi > chi limit(kmax/2, p) then
24: sup = h
25: else
26: inf = h
27: end if
28: end while
29: Gˆ = tag subgraph(G, get subset(L,sup))
30: end for
one obtained by the subgraph induced by the h highest nodes in L, in
the upper half of the distribution (the interval [kmax/2, kmax]) with the
statistical significance parameter set to p = 0.1.
The test is performed on the upper part of the distribution because
we believe that low values of k do not correspond to the network’s core
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but to less central parts, connected via Multi-Homed ASes and tree-like
structures. The statistical significance parameter p influences the goodness
of the fit. As p → 1 the fit is more precise at the cost of an increasing
core size, while for p → 0 the core becomes smaller but the fit is less
precise. Given the high variability of the maximal clique distribution, we
are satisfied by a curve which exhibits the same trend, while an extremely
precise fit is not needed. The experiments reported in Figure 3.2.1 show
that a value of p = 0.1 gives a small core with a sufficiently precise fit.
The output Gˆ = (Nˆ , Eˆ) is the core graph, which passed the χ2 test
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Figure 3.2.4: Maximal clique frequencies for the Internet’s core - 2013
with the minimum value of h. The obtained core Gˆ is a small, relatively
dense network. Figure 3.2.2 shows the evolution of the number of nodes
and edges within the core.
As of April 2013, the core has only |Nˆ | = 956 nodes and |Eˆ| = 50, 440
links, a heavy-tailed degree distribution (Figure 3.2.3), and a wide mul-
timodal maximal clique distribution. Figure 3.2.4 shows how this distri-
bution matches almost perfectly the one observed for the whole Internet.
This behavior is stable throughout the whole considered time span.
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3.2.2 Emergence of Maximal Cliques
The extraction procedure and the results described in the previous section
highlight that although the Internet is a large scale complex system, it
is still possible to identify a very small, dense, central component that
captures its structural properties very well in terms of communities, ex-
pressed through a high number of maximal cliques. Here we outline the
driving forces behind the emergence of such a huge number of cliques.
In 1969 Moon and Moser [MM65] showed that a network of |N | nodes
has at most 3|N |/3 maximal cliques. This number can be achieved by
complementing the graph which has |N |/3 disjoint triangles. More gen-
erally, a graph with a high number of maximal cliques can be obtained
by partitioning the network into n sets and connecting each node of a set
to all the other nodes in a different set. Each set is thus an independent
vertex set (IVS), that is, a set of nodes where no two are adjacent. Figure
3.2.5 depicts a graph obtained by applying the Moon-Moser technique to a
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network of 9 nodes, thus leading to 39/3 = 27 cliques. Basically each node
of an IVS forms a clique with any couple of nodes taken from different
IVSs; in Figure 3.2.5 node 1 forms the following cliques: {1, 4, 7}, {1, 4, 8},
{1, 4, 9}, {1, 5, 7} (dashed blue), {1, 5, 8} (dotted red), {1, 5, 9}, {1, 6, 7},
{1, 6, 8}, {1, 6, 9}.
Clearly this network has a huge number of links resulting in an ex-
tremely high density. Now consider the following two-layer random graph
model:
• There are n “important” nodes. Each node is connected to any other
node with high probability q.
• The remaining |N | − n nodes are partitioned into n IVSs, each of
which has an important node and other less-important nodes.
• Each less-important node is connected with an important node of
another IVS with probability p≪ q.
Basically, in this model we draw |N | nodes, out of which n are impor-
tant, and n(n−1)2 q+ (|N | − n)(n− 1)p edges: the first part of the sum is for
important nodes, the other for less-important nodes.
This network is a subset of the Moon-Moser graph shown previously,
where the network was separated into two components: a very dense
one responsible for the generation of large cliques and a less dense com-
ponent which generates smaller cliques. Figure 3.2.6 shows how this
model generates a high number of cliques for various values of |N |, n,
p, q. By changing the parameters we can generate all kinds of bimodal
distributions: boosting the important nodes number n or their connection
probability q results in a bigger right mode (Figures 3.2.6a and 3.2.6c),
while doing the same for less-important ones strengthens the left mode
(Figure 3.2.6b). As p increases, the left-hand mode can jump higher than
the right-hand one, therefore in order to obtain coherent distributions
with those observed for the Internet’s topology, it is crucial that p and q
remain far apart.
Our experiments show that in order to reproduce maximal clique
distributions similar to that of Internet’s topology, we need n ≈ 60÷ 70
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important nodes connected with a very high probability q ≈ 0.9 ÷ 0.95
(these values depend on the actual year, of course).
3.2.3 Core Decomposition
The emergence of the high number of network conglomerates within
the core seems to be tightly connected with the presence of zones with
different densities inside it. As we have just shown, one possible reason
for the high number of maximal cliques in the core is the coexistence of
one very dense zone of the network and another less dense zone. This
leads us to the analysis of the density d of the network. We recall from
Chapter 2 that network density is defined as the ratio between its number
of edges e and its maximum possible number: d = 2e/(n(n− 1)), where
n is the number of nodes.
Our main focus here is thus to analyze the density of the core just
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extracted, in order to understand if such different dense zones exist. A
well-known method for network decomposition is the k-core [CHK+07];
however, when applied to our core network this technique very soon
stops yielding as result a large network of 183 nodes, corresponding
to the 83-core, with density d ≈ 0.65. Our goal instead is to extract a
smaller and hopefully denser network. The problem of extracting the
densest subgraph of a given size (DalkS, Densest at-least-k Subgraph
[KBS09]) is known to be NP-Complete, however there exists a simple
2-approximation algorithm which solves it iteratively. At each step the
method computes the degree of each node and removes the node with
the minimum degree and all its links. Thanks to this procedure, the
core can be decomposed by removing all its nodes one by one, until we
obtain a clique, which of course has the maximum density d = 1. These
techniques have been applied to the Internet, with different aims from
ours in [WS04], where the authors searched for subgraphs of a specific
density and highlighted the geographical locality of the obtained clusters.
Figure 3.2.7, which we refer to as the “density curve”, shows the den-
sity of the graph Gˆ as the number of nodes decreases. The figure also
shows the density of the various k-cores obtained via k-core decompo-
sition. This pictures refers to the single time step of November 2012,
however, the same behavior applies to all the other considered time steps.
It is clear that the densities of the k-cores adhere to those obtained with
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the above method (up to the 83-core, composed of 183 nodes, where the
k-core decomposition terminates).
Although there is no clear distinction between the two zones as con-
jectured in the previous section, Figure 3.2.7 highlights two main points:
the existence of a very dense central zone made up of very few nodes,
and the exponential decrease in density as the network size grows. Figure
3.2.8 shows the first derivative of network density, zoomed in the interval
[30; 300]: the curve has a unique minimum for n¯ ≈ 70, indicating an inflec-
tion point for the density curve. Consequently the exponential decrease
is not a constant behavior, but something that happens only for n > n¯,
while for a smaller value of n, the density decrease is slower.
We believe that the different behavior of the density curve reflects a
different nature of the network before and after n¯. We thus separate the
nodes of graph Gˆ into the following partitions:
The Centrum contains N1 = n¯ nodes obtained by applying DalkS to Gˆ
up to the inflection point obtained at d¯.
Layer-1 contains N2 nodes with a direct connection to centrum nodes.
The second layer contains all the other nodes.
The second layer consists of very few nodes and has a negligible contribu-
tion to the metrics of interest, so this part can be discarded. Thanks to the
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partitioning, we can now decompose the core into three networks:
The centrum network with N1 nodes and E1 edges, consists of all cen-
trum nodes and their mutual connections.
The vertical network with N1 +N2 nodes and E2 edges, consists of the
centrum network plus all layer-1 nodes and their vertical connections
(that is, connections to the centrum).
The horizontal network with N2 nodes and E3 edges, consists of only
layer-1 nodes plus their horizontal connections (that is, connections
to other layer-1 nodes).
Figure 3.2.9 depicts our network. Interestingly, while the density curve
changes at each time step, the inflection point n¯ varies slowly from about
50 to 70 over the analyzed time span, therefore while the size of layer-1
grows, the centrum is almost static or slowly growing. Moreover, the
value of d¯ at the inflection point is about 0.9÷ 0.95. This value is in 1 to 1
correspondence with the connection probability of a random graph (see
Section 3.2.2), and the values of n¯ and q¯ therein used to obtain maximal
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clique distributions akin to that of Internet’s topology, agree almost exactly
with those just obtained.
3.3 Core Analysis
The decomposed network is further examined to better characterize its
participants and their interconnections, and lay the groundwork for defin-
ing a core network model.
3.3.1 Structural Analysis
As shown in Figure 3.2.9, our core is a 2-layer graph made up of three
different networks. We can now study the properties of these networks in
terms of the degree and maximal clique distributions. The centrum is a
network of very few well connected nodes. Figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 show
that the main characteristic of this network is not the degree, which is
similar for all nodes, but the formation of a small number of fairly large
maximal cliques.
As shown in Figure 3.3.1, the vertical network has a very particular
degree distribution, with a turning point at pv (pv ≈ 65 as of November
2012). If we split the curve into two parts, for k < pv we have the distribu-
tion of the N2 layer-1 nodes, while for k > pv we have the distribution of
the N1 centrum nodes. Since the layer-1 nodes are not connected to each
other in the vertical network (these links have been placed, by construc-
tion, in the horizontal graph), the distribution for k < pv tells us exactly
how many links each node should inject in the vertical network. Figure
3.3.3 zooms in on the first part and reveals that this distribution is approx-
imately uniform U (1, pv). As well as the centrum size n¯, parameter pv is
also approximately constant, just slowly growing, during the analyzed
time span.
The horizontal network (Figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2) provides a small contri-
bution in terms of large cliques. On the other hand, its degree distribution
is similar to that of a scale-free network with a smooth cutoff, just like the
networks obtained via classic preferential attachment modeling.
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3.3.2 Impact of IXPs within the Core
In order to better characterize the core, we exploited the enriched dataset
shown in Section 2.2.1.1 of Chapter 2, and labeled nodes and links:
Links were labeled by adding the economic relationship between ASes.
We recall that relationships can be either customer to provider (C2P,
or transit), when the former pays the latter for the service, or peer
to peer (P2P, or peering) when two ASes agree to exchange traffic
for free.
Nodes were labeled according to the following data, publicly available
from PeeringDB [pee]:
Node Type, either Network Service Provider (NSP), Internet Ser-
vice Provider (ISP), Content Provider (CP) or Other (Non-Profit,
Educational, Research, etc..);
Number of IXPs a node is attached to, which can be directly com-
puted by exploiting IXP participation lists;
Node Peering Policy, either open, selective or restrictive, according
to the willingness of the node to participate in peering sessions
over an IXP.
66
Link/Network Core Centrum Vertical Horizontal
C2P 20.7% 2% 16.2% 28.5%
P2P 79.3% 98% 83.8% 71.5%
Table 3.1: Link types - 2012
Network NSP ISP CP Other
Centrum 70% 18.3% 0.1% 11.6%
Layer-1 37% 27.8% 16.1% 19.1%
Table 3.2: Node types - 2012
Network kInternet kP2P #AttachedIXPs
Centrum 525.5 444.6 8.35
Layer-1 112.5 55.8 3.48
Table 3.3: Node properties - 2012
Figure 3.3.4 summarizes the labels available. Our core network is
predominantly made up of peering links (Table 3.1), especially the centrum
which is nearly exclusively made up of P2P links. The vast majority of
the nodes within the core are Network Service Providers (Table 3.2),
which is expected given that these ASes provide backbone access to the
Internet, and participate in IXPs. There are few Content Providers in the
core, probably due to the incompleteness of the Internet graph, especially
concerning peering links [RWM+11]. A comparison between the two
layers of our decomposition highlights that centrum nodes typically have
a higher degree (indicated with k in Table 3.3) and participate in more
IXPs.
If we just consider the ASes which are NSPs, participate in four or
more IXPs and have a peering degree that is higher or equal to 100, we
find that 33 nodes of the centrum (55%) lie in this category, while only
28 nodes (3.8%) of layer-1 nodes adhere to these kinds of specifications.
A further analysis, reveals that centrum nodes falling into this category
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typically have an Open/Selective peering policy, while all but one of the
layer-1 nodes have a Restrictive/Selective policy.
In summary, peering links are the glue that keeps the core well con-
nected. The main difference between centrum and layer-1 nodes is that
while the former have a general tendency to establish well connected clus-
ters by participating in many IXPs with a generally open peering policy,
the latter (unless small ASes) tend to be more restrictive in establishing
peering connections. Interestingly, Tier-1 nodes are located inside layer-1
due to their restrictive peering policies (they do not peer at IXPs).
3.4 Conclusions
The decomposition technique enables us to shrink the large scale Internet,
with over forty thousand nodes, to a relatively small network of only a
hundred nodes. The benefits of this are twofold: on the one hand, while
keeping the most interesting structural properties of the network intact,
we are able to perform a very simple analysis of a two-layer graph. On
the other, this analysis enlightens some important aspects related to the
current structure of the Internet.
Although the core extraction and decomposition technique has been
specifically applied to the Internet environment, it can be used, mutatis
mutandis, on many other networks (e.g. social networks). Depending
on the specific characteristics of the network under investigation, a core
might emerge or not. The more regular the structure of the network is, the
larger the core will be, otherwise (i.e. for heterogeneous networks such
as the Internet) a smaller core will show up. Depending on the internal
core density, multiple layers might emerge. The tool is thus fairly general,
and can be used to gain insight on the internal structure of many different
multi-layer networks.
The in-depth analysis carried out in Section 3.3.2, illustrates the key
role of IXPs within the core, both in the centrum, where there is a high
participation and a general openness, and in the layer-1, where nodes are
still participating to IXPs, but with more restrictions. The core embodies
perfectly the Internet flattening and the emergence of communities, two
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intertwined phenomena leading the network growth.
The emerging key role of IXPs poses some questions: what is the
relationship between IXPs and backbone service providers (NSPs), his-
torically responsible for the Internet connectivity? And what is the rela-
tionship between other nodes, i.e. Internet Service Providers and Content
Providers, and these two facilities (i.e. IXPs and NSPs) enabling them to
communicate? Answering those questions will enable us to understand
the mechanisms used by nodes to establish links between each other.
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Chapter 4
Peering or Transit: IXPs vs
NSPs
The second problem shown in the introduction, is tackled here. As we
stressed, network evolution is not dictated by a central authority, but is
mainly the outcome of local economic and technical constraints. Therefore,
we have to understand the behavior and the decision of the Autonomous
Systems living in the Internet ecosystem by taking them, rather than the
network, as the main characters of the system, and study their reciprocal
interactions. Here, we propose a model to analyze the decisions taken by
ASes living in an Internet environment. In particular, due to the outcome
of the analysis from the previous chapter, we focus on the core and on the
key role of IXPs as an alternative to the old paradigm using NSP backbone
providers [AAGL14b; AAGL14a].
4.1 Introduction and Related Work
The Internet, as stressed in the first chapter, consists of thousands of
Autonomous Systems, independently administered networks that dynam-
ically connect together to provide end-to-end reachability. Depending on
their importance and the offered services, ASes can be sorted in different
tiers and categories: content providers, access providers, transit providers
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and so on [Nor11]. During the past century, Internet’s structure was pre-
dominantly hierarchical, with customer ASes paying their providers to
carry their traffic, and the latter providing default gateways to reach any
requested destination. The pricing strategy for this transit policy is typ-
ically volume-based, metered using the 95th percentile traffic sampling
technique (this allows customer ASes to burst, for a limited time period,
beyond their committed base rate) [Nor10b].
Nowadays Internet, as already stated, is evolving from its previous
structure and becoming flatter through the introduction of peeringmeshes,
with ASes establishing bilateral agreements to exchange traffic between
them for free. Peers must agree to each other’s policy, which is used to
avoid abuse of the peering relationship. Typical clauses include prohibi-
tion of using the peer as default gateway (therefore peers cannot be used
to reach other Internet’s routes) and traffic ratio balancing, meaning that
the ratio between incoming and outgoing traffic over the link must not
exceed some value (e.g. 2:1) [Nor10a].
The massive diffusion of peering meshes was mainly achieved thanks
to the increasing deployment of Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) [GILO11].
The pricing strategy of an IXP, with respect to its customers, is typically
flat. Each one of them pays a monthly-based fee, depending on the
size (speed) of the port they are using and the cost of maintaining the
equipment. Thanks to this mechanism, the IXP can share maintenance
costs among all its participants [Nor10c]. It is worth noting that this
pricing strategy doesn’t allow standard cost function modelization (like in
[ORS93]), since the addition of new participants potentially brings down
the costs of an IXP customer.
ASes joining the Internet face the complex question of what is the
best strategy for offering their services (e.g. traffic delivery) at the lowest
possible cost. While the answer was easy in the past century, due to the
existence of transit as the unique interconnection policy, today’s answer
is much more complex. In fact, peering policies and IXPs brought new
variables to the problem, such as the fact that the outcome of an AS
decision also depends onwhat other ASes, dealing with the same problem,
do: due to this aspect, we believe that a game-theoretical analysis of the
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problem would be highly insightful. Realistic modeling of the whole
decision space of an AS is an extremely difficult task, therefore in our
work we restrict our analysis to the problem of peering versus transit.
As a matter of fact, a proper understanding of this problem is crucial
if we really want to grasp the behavior of ASes living in the Internet
ecosystem, and answer the two questions that arose in the last part of
previous chapter.
In order to keep the problem analytically tractable we do not aim
at modeling the whole network formation process. We rather study
the interaction between ASes which connect to an existing network in
order to serve some demands. In this context, a possible modelization
of a network where access providers need to select a subset of content
providers and fetch traffic from them in a cost-efficient manner is given in
[JHA12]. However, the aim of this work is quite different from ours, as it
concentrates on the economic analysis of neutral/non-neutral network
features, without taking into account the difference between traffic and
peering agreements. Themodels in [CRT00; N06] focus on the competition
between backbone providers and on the conditions under which they
agree or refuse to establish bilateral peering connections with each other.
In [SS06], authors perform an interesting analysis on network pricing and
analyze the economics of private Internet exchanges. However, as already
explained in Section 2.1.3 of Chapter 2, private peering has different rules
and costs compared with public peering. Nowadays Internet is largely
dominated by public peering, occurring at IXPs, therefore in our work we
concentrate on this last phenomenon, which allows us to give different
insights on the present difference between transit and peering.
The work carried out in this chapter brings contributions both from
a game theoretic perspective and an engineering perspective. First of all
this is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel model to analyze the strategic
choices of ASes living in an Internet environment with both technological
and economic constraints. The modelization takes into account many
realistic elements, which do not fall into standard frameworks, yet tries
to keep the problem mathematically manageable. From a game-theoretic
perspective, we prove that our game falls in a specific category for which
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we both demonstrate the existence of equilibria and provide an algorithm
for computing stable solutions. From an engineering perspective, the out-
come of the analysis is highly insightful as it shows both the suboptimality
of the decentralized solution and the emerging competition between the
two facilities enabling either transit or peering connectivity: Network
Service Providers and Internet Exchange Points.
In Section 4.2 we define the general model, in Section 4.3 we analyze a
simplified “minimal complexity” model, derive the existence of equilibria
and the algorithm to compute them, and in Section 4.4 we show ineffi-
ciencies of the decentralized solution. Section 4.5 extends convergence
results to the general model, then Section 4.6 shows simulative results for
both converging and non-converging cases.
4.2 General Scenario
In the following we describe the general scenario under investigation and
derive the cost function.
4.2.1 Description
Using once again our enriched dataset (Section 2.2.1.1 of Chapter 2), we
group ASes in their different categories. We concentrate on the following
main categories present within the core of the Internet, and assign a
specific role to each of them, so as to derive a game theoretic decision
model:
Internet Service Provider (ISP)1 this node gives to eyeballs (i.e. the end
users) and lower tiers, access to the Internet and its contents. Each service
provider has a traffic demand, hereafter demand, which represents the
amount of traffic (uplink+downlink) that it handles.
1ISPs, NSPs and CPs are typically ASes. IXPs are not ASes, even if their infrastructure is
under a single administrative control.
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Content Provider (CP)1 this node has physical access to the contents
users are looking after, therefore an ISP with a demand for his specific
content, has to connect to it in order to serve this demand.
Internet Exchange Point (IXP)1 this is the facility that provides peering
connection to all its participants. This means that all the nodes connected
to a given IXP can potentially communicate with each other.
Network Service Provider (NSP)1 this node is located at the highest
hierarchical level of the network, meaning that each CP can be reached
through it. ISPs can reach CPs by establishing a transit connection with
an NSP. In particular, here NSPs can be either Tier-1 ASes, or high-level
backbone service providers, whose main interest is to sell transit to lower
tiers.
We consider a network with i ∈ {1, ..., I} ISPs, n ∈ {1, ..., N} CPs and
l ∈ {1, ..., L} transmit facilities (TF), that can be either the NSPs or the
IXPs. Without loss of generality, we impose that TFs j1 ∈ {1, ..., l1} are
NSPs, while TFs j2 ∈ {l1 + 1, ..., L} are IXPs.
The main difference between transmit facilities is that while links
to NSPs are established through transit connections, links to IXPs are
established through peering connections.
In a transit connection, or customer-to-provider (C2P) connection, the
cost to the customer is a function of the amount of traffic that crosses the
link (typically expressed as $/Mbps).
In a peering connection, the price is generally flat and depends on the
size of the port the customer buys. Moreover, when peering connections
are maintained by an IXP, the costs are shared among all the participants.
Each ISP i has a demand for a CP n, which we indicate as φni . The
players of our game are the ISPs, which need to decide how to split their
demand among all possible transmit facilities. Figure 4.2.1 depicts our
network scenario.
We indicate with xni,l the flow from ISP i to CP n via TF l. The strategy
of ISP i is given by the vector xi = (x
1
i,1, ..., x
n
i,l, ..., x
N
i,L) ∈ RL×N , while
the strategy of all the other players is expressed as x−i ∈ R(I−1)×L×N . The
75
ISP1
NSP1
NSPl1
CP1
ISPI
ISPi
IXPL
IXPl
CPn
CPN
?ni
?1i
?Ni
c'n
tl(xi,l,xl)
xni,l
ci,l
bnl
t1(xi,1,x1)
Figure 4.2.1: General model
goal of each player is to serve, at the minimum possible cost, his demand
φi = (φ
1
i , ..., φ
N
i ) ∈ RN by splitting it into several flows xni,l. Please note
that we are not dealing with the issue of complete connectivity for the
ISPs (in which case, it is sufficient to deploy a single transit connection):
our aim is just to enable them to serve their specific demands.
We also indicate as:
• xi,l =
∑N
n=1 x
n
i,l the total flow from ISP i to TF l;
• xl =
∑I
i=1
∑N
n=1 x
n
i,l the total flow at TF l.
Each player, say i, for each transmit facility (NSP or IXP) it connects to,
incurs some costs:
TF usage cost this cost depends on the transmit facility used. If it is an
NSP, then it is a function of xi,l, the flow from the player to the NSP. Oth-
erwise the TF is an IXP and the cost is shared among all the participants,
therefore it also depends on the other players, in the form of xl, the total
flow at the IXP. Consequently, this cost can be written as a function:
tl(xi,l, xl) (4.2.1)
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TF capacity cost each link between an ISP and a TF has a fixed capacity
ci,l; this means that we have a constraint of the form xi,l ≤ ci,l. While
we may introduce it in the problem “as is”, this would make the model
less manageable. Moreover, due to performance and congestion issues,
network operators typically avoid reaching the capacity limit and keep a
margin for traffic fluctuations. We can think of this performance degra-
dation as a “virtual cost” for the ISP, and therefore model the constraint
as a cost, that increases as the flow over the link approaches the capacity
limit (as is typically done in the literature for M/G/1 Processor Sharing
queues [ORS93]):
1
ci,l − xi,l xi,l (4.2.2)
We are aware that, in reality, network operators adjust this capacity
when there is more demand for it, and the interconnection cost grows
accordingly. However, this situation can be avoided as long as our work-
ing region is sufficiently far away from the saturation point. We will
always assume that capacities are symmetric w.r.t. the players, therefore
ci,l = cl ∀i. Typically the capacity of the NSP can be assumed to be much
larger than that of IXPs: cNSP ≫ cIXP (see [Nor10b] and [Nor10c]).
CP reachability cost let’s indicate with bnl the cost of transporting one
unit of flow from TF l to CP n. This cost is not relevant from the player’s
perspective (it is paid by the CP), however it can be used to express the
reachability of a given CP. In fact, while all the CPs are connected to the
NSPs, an IXP can be connected only to a subset of CPs. This phenomenon
can be expressed by putting:
bnl =
{
0 if l ≤ l1 or IXPl → CPn
∞ otherwise (4.2.3)
Thanks to all these considerations, the cost function for player i can be
expressed as the sum of (4.2.1), (4.2.2) and (4.2.3):
Ci(xi,x−i) =
L∑
l=1
(
tl(xi,l, xl) +
1
cl − xi,l xi,l
)
+
L∑
l=1
N∑
n=1
xni,lb
n
l (4.2.4)
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In order to serve all the demands, each player i has to satisfy the flow
constraint: for every CP, the total flow has to be equal to the demand φni .
Therefore player i’s best response BRi(x−i) is obtained by minimizing
cost function (4.2.4), subject to the flow constraints (4.2.5):
{
BRi(x−i) = argminxi C
i(xi,x−i)
s.t.
∑
l x
n
i,l = φ
n
i ∀n
(4.2.5)
The vector x∗ = (x∗
1
, ...,x∗
I
) ∈ RI×L×N is an equilibrium of the game
if and only if x∗
i
∈ BRi(x∗−i) ∀i, that is, if the strategy of each player is a
best response to the strategies of other players.
Throughout the chapter we will always refer to the description of
Figure 4.2.1, however, mutatis mutandis, the results are still valid for
scenarios where players are CPs or a mix of CPs and ISPs, as long as the
demands are changed accordingly.
4.2.2 Transmit Facility Usage Cost
The TF usage cost is different between the NSPs and the IXPs. More
specifically the NSP usage cost is linear in the amount of flow that each
player sends to it [Nor10b]. Therefore we can write:
tl(xi,l, xl) = alxi,l l ≤ l1 (4.2.6)
where al, l ≤ l1 represents the transit price of NSP l per unit of
flow. We are aware that, due to economies of scale in the traffic delivery,
transit costs are subadditive in reality. However, introducing this aspect
would overcomplicate the model, hiding the truly interesting differences
between transit and peering. Nevertheless, we are able to show that some
of our results still hold for more generic transit cost functions (see below,
Theorem 5).
For the IXP usage [Nor11], each player has to pay a share of the total
cost of IXP maintenance. This share can be expressed as the ratio between
the flow sent by player i on IXP l and the total flow crossing that IXP:
xi,l
xl
.
Assume we can write the cost of maintenance of IXP l as a function hl of
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Figure 4.2.2: IXP port costs for MIX (log-log scale)
the total flow through the IXP, therefore the usage cost is:
tl(xi,l, xl) =
xi,l
xl
hl(xl) l > l1 (4.2.7)
The cost of maintaining the equipment of an IXP is, in general, a
non-linear function of several parameters. In order to keep the problem
manageable, we will approximate this cost with that of a single port which
handles xl, the entire flow over the IXP. The cost of a port is a step-wise
increasing function, as shown in Figure 4.2.2 for the MIX2, an Italian IXP.
This type of cost functions can be modeled (see [MDFL12]) by using a
function like xα with α ∈ [0.4; 0.7]. For simplicity, we take α = 0.5 as this
value provides a fairly accurate fit (shown in Figure 4.2.2). Therefore, we
express the maintenance cost as:
hl(xl) = al
√
xl (4.2.8)
where al, l > l1 is a constant relating the total flow through IXP l with
its maintenance cost. By putting together definitions (4.2.6), (4.2.7) and
2Milan IXP - public peering costs available online: http://www.mix-it.net
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(4.2.8), the cost function (4.2.4) can be rewritten as:
Ci(xi,x−i) =
l1∑
l=1
alxi,l +
L∑
l=l1+1
(
al√
xl
xi,l
)
+
+
L∑
l=1
(
1
cl − xi,l xi,l
)
+
L∑
l=1
N∑
n=1
xni,lb
n
l (4.2.9)
Now, we define these new functions:

f l
(∑
i
∑
n x
n
i,l
)
=
{
a1 l ≤ l1
al√∑
i
∑
n
xn
i,l
l > l1
gl
(∑
n x
n
i,l
)
= 1cl−
∑
n
xn
i,l
(4.2.10)
By using (4.2.10) and recalling that xi,l =
∑
n x
n
i,l and xl =
∑
i
∑
n x
n
i,l
, we can rewrite (4.2.9) as:
Ci(xi,x−i) =
∑
l
∑
n
xni,l
[
f l
(∑
i
∑
n
xni,l
)
+ gl
(∑
n
xni,l
)
+ bnl
]
(4.2.11)
Equation (4.2.11) is the most general expression of the cost function for
each player. Please note that (4.2.11) is in general a non-convex function of
xi,l, and therefore we cannot directly establish existence of pure equilibria.
In particular it does not comply with the general assumptions used for
link cost functions in the framework described in [ORS93]. Nevertheless,
we cannot avoid dealing with functions of this shape if we want to prop-
erly grasp the difference between transit and peering strategies offered,
respectively, by NSPs and IXPs.
4.3 Minimal Complexity Model (MCM)
In order to gain insights on the problem solution, in this section we
analyze a simpler model, which we call Minimal Complexity Model
(MCM), where I, L,N = 2. The MCM has two ISP players, two CPs
(therefore each player only has two demands, namely φ1i and φ
2
i ) and two
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Figure 4.3.1: Minimal complexity model
transmit facilities available, either the NSP (l = 1) or the IXP (l = 2), as
depicted in Figure 4.3.1. With some algebraic manipulations, explicitly
shown in Appendix 4.8.1, we can rewrite cost function (4.2.11) for player
1 of the MCM as:
C1(x1, x2, y1, y2) = (4.3.1)
=
(
φ11 + φ
2
1 − x1 − x2
)(
a1 +
1
c1 − (φ11 + φ21 − x1 − x2)
)
+
+ (x1 + x2)
(
a2√
x1 + x2 + y1 + y2
+
1
c2 − (x1 + x2)
)
+
+
(
φ11 − x1
)
b11 +
(
φ21 − x2
)
b21 + x1b
1
2 + x2b
2
2
where xn is the flow sent from player 1 to CP n through the IXP and
φn1 − xn is, by constraint, the flow sent through the NSP. The same applies
to yn for player 2.
Assume now that the topology is fully connected, meaning that bnl =
0 ∀l, n. In this case, from the player’s perspective, the cost does not
depend on the facility used for a specific CP, but rather on the total
amount of flow going through a specific TF, independently from the
destination. Once again, with some algebraic manipulations (shown in
Appendix 4.8.1) we rewrite cost function (4.3.1) for both players as:

C1(x, y) = (φ1 − x)
(
a1 +
1
c1−(φ1−x)
)
+ x
(
a2√
x+y
+ 1c2−x
)
C2(x, y) = (φ2 − y)
(
a1 +
1
c1−(φ2−y)
)
+ y
(
a2√
x+y
+ 1c2−y
) (4.3.2)
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where x is the cumulative flow of ISP1 through the IXP and φ1 is its
cumulative demand. The same applies to y and φ2 for ISP2. The best
response of player i is thus obtained by minimizing Ci(x, y) defined in
(4.3.2).
While simple, the MCM is interesting on its own as it provides a clear
way to study the fundamental difference between transit and peering
agreements, shedding light on the emerging competition between NSPs
and large IXPs, first observed in [ACF+12].
4.3.1 Theoretical Results
Definition 1. Supermodular games [Yao95]
Consider a generic game G, where user’s payoffs are given by an
utility function u : Rk → R. The game is said supermodular if the utility
function is supermodular, that is:
u(x ∨ y) + u(x ∧ y) ≥ u(x) + u(y) ∀x, y ∈ Rk
where x ∨ y denotes the componentwise maximum and x ∧ y the com-
ponentwise minimum of x and y. If u is twice continuously differentiable,
this property is given by the following condition:
∂2u
∂zi∂zj
≥ 0 ∀i 6= j
In our case we consider costs rather then utilities and minimization
instead of maximization, therefore a game like ours is supermodular iff:
∂2C(x)
∂xi∂xj
≤ 0 ∀i 6= j (4.3.3)
When the strategy space can be expressed using just two variables, as
in the MCM case, we can write:
∂2C(x, y)
∂x∂y
≤ 0 (4.3.4)
Theorem 1 of [AA03] proves the existence of equilibria for supermod-
ular games, moreover it provides a way of computing them. The proof
82
is based on showing that best response sequences are monotone and
therefore converge to a limit which is then shown to be a Nash Equilib-
rium Point (NEP). The monotonicity is a consequence of the “strategic
complementarity” of the players: if one of them chooses a strategy x that
decreases its own cost, this decision is beneficial for the cost of the other
players too.
Herewe relax the results on the existence of equilibria and convergence
of best response sequences in supermodular games.
Definition 2. Symmetric supermodularity
We define as symmetric supermodular games, those for which (4.3.4)
holds for all strategies x = y, meaning that the property holds along the
symmetric axis.
Definition 3. Symmetric best response sequence
We call symmetric best response sequence a path (x0, y0), (x1, y1), . . .,
where x0 = y0 and ∀i, (xi, yi) satisfies xi = yi.
Theorem 4. In symmetric supermodular games, pure equilibria exist and are
given as the limit of symmetric best response sequences.
Proof. Consider a sequence of best responses (x0, y0), (x1, y1), . . .. Due
to symmetry we can choose this path to be a symmetric best response
sequence. From definition 2 and by applying the same reasoning as in the
original proof [AA03], we shall get monotone sequences whose limits are
equilibria.
Theorem 4 not only proves the existence of equilibria for symmetric
supermodular games, but also gives an algorithm for computing them.
Please note that, for this theorem to hold, the game does not need to
satisfy (4.3.4) for all possible strategies, but just along the symmetric path.
This result can be applied to our game thanks to Theorem 5 and Corollary
6.
Theorem 5. The game defined in (4.3.2) is symmetric supermodular.
Proof. Consider the cost function of our game. We compute the mixed
second derivatives:

∂2C1(x,y)
∂x∂y = − a22(x+y) 32 +
3a2x
4(x+y)
5
2
∂2C2(x,y)
∂x∂y = − a22(x+y) 32 +
3a2y
4(x+y)
5
2
(4.3.5)
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Since we are interested only in their sign, we canmultiply both derivatives
in (4.3.5) by (x + y)
3
2 , which is always positive as long as the flows are
positive. Therefore we have:

sgn
(
∂2C1(x,y)
∂x∂y
)
= sgn
(
a2
4 · x−2yx+y
)
sgn
(
∂2C2(x,y)
∂x∂y
)
= sgn
(
a2
4 · y−2xx+y
) (4.3.6)
Consider now the symmetric axis, where x = y. With this equality
both mixed second derivatives in (4.3.6) become negative, therefore due
to condition (4.3.4) the game is symmetric supermodular.
It is interesting to note that, as long as the transit cost function tl of one
ISP does not depend on the other ISP, the mixed second derivative (4.3.5)
does not change. Therefore, symmetric supermodularity can be applied
to game (4.3.2) even for more general transit cost functions (as outlined
in Section 4.2.2). Please note that without the symmetric assumption, the
game is neither supermodular, nor submodular, because we cannot say
anything about the sign of the mixed derivatives.
Corollary 6. The game defined in (4.3.2) has at least one pure equilibrium for
symmetric demands, given as the limit of a symmetric best response sequence.
Proof. By hypothesis the demands satisfy φ1 = φ2. If we put this condition
in system (4.3.2), the two players become symmetric, therefore we get this
result combining Theorems 4 and 5.
4.3.2 Cost Function Analysis
In order to gain insights on the outcome of the best response sequence
algorithm, here we analyze the cost function. Consider the cost function
of player 1 and suppose that the strategy y of player 2 is fixed, so:
C1(x) = (φ− x)
(
a1 +
1
c1 − (φ− x)
)
+ x
(
a2√
x+ y
+
1
c2 − x
)
(4.3.7)
Lemma 7 and Theorem 8, whose proofs can be found in Appendix
4.8.2, tell us the shape of the cost function.
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Figure 4.3.2: Cost function
Lemma 7. The second derivative of the cost function (4.3.7) is a monotonically
increasing function.
Theorem 8. The cost function (4.3.7) can be either: always concave, always
convex, or first concave and then convex.
Figure 4.3.2 shows the possible cases. Please note that the shape
depends both on the parameters and the strategy y of the other player:
while for specific values of y the function might be convex as in Figure
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Algorithm 4.1 Best Response Sequence
1: startingpoint = ... ⊲ Initial strategies
2: tolerance = ... ⊲ NEP stationariety tolerance
3: newx = startingpoint
4: repeat
5: oldx = newx ⊲ current step game strategies
6: for i = 1; i < I; i++ do
7: x−i = oldx−i ⊲ other players strategy
8: xi = argminxi C
i(xi,x−i) ⊲ i strategy
9: s.t.
∑
l x
n
i,l = φ
n
i ∀n
10: newxi = xi ⊲ next step game strategies
11: end for
12: until ||newx− oldx|| < tolerance
4.3.2b, it can also be concave (Figure 4.3.2a) and in general is neither
convex nor concave, as shown in Figure 4.3.2c.
4.3.3 The Simulator
The analysis of the cost function, performed in Section 4.3.2, suggests
that in our game (4.3.2), even if the best response procedure converges
to a NEP, there might be multiple equilibria, because of the presence of
multiple local minima. This assumption can be verified via simulation,
where we show a specific case in which the NEP reached can change,
depending on the starting point of the algorithm.
We implemented in MATLAB [Mat] the general model (4.2.11) de-
scribed in Section 4.2. Iteratively, each player performs its best response
to the set of other players’ strategies as shown in algorithm 4.1. If the
simulation converges (this has not yet been proven for the general game
(4.2.11)), the output newx is the NEP for the given input parameters,
which are:
• The number of ISPs, TFs and CPs, respectively I , L, N .
• The cost function parameters al, cl, b
n
l and demands φ
n
i .
• The tolerance and the startingpoint.
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We can use the implemented algorithm on the MCM, which has fully
connected topology and symmetric demands, by putting I = 2, L = 2,
N = 2, bnl = 0 ∀l, n and φni = φn. Given the selected scenario and the best
response sequence algorithm, Theorem 6 ensures the convergence of the
simulation for whatever cost function coefficients. Moreover, thanks to
the symmetric property, we can just investigate the strategy of player 1
(x), because player 2 will show exactly the same behavior.
We simulate the following parameters: a1 = 4, a2 = 5, φ
1 + φ2 = 4,
c1 = 10, c2 = 5. In this case, as previously shown in Figure 4.3.2c, the
cost function could present multiple local minima, depending on the
players’ strategies. The simulation has multiple outcomes: if we start
from the mean point (x = 2, φ−x = 2) we end up in an equilibriumwhere
traffic is split between the IXP and the NSP: x∗ = 3.64; φ − x∗ = 0.36.
The IXP is preferred because the usage cost is shared among the two
players, however it is not used exclusively due to its smaller capacity not
being able to serve all the traffic. With a bigger capacity, all the traffic
would have been routed through the IXP. Otherwise, if we start from a
strategy where the majority of traffic is routed through the NSP (x = 0.4,
φ − x = 3.6), we end up in an equilibrium where all the traffic flows
through the NSP: x∗ = 0; φ−x∗ = 4. This happens because when the IXP
is routing a small amount of traffic, the flat port cost is too high to justify
its use, therefore the players prefer the NSP. Once the NSP is serving all
the traffic no player has an incentive to deviate, because he would pay the
whole IXP cost by himself.
As we see, the outcome of the game is highly dependent on the starting
point: the IXP is preferred only if it already has, at the beginning, a good
amount of flow passing through him, otherwise all players will stick to the
NSP. This result is consistent with reality, in fact, the necessary condition
for an IXP to emerge is that it has a critical mass (represented by a fraction
of the traffic/users in the Internet) which makes the value perceived by a
potential participant greater than the cost he would incur in by joining
the facility [Nor10c].
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4.3.4 The best response behavior
With the purpose of understanding the number and position of NEPs, we
draw the Best Response Intersection (BRI) picture. In this graph, shown
in Figure 4.3.3, the line with tick marks represents the best response x of
player 1 as a function of player 2’s strategy y, while the line with cross
marks does the exact opposite. The intersection points on the graph
mean that both players are playing their best responses, therefore they
are Nash Equilibrium Points. As we can see, there are three NEPs and,
as expected due to the symmetric property, they are all on the symmetric
axis [fCRVW04]:
Left Equilibrium is in x = x∗L = 0 and corresponds to the scenario
where all the traffic is routed through the NSP.
Right Equilibrium is for x = x∗M = 1.43 and is the one where traffic is
split between the IXP and the NSP.
Middle Equilibrium happens for x = x∗M = 0.31. This is however a
repulsive equilibrium, in fact, as soon as one of the two players deviate,
they will never return to this point and reach instead one of the two others
equilibria.
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These three equilibria can be understood by observing Figure 4.3.2c:
x∗L and x
∗
R are attractive, and correspond to the minima of the cost func-
tion, while x∗M corresponds to the maximum of the cost function, and is
thus repulsive. Of course, the last picture corresponds to the cost func-
tion for a specific strategy, therefore it cannot assert the position or the
existence of equilibria, however it gives an insight on their meaning.
As we change the game parameters we observe that the shape of the
best response is always the same, while the position of x∗M and x
∗
R changes.
In particular, as shown in Figure 4.3.4, If the ratio a2/a1 increases (meaning
that IXP cost w.r.t. NSP cost increases) then x∗M gets nearer to x
∗
R, making
the left equilibrium is easier to reach. Moreover, we observe that if the
capacity c2 of the IXP is large enough, than in the right equilibrium all the
traffic will flow through him.
4.4 Price of Anarchy, Stability and Fairness
4.4.1 Social Optimum
We now compare the performance of the distributed system, where each
Service Provider acts on its own, with that of an ideal centralized system
where decisions are took by some external entity. In this case the objective
is to minimize the total cost of the two players, given by the summation
89
of the two costs in (4.3.2):
C(x, y) =
∑
i
Ci(x, y) = (φ1 + φ2 − x− y) a1 + φ1 − x
c1 − (φ1 − x)+
+
φ2 − y
c1 − (φ2 − y) +
x+ y√
x+ y
a2 +
x
c2 − x +
y
c2 − y (4.4.1)
Theorem 9 and Corollary 10, whose proofs can be found in Appendix
4.8.2, explain how to optimize this cost function.
Theorem 9. The cost function (4.4.1) has a global minimum point. For sym-
metric demands this minimum point is attained at symmetric strategies, and it is
either the left endpoint of the strategy space or the unique local minimum point
of its convex part.
Corollary 10. The global minimum point of (4.4.1) is, for symmetric demands,
either the left endpoint of the strategy space or the output of a standard algorithm
for convex function optimization that starts from the right endpoint.
The globally optimal solution to problem (4.4.1) can thus be computed
by comparing the two candidate points highlighted in Corollary 10.
4.4.2 Alpha-Fair solution
Another metric for comparison comes from the theory of fairness. A
unifying mathematical formulation, known as α-fairness [LKCS], says
that given a set of users and utility functions Ui(x), the α-fair solution to
the problem of maximizing their utilities is given by:
max
x
(∑
i
U i(x)(1−α) − 1
1− α
)
For α = 0, this is the same as maximizing the sum of the utilities, thus
it gives the social optimum for the problem. The case α → 1 yields the
proportional fair share assignment, however this solution is not feasible
when we have to deal with cost function rather then utilities, and for
α → ∞ it is equivalent to the max-min fairness. For α = 2, the formula
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gives us the “harmonic mean fair” solution, which we investigate here:
max
x
(∑
i
U i(x)(1−α) − 1
1− α
)
= min
x
(∑
i
−1− 1
Ci(x)
)
The solution is computed numerically in the next subsection.
4.4.3 PoA/PoS/PoF Comparison
As is usually done in the literature [JHA12; LKCS], we define the Price
of Anarchy (PoA) as the ratio between the worst decentralized solution
(equilibrium) and the social optimum. Similarly, the Price of Stability
(PoS) is defined as the ratio between the best equilibrium and the social
optimum:
PoA =
C (x∗worst)
C (xopt)
≥ 1 PoS = C (x
∗
best)
C (xopt)
≥ 1
In our case we have just two attractive equilibria, therefore the best
and worst equilibria are either x∗L or x
∗
R. Following the same path, we
define the price of fairness as the ratio between the fair and the optimal
solution:
PoF =
C (xfair)
C (xopt)
≥ 1
Algorithm 4.1 has been extended to include numerical computation
of the above-defined Prices of Anarchy, Stability and Fairness. We use as
general configuration: a1 = 3, a2 = 4, φ = 2, c1 = 10, c2 = 3 (except for
Figure 4.4.1c, where c2 increases as φ increases), and show PoA, PoS and
PoF as parameters a1, a2 and φ change. Results are reported in Figure
4.4.1. As we see, it is always the case that PoF = 1, meaning that the
harmonic mean fair solution is equal to the social optimum.
The PoA almost always corresponds to the left equilibrium. An excep-
tion to this is the case where there is a small amount of total traffic, shown
in Figure 4.4.1c for φ = 1: in this case the left equilibrium outperforms the
right one, meaning that for small amounts of flow it is not convenient to
share costs at the IXP. As φ increases, the advantages of sharing become
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Figure 4.4.1: Price of anarchy, stability and fairness
obvious. Figures 4.4.1a and 4.4.1b show that the PoA increases as a1
increases and decreases as a2 increases. An exception to this is the case
a2 = 1 of Figure 4.4.1b: with these parameters the cost function resembles
that of Figure 4.3.2b, therefore we have only one equilibrium. The PoS
is almost always very low, and it is always caused by the fact that the
competition between ISPs reduces the amount of traffic through the IXP,
thus reducing their opportunities to share costs.
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4.5 Generalizations
While the results obtained by the MCM are interesting on their own, as
they shed light on the competition between an Internet Exchange Point
and a Network Service Provider, driven by the clear differences between
transit and peering, one might argue that this topology is quite small and
simplified to represent the Internet. Here we explicitly tackle this problem
by both extending the convergence results to more general scenarios,
and using simulation to cover other cases for which we couldn’t obtain
analytic results, thus analyzing a broad variety of general cases.
4.5.1 Extended Analytical Results
We consider a system with I ISPs, N CPs, and L TFs, with l1 = 1, in a
possibly disconnected topology. While having multiple IXPs is funda-
mental for understanding how players aggregate around exchange points,
especially in presence of reachability constraints (IXPs may be connected
to only a subset of CPs), this is not the case for NSPs, due to the fact that
their cost is independent from other players’ choice, and they are neces-
sarily connected to all possible CPs. Therefore, without loss of generality
for our problem, it is safe to consider only a single NSP for l = 1, and
L− 1, for l = 2..L, IXPs as we do here. In the following we will always
refer to this system, which is a single NSP version of Figure 4.2.1.
The cost function of Section 4.2 can thus be rewritten separating the
NSP component from the IXPs, therefore:
Ci(xi,x−i) =
∑
n
xni,1
(
a1 +
1
c1 −
∑
n x
n
i,1
)
+ (4.5.1)
+
∑
l 6=1
∑
n
xni,l

 al√∑
i
∑
n x
n
i,l
+
1
cl −
∑
n x
n
i,l
+ bnl


where the CP reachability cost for the NSP has been removed since we
know from (4.2.3) that bn1 = 0 ∀n.
Theorem 11 and Corollary 12, whose complete proofs can be found in
Appendix 4.8.2, demonstrate existence of equilibria and convergence of
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the symmetric best response algorithm for the general case just formal-
ized.
Theorem 11. The game defined in (4.5.1) is symmetric supermodular.
Sketch of the Proof. The proof is based on showing that (4.3.3) holds along
the symmetric axis for any possible combination of indexes:
∂2Ci(xi,x−i)
∂xn¯
j,l¯
∂xni,l
∣∣∣∣∣
xn
i,l
=xn
j,l
≤ 0 ∀i 6= j, ∀l, l¯, n, n¯ (4.5.2)
Corollary 12. The game defined in (4.5.1) has at least one pure equilibrium for
symmetric demands, given as the limit of a symmetric best response sequence.
4.5.2 Subcases Analysis
After proving existence of equilibria for the general case, here we analyze
some subcases in order to understand what kind of equilibria we should
expect for specific scenarios. We have two main categories:
Fully Connected Topologies Suppose that we have a fully connected
topology, meaning that bnl = 0 ∀l, n. In such a case, we can take the
summation over n and consider cumulative flows and demands:
{
xi,l =
∑
n x
n
i,l cum. flow ISPi → TFl
φi =
∑
n φ
n
i cum. demand ISPi
We can now substitute these two variables inside cost function (4.2.11),
thus obtaining an equivalent problem where the strategy of each player
is a vector xi = (xi,1, ..., xi,l, ..., xi,L) ∈ RL. This means that, in fully
connected topologies, our system is equivalent to another one where we
only have a single CP, and each player has to serve a cumulative demand
φi for that CP. This happens because there are no reachability constraints,
therefore from a player’s perspective the specific CP from which he has
to fetch data is not relevant.
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Figure 4.5.1: BRI for 3 players: a1 = 2, a2 = 2, φ = 2, c1 = 10, c2 = 3
Symmetric IXPs Suppose that all the IXPs have the same costs, capaci-
ties and reachability matrix: al = aIXP , cl = cIXP , b
n
l = b
n
IXP ∀l 6= 1. Due
to their symmetry, there is an equilibrium where traffic is split equally
among them [fCRVW04], therefore we might think of transforming this
problem in an equivalent one having a single IXP with the same reachabil-
ity matrix and transformed costs and capacities. Unfortunately, we were
unable to perform this conversion due to the form of the cost function for
the IXPs. In fact, as we see from (4.2.11) and (4.2.10), the non linear port
cost hl makes it quite different for players to share small traffic quantities
rather then large ones.
The analysis of the two categories highlights that scenarios with mul-
tiple CPs can be highly simplified with fully connected topologies, while
in the case of multiple IXPs, even if symmetric, the analysis can be quite
difficult. To conclude this section, we analyze in more detail the simplified
case where we have fully connected topology and just one IXP. Due to the
fact that we can handle the multiple CPs as if there was just a single one,
this scenario is quite similar to the MCM, except that we have a generic
number I of players. However, thanks to Corollary 12, we now know that
for symmetric demands φi = φ ∀i we can compute equilibria as the limit
of symmetric best response sequences. Just like it was done for the MCM,
we can use algorithm 4.1 to compute the equilibria.
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With the purpose of analyzing number and position of equilibria, for
the case of I = 3 (it would be difficult to represent more dimensions), we
can draw the Best Response Intersection (BRI) graph, shown in Figure
4.5.1. Just like in the MCM, the picture shows three equilibrium points,
obtained by the intersection of the three surfaces representing the players’
best responses. As we see from the straight line crossing all such points,
the three equilibria are symmetric, with the leftmost (traffic split between
NSP and IXP) and the rightmost (all flows through the NSP) being the
stable ones.
4.6 Simulations
In this section, we use our MATLAB implementation to test the behav-
ior of the system. As a matter of fact, thanks to Theorem 11, we have
proven convergence for symmetric scenarios, showing that symmetric
supermodularity holds for the general scenario of Section 4.2. We do
not have convergence guarantees for asymmetric topologies. However,
we know that if the best response sequence algorithm converges, then it
converges to an equilibrium [AA03]. Therefore we can use our simulator
both to study our system in general cases, and to assess convergence for
specific cases.
Simulations have been performed using the symmetric best response
algorithm 4.1: iteratively, each player performs its best response to the set
of other players’ strategies. If the simulation converges, the output is the
equilibrium for the given input parameters, which are:
• the number of ISPs, TFs and CPs, respectively I , L, N ;
• the cost function parameters al, cl, b
n
l and demands φ
n
i .
Moreover, it is important to set a startingpoint, because, as we saw, on
startup IXPs need a critical mass, represented by a share of the total traffic
in the system, in order to be able to attract players.
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Figure 4.6.1: Traffic ratios and equilibrium breakpoint as I grows
4.6.1 Growing Number of ISPs/IXPs
We start with showing the behavior of system for symmetric cases, for
which convergence has been proven, and checking what happens as the
number of agents in the system grows. The base configuration used is
I = 2, L = 2,N = 2, bnl = 0 ∀l, n and φni = φn = 2, and all tests have been
performed with fully connected topology and symmetric demands. The
cost coefficients used are: a1 = 1, a2 = 1.5, c1 = 10, c2 = 6. As long as
flows and capacities are properly balanced, the existence of multiple CPs
does not seem to affect the results of the simulations, therefore here we
check what happens when we have either more ISPs or IXPs.
Generic Number of ISPs When the number I of players increase, the
benefits of joining an IXP increases as well, due to the fact that costs are
shared among multiple participants: in fact, as shown in Figure 4.6.1 on
the y1 axis, the fraction of traffic flowing through the IXP at the equilib-
rium increases with I . We recall from Section 4.3.3 that IXPs need a critical
mass to be used, which in our case corresponds to a fraction of the total
traffic in the system. Very interestingly, the y2 axis of Figure 4.6.1 shows
that this fraction decreases as the number of player grows.
Generic Number of IXPs In order to have an interesting case study as L
grows, we test a scenario where the global IXP capacity does not change,
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Figure 4.6.2: Traffic ratio as L grows
therefore cl = c2/(L− 1) ∀l 6= 1. This means that instead of having one
“large” IXP with a high capacity, we have multiple IXPs with less capacity.
In order to have meaningful capacities for the small IXPs, we increased
global flows and capacities to: c1 = 50, c2 = 25, φ
n
i = φ
n = 10. As shown
in Figure 4.6.2 the fact that IXPs only offer small ports is detrimental for
the players, and after a certain point they will all stick to the NSP.
Simulations show that while the IXP critical mass decreases with a
larger player base, this effect is counterbalanced by the fact that the critical
mass increases with the number of IXPs. Therefore, the results found in the
two player case still hold in more realistic scenarios: IXPs need a critical
mass to emerge even in scenarios with more ISPs and IXPs, otherwise we
still end up in an equilibrium with dominant NSP connectivity.
4.6.2 Flow Path Analysis
In this section we show results of simulations regarding the path followed
by traffic flows. The simulations were performed both for symmetric
scenarios, for which convergence has been proven in the general case,
and asymmetric scenarios, for which we have no proofs. In fact, as we’ll
see later on, in this last case it is possible for players to never reach an
equilibrium.
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4.6.2.1 Symmetric Case
We simulate a scenario with I = 10 ISPs, L = 4 TFs (L−1 symmetric IXPs)
and N = 4 CPs. The connectivity matrix is:
bnl =
{
∞ (l, n) = (2, 2) ∨ (l, n) = (4, 1) ∨ (l, n) = (4, 4)
0 otherwise
The cost parameter al has been chosen in order to be similar to present
reality [Nor10b], therefore we choose a1 = aNSP = 3 and ∀l 6= 1,
al = aIXP = 30 as seen in the fit performed for the MIX (Figure 4.2.2).
All users have symmetric flows φni = 12.5 ∀i, n and their capacities to
the facilities are c1 = cNSP = 100 and ∀l 6= 1, cl = cIXP = 20, so that
cNSP ≫ cIXP .
As already happened in the MCM, depending on the startingpoint
we notice the existence ofmultiple equilibria. In fact, if the initial condition
is such that one or more IXPs are underutilized, than at equilibrium those
IXPs will not be used. This phenomenon corroborates the outcomes of
the MCM, showing that indeed even in general scenarios the competition
between NSPs and IXPs, and even between IXP themselves, strongly
emerges. Differently from the MCM, in this case we observe more than
two stable equilibria, since any combination with one or many unused
IXPs can be an equilibrium.
Suppose now that the startingpoint is such that flows are split
equally among the facilities, so that all IXPs have the critical mass to
attract players. Figure 4.6.3 shows the scatterplot at equilibrium. In this
plot, each dot represents the flow quantity that each user sends on a given
path (that is, to a fixed CP through a given IXP). Due to symmetry, we
observe that all users will behave symmetrically on the same path, and
this is exactly what happens in Figure 4.6.3. There is generally a low
utilization of the NSP, which rises a little bit for those CPs with a worse
reachability matrix (CP1, CP4).
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Figure 4.6.3: Symmetric case flows scatterplot: φni = 12.5
4.6.2.2 Asymmetric Case
We now show the impact of asymmetric players’ demands. In this case,
convergence of the best response sequence is not guaranteed by Corollary
12, however, we know that if the simulation converges we certainly reach
an equilibrium.
We simulate a scenario with exactly the same parameters as in the
symmetric case, except that now the demands grow linearly from φn1 =
10 ∀n to φnI = 15 ∀n. The average demand is still 12.5, but now the
demand of the last player is 1.5 times that of the first one. The scatterplot
at equilibrium is shown in Figure 4.6.4.Very interestingly, even if demands
are asymmetric, paths of flow tend to be almost symmetric for the IXPs,
while they spread apart for the NSP. This happens because the benefits
of sharing costs at the exchange points is bigger when the traffic ratio is
approximately the same between participants, therefore players tend to
“symmetrize” around the IXPs. Due to the fact that flows around the IXPs
are more or less symmetric, players will send the traffic residual through
the NSP, which will see highly asymmetric patterns.
In previous case, the asymmetry in players’ demands was not very
pronounced. Let’s now see what happens when the demands go from
φn1 = 6.5 ∀n to φnI = 18.5 ∀n, meaning that last player demand is nearly
three times that of player one. Again, Figure 4.6.5 shows the scatterplot
at equilibrium. Due to the heavily unbalanced demands, the symmetric
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Figure 4.6.4: Asymmetric case flows scatterplot: φni = 10 → 15
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Figure 4.6.5: Asymmetric case flows scatterplot: φni = 6.5 → 18.5
patterns around the IXPs are still present, but much less pronounced.
While in the previous case equilibrium was driven by the simple rule
of “symmetric behavior”, in this case the outcome is more difficult to
predict. In general, due to the asymmetry, cost benefits of players’ for
using exchange points decrease, therefore we observe, on average, a
higher quantity of flow going through the NSP.
The phenomena emerged through this analysis can provide some
preliminary insight on how to devise optimal policies to handle peering
traffic at IXPs. More specifically, the “symmetric behavior” rule highlights
that it is beneficial to balance traffic as much as possible, therefore IXP
owners should create few classes of traffic (namely, few different port
101
sizes), and participants should try to aggregate traffic on these ports, since
unbalanced flows must be handled at NSPs and bring to suboptimality.
While simulations have been carried out with a limited network size due
to computational constraints, the conclusions are fairly general, therefore
we expect similar results to hold for larger-scale scenarios.
4.6.3 Non Convergence
Even quite simple scenarios for which we cannot apply Theorem 11, might
lead to a situation where players’ behavior oscillates, never reaching an
equilibrium. Consider a system with two symmetric IXPs and an asym-
metric starting point s.t. a group of players send more traffic to one of the
IXPs and less to the other, while the other group of players do the opposite.
Due to the asymmetric assumption we cannot apply Corollary 12, and
simulation shows that this scenario might never reach an equilibrium.
This happens when players enter a never-ending oscillation between the
first and the second group, as detailedly shown in the following example.
Example 13. Non-Convergence.
Consider a system with fully connected topology, I = 16 ISPs, L = 3
TFs (one NSP and two symmetric IXPs) andN = 1 CP. Once again we use
cost parameters aNSP = 3 and aIXP = 30. Capacities are cNSP = 200 and
cIXP = 70 and we even take symmetric demands φ
n
i = 50 ∀i, n. Accord-
ing to Corollary 12, equilibrium can be reached following a sequence of
symmetric best responses. Instead, we set an asymmetric starting point:


xi,l = 24.9 if (l = 1 ∧ i ≤ 8) ∨ (l = 2 ∧ i > 8)
xi,l = 25.1 if (l = 2 ∧ i ≤ 8) ∨ (l = 1 ∧ i > 8)
xi,l = 0 otherwise
Simulation shows that players never reach an equilibrium, and go
through a never-ending oscillation between two points:


x−i,l = 0 x
+
i,l = 50 if (l = 1 ∧ i ≤ 8) ∨ (l = 2 ∧ i > 8)
x−i,l = 50 x
+
i,l = 0 if (l = 2 ∧ i ≤ 8) ∨ (l = 1 ∧ i > 8)
x−i,l = x
+
i,l = 0 otherwise
102
This happens because, on each iteration, each player of the first group
sees the second group of players on a different IXP, and finds it beneficial
to deviate on that TF. The same happens for the players of the second
group, which in turn deviate altogether to the IXP of the first group. After
the deviation, situation is reversed, therefore the two groups keep devi-
ating all the time, never reaching an equilibrium. Please note that using
a symmetric starting point would immediately lead to an equilibrium
where xi,l = 25 if l is an IXP, and zero otherwise.
4.7 Conclusions
The proposed model gives insight into the economy of different types of
Autonomous Systems and the driving forces behind the decisions they
make when joining the Internet. The peculiar pricing strategies of players
doesn’t allow standard modelization, however, by exploiting peculiar
properties of the game, we are able to prove analytically the existence of
multiple equilibria, and provide an algorithm to compute the stable ones.
From a game theoretic perspective, while the theory on supermodularity is
well-developed, we relaxed this concept and introduced the new category
of Symmetric Supermodular games. Thanks to this we were able to prove
existence of equilibria and convergence of best response sequences in
our game. This is the first case, to the best of our knowledge, where
results on supermodularity are applied even if the property does not hold
for the game in general, by showing that it holds along the symmetric
path. From an engineering perspective, the outcome of the analysis is
highly insightful as it shows different interesting aspects. First of all,
we observe the suboptimality of the decentralized solution, originated
by the non-cooperative behavior of the ASes, by showing the existence
of a Price of Anarchy and Stability. Second, we have shown that also
for asymmetric cases the system often reaches an equilibrium. Such
equilibrium suggests that players tend to “symmetrize” their traffic as
much as possible with respect to the peering exchange points, and send
their asymmetric traffic quota via the transit service providers. This
observation can provide insights on how to devise optimal policies to
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handle peering traffic at IXPs. Last, but probably most important, we
highlight the growing competition between IXPs, providing customers
the ability to lay out peering connections, and NSPs, high-level providers
selling transit connections, even for large-scale scenarios.
The developed model is a simple yet effective way of analyzing how
Autonomous Systems manage their traffic, and what are the possible
ways to optimize their costs for handling such traffic. Therefore, it is
reasonable to think of simulating the model using as input realistic traffic
demands expected in the Internet environment. Unfortunately, traffic
data between ASes over the Internet is undisclosed, and the few studies
related to this subject rely on private data [ACF+12]. Nevertheless, we
are currently trying to evaluate traffic patterns using available DNS data,
so as to indirectly assess the fraction of traffic flowing between different
ASes.
The growing importance of IXPs is a key aspect in the flattening, com-
munity structure of the Internet. The novel aspect introduced by IXPs, is
that its customers, even when acting in a myopic and selfish manner, can
find benefits in being together on IXPs. These benefits increase for, but
are not limited to, customers with symmetric traffic levels, and hence of
similar importance in the hierarchy. Therefore, an IXP acts as an attractor,
and its participants typically become very well connected between them-
selves to exploit all the benefits of this facility. This interaction paradigm
will be deepened in the next chapter, where we show how IXP partic-
ipants become well “correlated” between themselves, and exploit this
phenomenon as the ground truth for the core network model.
4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 MCM Cost Function Derivation
Consider the model in Figure 4.3.1. Given that we have I, L,N = 2, where
l = 1 is the NSP and l = 2 is the NSP, we can explicitly rewrite the general
cost function (4.2.11) for the two players as in (4.8.1).
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

C1(xi,x−i) =
(
x11,1 + x
2
1,1
) (
a1 +
1
c1−(x11,1+x21,1)
)
+
(
x11,2 + x
2
1,2
) ·
·
(
a2√
x11,2+x
2
1,2+x
1
2,2+x
2
2,2
+ 1
c2−(x11,2+x21,2)
)
+
+x11,1b
1
1 + x
2
1,1b
2
1 + x
1
1,2b
1
2 + x
2
1,2b
2
2
C2(xi,x−i) =
(
x12,1 + x
2
2,1
) (
a1 +
1
c1−(x12,1+x22,1)
)
+
(
x12,2 + x
2
2,2
) ·
·
(
a2√
x11,2+x
2
1,2+x
1
2,2+x
2
2,2
+ 1
c2−(x12,2+x22,2)
)
+
+x12,1b
1
1 + x
2
2,1b
2
1 + x
1
2,2b
1
2 + x
2
2,2b
2
2
(4.8.1)
Constraints shown in (4.2.5) can also be rewritten as:
{
x11,1 + x
1
1,2 = φ
1
1
x21,1 + x
2
1,2 = φ
2
1
{
x12,1 + x
1
2,2 = φ
1
2
x22,1 + x
2
2,2 = φ
2
2
(4.8.2)
For the sake of readability, we apply the following variable renaming
to our problem:
{
x1 = x
1
1,2
x2 = x
2
1,2
{
y1 = x
1
2,2
y2 = x
2
2,2
(4.8.3)
Meaning that xn is the amount of traffic sent from player 1 to CP n
through the IXP, while yn is the analogous for player 2. Due to constraints
(4.8.2) we have that:
{
x11,1 = φ
1
1 − x1
x21,1 = φ
2
1 − x2
{
x12,1 = φ
1
2 − y1
x22,1 = φ
2
2 − y2
(4.8.4)
By substituting the variables defined in (4.8.3) and the ones obtained
in (4.8.4), we get system (4.8.5), which gives the cost functions of the two
players for the MCMmodel.
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

C1(x1, x2, y1, y2) =
(
φ11 + φ
2
1 − x1 − x2
)(
a1 +
1
c1−(φ11+φ21−x1−x2)
)
+
+(x1 + x2)
(
a2√
x1+x2+y1+y2
+ 1c2−(x1+x2)
)
+
+
(
φ11 − x1
)
b11 +
(
φ21 − x2
)
b21 + x1b
1
2 + x2b
2
2
C2(x1, x2, y1, y2) =
(
φ12 + φ
2
2 − y1 − y2
)(
a1 +
1
c1−(φ12+φ22−y1−y2)
)
+
+(y1 + y2)
(
a2√
x1+x2+y1+y2
+ 1c2−(y1+y2)
)
+
+
(
φ12 − y1
)
b11 +
(
φ22 − y2
)
b21 + y1b
1
2 + y2b
2
2
(4.8.5)
We further know that the topology is fully connected, meaning that
bnl = 0 ∀l, n. In this case, from the player’s perspective, the cost does not
depend on the facility used for a specific CP, but rather on the total amount
of flow going through a specific TF, independently from the destination
content provider. Therefore we can consider these cumulative flows and
cumulative demands as new variables of our problem:{
x = x1 + x2 flow ISP1 →IXP
y = y1 + y2 flow ISP2 →IXP
(4.8.6)
and {
φ1 = φ
1
1 + φ
2
1 cum. demand ISP1
φ2 = φ
1
2 + φ
2
2 cum. demand ISP2
(4.8.7)
By plugging (4.8.6) and (4.8.7) in system (4.8.5), we obtain the final
form of the cost functions for the two players, shown in (4.3.2).
4.8.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 7. The second derivative of function (4.3.7) w.r.t. x is:
∂2C1(x)
∂x2
=
2c1
(c1 − (φ− x))3
+
2c2
(c2 − x)3
+
3a2x
4 (x+ y)
5
2
− a2
(x+ y)
3
2
(4.8.8)
We have that c1 ≫ c2, φ, therefore the first term is negligible when trying
to check the sign of this derivative. Given that x, y > 0, c2 > x and x ≤ φ,
106
the second term is an always positive increasing function. For a fixed
value of y, the summation of the third and forth term is an always nega-
tive increasing function. Therefore (4.8.8) is a monotonically increasing
function, as it is the summation of two increasing functions.
Proof of Theorem 8. According to Lemma 7 the second derivative of (4.3.7)
is monotonically increasing. Therefore we can only have three cases:


∂2C1(x)
∂x2 < 0 ∀x ⇒ C1 always concave
∂2C1(x)
∂x2 > 0 ∀x ⇒ C1 always convex
∃!x¯ s.t. ∂2C1(x)∂x2
∣∣∣
x=x¯
= 0 ⇒ C1 concave in [0;x¯]
and convex in [x¯;c2]
Proof of Theorem 9. The strategy space is x ∈ [0,min(c2, φ1)[ and y ∈
[0,min(c2, φ1)[. Within this set, C is continuous, therefore, by Weierstrass’
theorem, it has a global minimum, which might be either a stationary
point or one of the interval endpoints. In order to find all the stationary
points, we study the function gradient:
{
∂C(x,y)
∂x = −a1 − c1(c1−(φ1−x))2 +
a2
2
√
x+y
+ c2
(c2−x)2
∂C(x,y)
∂y = −a1 − c1(c1−(φ2−y))2 +
a2
2
√
x+y
+ c2
(c2−y)2
(4.8.9)
By hypothesis we have symmetric demands: φ1 = φ2 = φ. If we sum the
two equations in (4.8.9) we have that:
− c1
(c1 − (φ− x))2
+
c2
(c2 − x)2
= − c1
(c1 − (φ− y))2
+
c2
(c2 − y)2
which clearly is true only for symmetric strategies, therefore we must
have x = y.
The capacity of the NSP is typically c1 ≫ φ, x therefore we can simplify
c1
(c1−(φ−x))2 ≈
1
c1
. In order to find the stationary points we need to find
the roots of equation:
− a1 − 1
c1
+
a2
2
√
2x
+
c2
(c2 − x)2
(4.8.10)
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Unfortunately, this is a fifth-degree polynomial, therefore we don’t have
an explicit solution. Consider now the derivative of equation (4.8.10):
− a2
√
2
8x
√
x
+
2c2
(c2 − x)3 (4.8.11)
This is a monotonically increasing function (as it is the sum of two in-
creasing functions), that goes to −∞ for x → 0 and to +∞ for x → c2,
therefore it has one root. As a consequence, we know that eq. (4.8.10),
representing the first derivative of C, is convex and has limits +∞ for
x→ 0, c2. Therefore, it has a unique minimum point corresponding to the
root of equation (4.8.11).
Given the form of its first derivative (4.8.10), the cost function (4.4.1)
is concave in its first part (where the derivative decreases) and convex in
the second part (where the derivative increases). The points of minimum
of the concave part are its two endpoints, while the convex part has a
unique minimum point. The right endpoint of the concave part is inside
the convex part (C is continuous), therefore the convex minimum is an
improvement over it. Henceforth, the global minimum point is either the
minimum point of the convex part, or the left endpoint of the concave
part, which is also the left endpoint for C(x, y).
Proof of Corollary 10. Given such an algorithm, we execute it on the func-
tion giving as initial point the right endpoint of the strategy set, where
we know that the function is convex. The output of the algorithm is the
local minimum of the convex part, therefore according to theorem 10 the
global minimum point is either this point or the left endpoint.
Proof of Theorem 11. First of all, we can use constraint (4.2.5) to reduce the
number of variables of our system. In fact if we perform the summation
over n on left and right member, and separate the NSP component from
the IXPs, we obtain:
∑
n
xni,1 +
∑
l 6=1
∑
n
xni,l =
∑
n
φni (4.8.12)
Now we substitute
∑
n x
n
i,1 taken from (4.8.12) inside (4.5.1) and rear-
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range terms, so as to obtain:
Ci(xi,x−i) =
∑
l 6=1
∑
n
xni,l

 al√∑
i
∑
n x
n
i,l
+
1
cl −
∑
n x
n
i,l

+
+

∑
n
φni −
∑
l 6=1
∑
n
xni,l



a1 + 1
c1 −
(∑
n φ
n
i −
∑
l 6=1
∑
n x
n
i,l
)

+
+
∑
l 6=1
∑
n
xni,lb
n
l (4.8.13)
where all the flow variables have l 6= 1. Now we need to compute
the mixed second derivatives of equation (4.8.13). We observe that the
second term, referring to the NSP, has no mixed components, due to the
fact that the cost does not depend on other players’ choice, therefore this
term becomes zero in the computation. The same happens with the last
term, therefore we have:
∂2Ci(xi,x−i)
∂xn¯
j,l¯
∂xni,l
=
∂
∂xn¯
j,l¯



 al√∑
i
∑
n x
n
i,l
+
1
cl −
∑
n x
n
i,l

+
+
∑
n
xni,l

− al
2
(∑
i
∑
n x
n
i,l
)3/2 + 1(
cl −
∑
n x
n
i,l
)2




∀i 6= j, ∀l, l¯, n, n¯ (4.8.14)
Following the same reasoning previously done, we observe that the
second and forth term in (4.8.14) do not depend on xn¯
j,l¯
, therefore their
contribution in the final derivative is zero. Moreover, we observe that first
and third term only have flow variables with index l, therefore for any
l¯ 6= l the whole derivative becomes zero:
∂2Ci(xi,x−i)
∂xn¯
j,l¯
∂xni,l
= 0 ∀i 6= j, ∀l 6= l¯, ∀n, n¯ (4.8.15)
while in the other case we have:
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∂2Ci(xi,x−i)
∂xn¯j,l∂x
n
i,l
= − al
2
(∑
i
∑
n x
n
i,l
)3/2 + 3al
∑
n x
n
i,l(∑
i
∑
n x
n
i,l
)5/2
∀i 6= j, ∀l, n, n¯ (4.8.16)
Please note that, regardless of the chosen n, n¯, the derivatives are all
the same. In order to prove symmetric supermodularity, we have to show
that property (4.3.3) holds for both (4.8.15) and (4.8.16). While in the first
case this is trivial, for the second one we multiply (4.8.16) by the positive
quantity
(∑
i
∑
n x
n
i,l
)3/2
, thus obtaining that:
sgn
(
∂2Ci(xi,x−i)
∂xn¯j,l∂x
n
i,l
)
= sgn
(
al
4
·
∑
n x
n
i,l − 2
∑
j 6=i
∑
n x
n
j,l∑
i
∑
n x
n
i,l
)
(4.8.17)
Along the symmetric axis we have that xni,l = x
n
j,l ∀i 6= j, ∀l, n,
meaning that each couple (i, j) of players send, to a fixed CP n through
a given IXP l, the same quantity of flow. With this condition, equation
(4.8.17) is always negative, therefore (4.5.1) is symmetric supermodular.
Proof of Corollary 12. By hypothesis the demands satisfy φni = φ
n
j ∀i 6=
j, ∀n. Therefore ISPs keep playing along the symmetric axis [fCRVW04],
and we obtain this result by combining Theorems 4 and 11.
110
Part III
A Novel Model for the
Internet Topology
111

Chapter 5
The evolving Internet’s
Core: an IXP-centric
network model
In this chapter, we propose an IXP-centric network model aimed at accu-
rately reproducing the evolving core of the Internet at the Autonomous
System (AS) level. The proposed model, called X-CENTRIC (iXp-Centric
Evolving NeTwoRk model for the Internet’s Core), exploits the results
from previous chapters, that tackled two of the most important problems
faced when modeling the Internet. Therefore, X-CENTRIC focuses on
the Internet’s core, as it is the most interesting and structured part of
the network, and uses an innovative dynamic which reflects the driving
forces behind the evolution of the Internet, with the emerging flattening
of its structure through the massive diffusion of IXPs.
Indeed, the game-theoretic model shown in the previous chapter high-
lights the role of IXPs as “concentrators”, since the benefits of joining
these facilities specifically emerge when there are many well connected
participants. The natural evolution of this mechanism is the formation
and growth of dense peering meshes around the IXPs. This consideration
serves as the basis for the deployment of the dynamic rules of X-CENTRIC,
as detailedly explained in Section 5.2. These dynamic rules are embedded
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in X-CENTRIC through a small set of physically meaningful parameters,
thanks to which the model has the potential to forecast the evolution
of the core network. Results show that X-CENTRIC is able to both cap-
ture the statistical characteristics of the Internet’s core and its community
structure, measured in the form of maximal cliques [AGL14b].
At the end of the chapter, we highlight the crucial importance of the
third key problem stressed in the thesis introduction. Indeed, the predic-
tion properties are based on data from real measurements, therefore it is
important to remove the biases introduced by data incompleteness, in or-
der to accurately predict the future evolution of the Internet topology. We
conclude that the model is versatile and capable of accurately predicting
the evolution of the Internet’s core as long as we are able to foresee the
growth of the modeling parameters, which can be done under a stable
measuring infrastructure.
5.1 Introduction and Related Work
Current efforts to analyze the Internet topology focus on the driving
forces behind its evolution. Many studies have focused on the analysis
of the Internet’s topology evolution [DD11], highlighting the flattening
phenomenon [DD10; LWY12] and the impact of IXPs [GILO11; AG10],
however none have been able to devise a model which reproduces the
evolving Internet topology under such driving forces. Moreover, studies
in this field typically do not take into account the measuring infrastructure
used to infer the Internet topology [GIL+12], and the possible biases
introduced by the fact that this infrastructure changes over time.
The main research contribution of this chapter is X-CENTRIC, a novel
IXP-centric evolving model for the Internet’s core, whose ground truths
are the structural properties of the topology and the awareness of the
IXPs impact on its flattening (see Chapters 3 and 4). X-CENTRIC makes
use of a well-defined service model, able to outline the true driving
forces behind link creation and the Internet’s evolution. Using a set of
correlation parameters, we highlight the importance of IXPs within the
Internet’s core as responsible for its community structure, and define a
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mechanism through which exchange point customers become attached.
The successful validation carried out, using even sensitive metrics such
as maximal cliques, highlights how fundamental our mechanism is if we
want to grasp the true driving forces behind the evolution of the Internet’s
core.
X-CENTRIC reproduces the statistical characteristics of the Internet’s
core, such as the heavy-tailed degree distribution and its community
structure (in the form of maximal cliques). In addition, it also captures
the evolution of the network by looking at the growth of the modeling
parameters, possibly making predictions on the future evolution of the
core.
Unlike growing network models, X-CENTRIC can deal with aggre-
gated events. Specifically, in growing network models, such as the BA-
model, the time evolution is measured with respect to the number of
nodes added to the graph. X-CENTRIC takes a different approach, and
builds different graphs in different time steps: time is measured with
respect to the evolution of modeling parameters at the different steps. The
difference between the two approaches can be easily understood by an
analogy with physics: we study the evolution of the temperature, pres-
sure, etc.. (modeling parameters) of a room, rather than the interaction
of its molecules (nodes). The strength of our method lies in the fact that
modeling parameters are both a high level representation of the system
and a way of reproducing the driving forces behind the node interactions.
Using X-CENTRIC and existing topological data, we highlighted a crit-
ical aspect of the measurement infrastructure: with the existing topologi-
cal data it is impossible to study the long-term evolution of the Internet, as
the measuring infrastructure is too variable over time and generates long-
term fluctuations that hide the real evolution of the topology. However,
the insights provide directions for future research in the field of Internet
measuring and data gathering, and should be considered when trying to
apply evolutionary network models to such data.
X-CENTRIC is thus versatile and capable of accurately predicting the
evolution of the Internet’s core as long as we are able to foresee the growth
of the modeling parameters. Under a stable measuring infrastructure,
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with knowledge of such parameters, the model would be able to predict
the future evolution of the Internet.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2
we recall the core structure presented in Chapter 3 and illustrate our inno-
vative dynamic, based on considerations from Chapter 4. In Section 5.3
we devise the X-CENTRIC model and compare its results with measured
data, then Section 5.4 analyzes the evolution of the core, compares it with
the measuring infrastructure, and highlights the predictive properties of
our model.
5.2 Core Analysis and Correlations
As shown in Figure 3.2.9 of Chapter 3, the core of the Internet is a two-layer
graph made up of three different networks. Here we analyze the three
networks taking into account: i) the structural and behavioral properties
of the nodes (Chapter 3); ii) the role of IXPs as concentrators (Chapter 4).
The rational behind our analysis is the awareness that the core is made
up of many peering links, and its nodes participate in many IXPs. Thus,
links within the core are mainly links between subsets of customers of an
IXP. Internet eXchange Points act as concentrators between participants
of the same IXP, which therefore form a community. We believe that,
due to their role, IXPs naturally generate “correlation” properties in the
three networks, where customers of the same IXP have a high correlation
between them, and a low correlation with nodes participating in other
IXPs. A proper model of the Internet’s core should thus take into account
strategies that avoid the destruction of such correlations, since they are an
important indicator of the community structure (i.e. the massive presence
of maximal cliques) in the core network.
There are two main questions that enable us to build a core model,
and that we need to answer in our analysis: how many links should each
node draw? And what kind of attachment mechanism should it follow?
The answers depend on the reference network, and the mechanisms built
upon those answers should be able to provide the correlations mentioned
above.
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5.2.1 Centrum Network
The centrum is a network of very few nodes (at most 80 in 2013), which
participate in many IXPs and, as such, are very well connected. This
small network has a very high density, therefore it makes no sense to
look for the existence of correlated/non-correlated nodes. The number
of links that each node should draw is well captured by the first part
of the density curve (before the inflection point), shown in Figure 5.2.1.
A further analysis reveals that this curve can be easily modeled using
just three parameters: the size of the largest clique k¯, the size of the
centrum n¯, and the centrum density d¯. In fact, as shown in Figure 5.2.1, the
actual density curve is well approximated by a curve which averages a
linear and a quadratic interpolation between points
(
k¯, 1
)
and
(
n¯, d¯
)
. The
approximated density curve can be used to derive the number of links
drawn per node.
As far as the attachment mechanism is concerned, it is possible to show
that the “directed preferential attachment” mechanism [AGL13] is able
to reproduce the high number of maximal cliques observed. Specifically,
the node has a picture of the directed centrum network, where each edge
goes from the newer connecting node to the older connected node, and
the preferences are [1 : 2]. This means that for each node, an outgoing link
adds a preference of 1, while an incoming link adds a preference of 2. In
any case, the small network size makes the problem of deriving a good
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attachment mechanism far less crucial compared with the same problem
applied to the other networks.
5.2.2 Vertical Network
The vertical network has a very particular degree distribution, shown in
Figure 3.3.3 of Chapter 3. This distribution is in 1 to 1 correspondence
with the number of vertical links towards the centrum. Therefore, from it
we can infer that the number of links that each node should inject to the
centrum is uniformly distributed in U (1, pv).
Vertical links reflect the willingness of a node to connect to the centrum.
We believe that the main mechanism through which a layer-1 node lays
out connections towards the centrum is related to its willingness to join
an IXP. As shown in Chapter 3, centrum nodes participate in many IXPs
with an Open Peering policy. Therefore, when a layer-1 node joins the IXP,
it will connect with many centrum participants. In addition, since these
participants are on the IXP, they are also very well connected with each
other, therefore the addition of a new node will contribute to form new
large cliques.
This assumption can be verified with real data. X(i) indicates the set
of centrum nodes to which layer-1 node i is connected, and EX(i) the set of
edges between such nodes. Therefore, cX(i) = 2|EX(i)|/(|X(i)|(|X(i)|−1))
indicates the density of X(i). If cX(i) → 1 then X(i) tends to a clique,
while for cX(i) → 0 the nodes of X(i) tend to an independent vertex
set. An example of computation for cX(i) is shown in Figure 5.2.2. We
measured cX(i) ∀i ∈ N2, that is, for all layer-1 nodes. Figure 5.2.3 com-
pares the distribution of cX(i) obtained with real data, with the one that
would have been obtained if each layer-1 node had chosen X(i) using a
classic preferential attachment (PA). The huge distance between the two
distributions validates our thesis: the driving force behind the choice of
nodes is far from random, and derives instead from their willingness to
join an IXP, thus forming cliques with other participants.
We studied the distribution in Figure 5.2.3, which we call a “vertical
correlation distribution”, over time and noticed that its structure comes
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from the superposition of a Gaussian distribution with small variance,
and a mirrored power law distribution. We believe that this behavior
derives from the two possible rules that a node can use when joining an
IXP: manually configuring its peers or joining the Route Server [Eur]. In a
manual configuration, the node will typically lay out a small number of
links. Such connections are also fine-tuned by the administrator, therefore
there is a high chance that peers are already part of the same commu-
nity, thus they are already peering with each other. This phenomenon
is reflected in Figure 5.2.4, where the vertical correlation distribution for
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nodes injecting few links (square markers curve), is well fitted by a power
law with an average close to 1 (triangle markers curve). If the node uses
the Route Server, it will automatically peer with all the participants in the
IXP, therefore the number of connections laid out will be typically high.
Peers will not necessarily be part of the same community (there is no
fine-tuning), therefore the correlation will be lower than in the previous
case. Figure 5.2.4 highlights the vertical correlation distribution for nodes
injecting many links (cross markers curve), well fitted by a Gaussian with
small variance (star markers curve).
To sum up, our attachment mechanism for the vertical network still
uses a preferential attachment to ensure a heavy-tailed degree distribution,
however we need a second constraint to ensure that the vertical correlation
follows the distribution highlighted in Figure 5.2.4.
5.2.3 Horizontal Network
We found that the number of links laid out by nodes in the horizontal
network is far less crucial than in the previous networks. In order to
keep the model simple, we use a uniform distribution U (1, ph) for the
horizontal network as well. Parameter ph is easily calculated so that when
the network formation is complete, the total number of links is |Eˆ|, the
same as the measured core.
As shown in Chapter 3, although their participation is less pronounced
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than that of centrum nodes, layer-1 nodes participate in IXPs as well,
however their peering policy is typically Selective or Restrictive. As such,
we believe that the main mechanism through which a layer-1 node lays
out connections towards other layer-1 nodes is related to a configuration
step, through which two layer-1 nodes already on the same IXP, decide to
create a direct link with each other. Since these nodes are already on the
same IXP, this means that they share a considerable number of neighbors,
therefore this link creation will also heavily contribute to the formation of
cliques.
As with the vertical network, we verified this assumption with real
data. For each edge (i, j) ∈ E3, in the horizontal network, X(i) and X(j)
indicate the sets of centrum nodes to which nodes i and j are connected,
respectively. We compute the Jaccard Similarity between these two sets
Ji,j = |X(i) ∩X(j)|/|X(i) ∪X(j)|. If Ji,j → 1 then i and j have the same
centrum neighbors, while for Ji,j → 0 the nodes have totally different
centrum neighbors. An example of computation for Ji,j is shown in Figure
5.2.2. Figure 5.2.5 compares the distribution of Ji,j obtained with real data,
with the distribution that would have been obtained if each layer-1 node
had chosen its horizontal neighbor using classic preferential attachment.
As in the previous case, the huge distance observed between the two
distributions validates our thesis: even this choice is far from random,
and can be pictured as a configuration step through which layer-1 nodes
on the same IXP create a new direct link, thus contributing to the clique
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formation process.
We studied the distribution in Figure 5.2.5, which we call a “horizontal
correlation distribution”, over time and noticed that its structure is always
a Gaussian distribution. To sum up, our attachment mechanism for the
horizontal network still uses preferential attachment to ensure a heavy-
tailed degree distribution, however we need a second constraint to ensure
that the horizontal correlation follows the distribution highlighted in
Figure 5.2.5.
5.3 X-CENTRIC
The two-layer core structure so far obtained, along with the new dynamic
rules highlighted in Section 5.2, enable us to build a novel model for the
Internet’s core, based both on the observed structural properties and on
behavioral rules for the nodes verified with real data.
In this section we propose X-CENTRIC, a model exploiting our find-
ings aimed at accurately reproducing the Internet’s core, capturing both
its statistical characteristics, such as the heavy-tailed degree distribution,
and its community structure, measured in the form of maximal cliques.
5.3.1 Core Modeling
Thanks to the partitioning of the core, it is possible to generate it in three
different steps, each of which builds a separate part of the network.
X-CENTRIC uses the following parameters, which were highlighted
in the previous section and are summarized here:


|N |, |E| core parameters
n¯, k¯, d¯ centrum parameters
U (1, pv) vertical distribution
Nv
(
µv, σ
2
v
)
vertical correlation
Nh
(
µh, σ
2
h
)
horizontal correlation
and builds the network using a three-step algorithm.
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Figure 5.3.1: Core attachment mechanisms
5.3.1.1 Centrum Network construction (alg. 5.1)
We start with a single node and for each new incoming node i < n¯ we
calculate how many links to add by exploiting the interpolated density
curve (line 2). The new links are drawn according to themechanism shown
in Figure 5.3.1 for node 5, referred to as “Directed preferential attachment”
(lines 8-13), where preferences are implemented through a bag of nodes as
shown in [CT12]. Basically the node has a picture of the directed centrum
network, where each edge goes from the newer connecting node to the
older connected one, and preferences are [1 : 2], meaning that for each
node an outgoing link adds a preference of 1, while an incoming link
adds a preference of 2 (e.g. node 2 with 2 in-links and an out-link has
preference 5). This choice emulates a [0 : 1] preference mechanism, which
would have been too detrimental for new nodes, and is needed to enforce
PA in a region where a similar degree of all nodes would have neglected
its use. Thanks to the fact that connected nodes have a higher preference
than connecting ones, we have that the more a node leaves the center, the
less the probability of a new node connecting to it.
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Algorithm 5.1 Centrum Construction
1: function DENSITY(i)
2: return 1 + (i−k¯)(d¯−1)(i+n¯−2k¯)
2(n¯−k¯)2
3: end function
4:
5: add to bag(cbag, 0)
6: for i = 1; i < n¯; i++ do
7: e = n edges(i, DENSITY(i)) ⊲ Interpolated density
8: while e 6= 0 do
9: n = cbag[uniform(0, sizeof(cbag))]
10: add edge(i, n)
11: add to bag(cbag, i, n, n) ⊲ Directed PA i→ n
12: e = e− 1
13: end while
14: end for
5.3.1.2 Vertical Network construction (alg. 5.2)
Starting from the centrum network, we add new nodes. Each incoming
node n¯ ≤ i < |N | adds e links towards the centrum, where e is extracted
from U (1, pv) (line 6). Note that in this step we do not add links between
layer-1 nodes.
The node extracts a number d from the vertical correlation distribution
Nv
(
µv, σ
2
v
)
(line 7) and then chooses a set X of centrum nodes using the
preferential attachment mechanism (lines 10-17), shown in Figure 5.3.1 for
node D. It then computes cX and checks whether |cX − d| < ǫ, meaning
that cX is near d (lines 18-19). If the condition is true, X is accepted and
the node creates the links (lines 20-23), otherwise it picks a new set X and
repeats the procedure. Thanks to this simple mechanism, we are able to
both use preferential attachment and ensure that the resulting vertical
correlation distribution is akin to Nv
(
µv, σ
2
v
)
.
Although the node knows the vertical links between layer-1 nodes
and the centrum, it is unaware of the internal structure of the centrum. This
means that at the beginning all centrum nodes have an equal preference of
1 (lines 1-3), which changes with the injection of new edges. In order to
inject just vertical links, we compute preferences only for centrum nodes,
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Algorithm 5.2 Vertical Construction
1: for i = 0; i < n¯; i++ do
2: add to bag(vbag, i) ⊲ Equal starting preferences
3: end for
4:
5: for i = n¯; i < |N |; i++ do
6: e = U (1, pv)
7: d = Nv
(
µv, σ
2
v
)
⊲ Requested vertical correlation
8: repeat
9: tbag = vbag, te = e
10: while te 6= 0 do ⊲ Select X with Centrum PA
11: n = tbag[uniform(0, sizeof(tbag))]
12: if edge not exists(i, n) then
13: add to bag(tbag, n)
14: insert(X ,n)
15: te = te− 1
16: end if
17: end while
18: cX = vert correlation(X) ⊲ Test correlation
19: until |cX − d| < ǫ
20: for all n ∈ X do ⊲ Add X neighbors to i
21: add edge(i,n)
22: add to bag(vbag, n) ⊲ Centrum PA → n
23: end for
24: end for
adding a preference of 1 for each undirected incident edge (e.g. node 2
has preference 3 due to its starting preference and the connections with A
and B).
5.3.1.3 Horizontal Network construction (alg. 5.3)
Starting from the previously obtained network, we iterate again over
the nodes n¯ ≤ i < |N |. Each node adds e links towards other layer-1
nodes, where e is extracted from U (1, ph) (line 6). Given that we already
generated the vertical network, it is easy to compute ph knowing both the
current number of nodes and edges, and its total number |N |, |E|.
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Algorithm 5.3 Horizontal Construction
1: for i = n¯; i < |N |; i++ do
2: add to bag(hbag, i) ⊲ Equal starting preferences
3: end for
4:
5: for i = n¯; i < |N |; i++ do
6: e = U (1, ph)
7: while e 6= 0 do
8: Xi=get neighbors(i)
9: d = Nh
(
µh, σ
2
h
)
⊲ Requested horiz. correlation
10: repeat
11: n = hbag[uniform(0, sizeof(hbag))]
12: if edge not exists(i, n) then
13: Xn = get neighbors(n)
14: J(i, n) = horiz correlation(Xi,Xn)
15: end if
16: until |J(i, n)− d| < ǫ
17: add edge(i, n)
18: add to bag(hbag, n, i) ⊲ Undirected PA i− n
19: e = e− 1
20: end while
21: end for
Similarly to the previous step, node i extracts a number d from the
horizontal correlation distribution Nh
(
µh, σ
2
h
)
(line 9), then chooses a
layer-1 node n using the preferential attachment mechanism (line 11),
shown in Figure 5.3.1 for node D. Afterwards, it computes Ji,n and checks
whether |Ji,n − d| < ǫ, meaning that Ji,n is near d (lines 14,16). If the
condition is true, n is accepted and the node creates the links (lines 17-19),
otherwise it picks another node n and repeats the procedure. Thanks
to this mechanism, we are able to both use preferential attachment and
ensure that the resulting horizontal correlation distribution is akin to
Nh
(
µh, σ
2
h
)
.
The preferences are separated: while step 2 uses preferences to the
centrum, step 3 refers to only layer-1 nodes (e.g. node B has preference 2
due to connections with nodes A and C).
126
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 1  10  100  1000
P
c
(k
)
k
Core
Core - Model
(a) 2007
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 1  10  100  1000
P
c
(k
)
k
Core
Core - Model
(b) 2010
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 1  10  100  1000
P
c
(k
)
k
Core
Core - Model
(c) 2013
Figure 5.3.2: Core network: degree distribution comparison
5.3.2 Results
We compared the extracted core Gˆ with the results obtained by
X-CENTRIC. Input parameters were extracted according to the proce-
dure outlined in Section 5.2.
Figure 5.3.2 compares the degree distribution of the core Gˆwith the
one obtained from X-CENTRIC, while Figure 5.3.3 compares their max-
imal clique distribution. X-CENTRIC provides a very good fit for the
degree distribution, matching it throughout the whole analyzed time
span, as shown in Figures 5.3.2a, 5.3.2b and 5.3.2c. The fit for the maximal
clique distribution is fairly good, the model is able to match the evolving
structure of the core despite of the evident change in number and size of
the maximal cliques (see Figures 5.3.3a, 5.3.3b and 5.3.3c). We know that
this fit is not perfect, however this is not the main concern, given the high
variability of this distribution observed on real data (see [RWM+11]).
Finally, Table 5.1 compares the core and X-CENTRIC taking into ac-
count other standard graph metrics, and shows how our algorithm is able
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Figure 5.3.3: Core network: maximal clique distribution comparison
to match the statistical characteristics of the Internet.
5.4 Core Evolution
Here we carry out the analysis of the Internet’s core evolution by ob-
serving the growth of the parameters used by X-CENTRIC, listed at the
beginning of Section 5.3.1 and extracted from the measured data using
the guidelines in Section 5.2.
5.4.1 Parameters Evolution
The ability to devise a model with a few scalar parameters, makes it
possible to analyze and predict the future evolution of the Internet. In
fact, if we can understand the time evolution of such parameters, and
predict their future value, then X-CENTRIC is able to construct a topology
matching what the future Internet would be.
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2006 2008 2010
Avg. Values Real Model Real Model Real Model
Degree 66.54 65.32 77.05 76.20 76.85 76.30
Clustering 0.642 0.622 0.628 0.620 0.631 0.644
Knn 156.07 139.54 175.97 161.12 246.13 211.03
Shortest Path 1.843 1.839 1.872 1.844 1.925 1.891
Betweenness 164.01 163.32 202.82 196.15 293.01 281.90
Closeness 0.548 0.548 0.541 0.547 0.525 0.530
Coreness 37.5 36.38 43.28 42.06 42.59 41.66
2012 2013
Avg. Values Real Model Real Model
Degree 93.80 91.63 105.52 104.64
Clustering 0.663 0.678 0.665 0.669
Knn 313.35 319.90 330.77 330.86
Shortest Path 1.984 1.921 1.978 1.910
Betweenness 443.93 409.63 467.18 428.39
Closeness 0.515 0.521 0.521 0.530
Coreness 51.38 49.03 58.37 56.26
Table 5.1: Real vs X-CENTRIC: average metrics comparison
Therefore, here we analyze the time evolution of such parameters,
shown in Figures 3.2.2 (from Chapter 3) and 5.4.1. In general, all the
parameters are growing with time. The number of nodes |N |within the
core grows linearly, while the number of links |E| grows quadratically
(Figure 3.2.2), which keeps the core well connected and highly dense.
Figure 5.4.1a reveals that the centrum is getting bigger, and so is its largest
clique. Like the size of the centrum, the number of vertical links towards
the centrum is also increasing. In fact, Figure 5.4.1a highlights that these
three parameters are strictly correlated: the centrum size n¯, the size of the
largest clique k¯ and the maximum number of vertical links towards the
centrum pv grow similarly, just shifted one from the other.
The centrum density d¯ and the average correlation values µh and µv
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Figure 5.4.1: Evolution of core parameters
are also increasing, as shown in Figures 5.4.1b, 5.4.1c and 5.4.1d. The
growth in correlation values over time seems to indicate the increasing
presence of IXPs within the core. On the one hand, the growth of µv
indicates that the presence of centrum nodes on exchange points is increas-
ing. On the other, the growth of µh reflects the fact that more and more
horizontal links are due to IXPs. While these parameters are all growing
over time, their specific trend is difficult to understand and model. The
centrum density d¯ grows linearly during some time slots, and seems to be
more stable in others (Figure 5.4.1b), as if there were different attitudes
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in different “epochs”. This behavior is clearly confirmed in the evolution
of the average correlation values µh and µv. The vertical correlation µv
(Figure 5.4.1d) grows during 2008-2009 and 2011-2012, but it is almost
stable in the other time slots. A similar trend is exhibited by µh (Figure
5.4.1c) although the growing time slots are slightly different. As shown
in Figures 5.4.1e and 5.4.1f, the variances are almost stable or linearly
growing. In either case, their value is very small and their evolution is
not expected to have a significant impact on the model.
To sum up, while it is difficult to model the trends of the parameters,
they appear to have a sort of semi-stationary behavior: we observe some
time-slots, or epochs, where they are almost stable, and other ones where
they grow. Initially this behavior seems to be directly due to the Internet
itself, but further analysis reveals that it is more related to the perception
of the Internet that we get through its measuring infrastructure.
5.4.2 Measuring Infrastructure
As previously mentioned, the dataset used in our modeling and analysis is
provided by Isolario [Iso], which infers the AS-level topology graph using
data coming from several cooperating ASes, indicate as feeders. Since each
feeder provides a representation of the network from its own specific
point of view, the data collected are aggregated to obtain the complete
Internet topology [GLM12].
As the number of feeders increases, the number of links observed
in the Internet topology increases as well. Therefore, it is difficult to
understand if the growing network topology is an effect of the evolution
in the network itself, or is due to the increased visibility of the Internet
topology obtained through the new feeders. Our aim here is to understand
how much the measuring infrastructure influences our viewpoint of the
Internet’s evolution.
As shown in [GLM12], each feeder provides a different contribution
to route collectors. To better quantify the total contribution of feeders, the
authors of [GLM12] subdivide them in three different categories: minor,
partial and full feeders. Several cooperating ASes are minor feeders and
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Figure 5.4.2: Evolution of core parameters vs number of full feeders
do not provide any relevant information to the route collectors, while a
few are full feeders and are responsible for most of the inferred Internet
topology. In addition, feeders can change over time, as new ASes begin
cooperating in route collector projects, while other ASes terminate their
cooperation.
Figure 5.4.2 shows the number of full feeders over time, highlight-
ing how the Internet’s measuring infrastructure is far from stable. More
specifically, Figures 5.4.2a, 5.4.2b and 5.4.2c compare the evolution of the
measuring infrastructure with that of the main parameters of X-CENTRIC.
As shown in Figure 5.4.2a, the trend of parameter µv is tightly coupled
with the growing number of full feeders: as the number of feeders in-
creases, µv grows as well, while it is almost constant with a stable number
of feeders. Figure 5.4.2b reinforces this claim, showing that it is also true
for pv. Since pv itself is coupled with other centrum parameters (n¯, k¯,
as previously observed in Figure 5.4.1a), also those parameters are indi-
rectly coupled with the evolution of the measuring infrastructure. Unlike
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previous parameters, the correlation between µh and the number of full
feeders, shown in Figure 5.4.2c, is more difficult to grasp. In this case,
there seems to be a time-shift between the two trends, as if the impact of
new feeders on µh is captured a few months after their establishment.
Since the evolution of core parameters is heavily biased by the mea-
suring infrastructure, one possible approach would be to try to find a
sufficiently stable time-slot and analyze the evolving core of the Internet
within that time slot. As shown in Figure 5.4.2, the number of feeders
seems sufficiently stable between the second half of 2008 and the begin-
ning of 2011. Unfortunately, a further analysis highlights that even in this
time-slot, the measuring infrastructure changes considerably: out of the
260 average number of full feeders, only 155 are stable, while there are
250 other feeders that appear/disappear during the time span. A second,
more drastic approach would be to extract a subpart of the topology ob-
tained considering only those feeders that are steadily present along the
analyzed time span. Unfortunately, there are few feeders that are stable
for a sufficiently long period of time, and considering only them would
misrepresent the Internet.
We believe that the insights arising from this analysis shed light on
directions for future research in the field of Internet measuring and data
gathering, and should be kept in mind when trying to apply evolutionary
network models to such data.
5.4.3 Predictive Properties
Despite its negative results, this analysis does not invalidate the main
results for X-CENTRIC and its ability to potentially predict the future
evolution of the Internet under a stable measuring infrastructure. In this
section, we illustrate the prediction properties of the model.
We take as input data the evolution of parameters observed in the 2006-
2009 time span and perform a linear fit of their observed trend (Figure
5.4.1). We suppose that future data are unknown, and use these fits to
“predict” the value of the parameters for the 2010-2012 time span. The
fitted parameters are used as input for X-CENTRIC, so as to generate a
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Figure 5.4.3: Maximal clique distribution for core prediction
prediction on the evolution of the Internet’s core.
While matching the statistical description of the Internet topology is
relatively easy, matching its structure in terms of cliques is far more diffi-
cult, therefore we focus on this task. Figure 5.4.3 compares the predicted
evolution of the maximal clique distribution with its actual evolution
(both from measured data and from our model). As we see, while the
short and medium-term predictions are quite good (Figures 5.4.3a and
5.4.3b), the long-term prediction is far from reality (Figure 5.4.3c). By
looking at the growth of parameters, it is immediately clear that such
behavior must be sought after the sudden change in their trend, especially
for some of them. For example, for d¯ and µv (Figures 5.4.1b, 5.4.1d), the
linear fits are quite different from the actual trend, and the effect of the
wrong estimation of their values is promptly reflected in a bad long-term
prediction of topological properties. As observed in the previous section,
this sudden difference in the parameters’ trend is caused by the changing
measuring infrastructure.
We conclude that X-CENTRIC is capable of accurately predicting the
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evolution of the Internet’s core as long as we are able to predict the
growth in the parameters observed. If we had complete knowledge of
such parameters, the model would be able to reproduce the topology even
in the event of drastic changes to the measuring infrastructure.
5.5 Conclusions
We have proposed X-CENTRIC, an innovative model able to outline
the true driving forces behind link creation and the evolution of the
Internet’s core. X-CENTRIC captures both the statistical characteristics
of the Internet’s core, such as its heavy-tailed degree distribution, and
its community structure, measured in the form of maximal cliques, over
a time span of almost eight years. X-CENTRIC also has the potential to
forecast the evolution of the network, which can be represented by a set
of few well-defined parameters. To the best of our knowledge this is the
first evolving model that achieves both these goals.
X-CENTRIC is versatile and capable of accurately reproducing the
core, and even predicting its evolution as long as we are able to predict
the growth of its parameters. The analysis carried out reveals that, to
date, our perception on the evolution of the Internet is tightly connected
with that of its measuring infrastructure, which fluctuates over time and
biases possible conclusions. Therefore, despite the potential predictive
properties of the model, it cannot be fully exploited to this end until the
measuring infrastructure is sufficiently stable.
In conclusion, X-CENTRIC is able to generate an evolving topology
which well represents the core of the Internet, and provides great insights
that could be exploited for future research. Since the model uses data
derived from real measurements, it is important to remove the biases
introduced by the measuring infrastructure, in order to observe the true
nature of the evolving network parameters, understand their real trend
and predict the future evolution of the Internet’s topology.
X-CENTRIC is able to only reproduce the core of the Internet. In
the last part of the thesis, we show how to add the periphery, so as
to obtain a model for the whole Internet. We anticipate that adding
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the periphery is a far easier task than modeling the core. In fact, this
periphery is represented by a sparse graph, with nodes not participating
in communities and exhibiting no correlation properties. Therefore, we
expect that properly corrected BA-like models are sufficient for describing
link creation outside of the core.
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Chapter 6
Modeling and Validation
for the Internet Topology
Thanks to the model proposed in the previous chapter, we have been
able to accurately reproduce the evolving core of the Internet at the Au-
tonomous System level. The model is based on several insights regarding
both the structure and the dynamical rules responsible for the interconnec-
tion of ASes, thus highlighting the driving forces behind the evolution of
the core network. The last compulsory step to obtain a topology generator
for the whole Internet is the addition of peripheral nodes to the core: here
we propose a simple dynamic for node attachment with this purpose
[AGL14a].
The generator, called X-CENTR-ITE (X-CENTRIC Internet Topology
gEnerator), is validated against the measured Internet graph, and it is
shown how it outperforms the reference generators in the literature when
looking at both coarse and medium-grained metrics such as the degree
distribution, and fine-grained metrics, quantitatively captured, in our
case, by the maximal cliques distribution. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first model able to match, with good accuracy and for such a
long time span, the statistical and structural metrics of the Internet.
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6.1 Introduction and Related Work
We use as ground truth for this work, the X-CENTRIC model proposed in
the previous chapter. In order to add the periphery to the obtained core,
we first exploit existing data so as to analyze the behavior of peripheral
nodes and define the criteria in order to attach them to the previously
obtained core.
In Section 6.2 we complete the previously obtained model for the In-
ternet’s core by adding the periphery. Section 6.3 presents the final results,
comparing our model with the four reference generators, described in Sec-
tion 2.3.3 of Chapter 2: ORBIS [MHK+07], GT-ITM [ZCD97], INET [WJ02]
and BRITE [MLMB01]. These generators were tuned using available data,
so that they could yield their best possible results.
6.2 Adding the Periphery
The X-CENTRIC model shown in the previous chapter is a first important
step for the development of our topology generator. In this section we
analyze the periphery, i.e. the partition outside the core, in order to define
the rules followed by peripheral nodes joining the Internet. Our final
result is obtained by putting all the pieces together, so as to obtain a
topology generator for the whole Internet.
6.2.1 Periphery Analysis
Following a similar path to the one used for the core, we try to understand
how to model the periphery by once again analyzing the dataset provided
by Isolario [Iso]. The analysis, as usual, reports results with specific
reference to the time step of April 2013. While some of the numbers
are changing in time, as will be shown in the next section, the general
behavior is the same throughout the whole analyzed time span of eight
years.
We recall some notations from previous chapters: G = (N,E) is the
graph of the whole Internet and Gˆ = (Nˆ , Eˆ) is the graph of the Internet’s
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core, where Nˆ and Eˆ are the core nodes and links, which we indicate
here as c-nodes and c-links. Furthermore, we define as N˜ = N\Nˆ and
E˜ = E\Eˆ all the Internet nodes and links lying outside the core, in the
periphery, which we indicate as p-nodes and p-links.
In order to include p-nodes and p-links in our topology generator, we
need to define the behavior of the peripheral nodes joining the Internet.
More specifically, we need to answer two questions:
1. Howmany p-links does each p-node draw when entering the graph?
2. What kind of attachment mechanism should each p-node follow?
According to the analysis performed throughout the thesis, the most
complex, structured, and interesting part of the Internet is the core, while
the periphery is made up of a large number of nodes mainly organized
into trees, with a negligible contribution to the community structure of
the Internet. A straightforward approach to modeling this part of the
Internet would be to use the standard Baraba´si-Albert method. In this case,
the answer to the above questions would simply be to draw a constant
number of p-links for each p-node, using classic preferential attachment.
Our analysis reveals that this approach, without proper corrections, is
wrong, both from an engineering standpoint and when looking at raw
data.
Question 1 The first step to answer Question 1 lies in understanding
the hierarchical structure of p-nodes. Once we have a core, in fact, we can
hierarchically organize the peripheral nodes, according to their “distance”
from the core. More specifically, for each p-node, we define its distance
from the core as the shortest path length between the peripheral node
and any of the c-nodes. Figure 6.2.1 represents the layering obtained with
this definition, where a p-node lies in layer x if it has distance x from the
core. Figure 6.2.1 highlights that the majority of links are up-directed,
connecting different layers, while only 16% of the links connect nodes
in the same layer, which therefore lie in the same hierarchical level. In
order to “break the tie” between them, we hierarchically order nodes from
the same layer so that the higher the degree, the higher the node level.
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Figure 6.2.1: Periphery layering as of April 2013
Therefore, if nodes A and B are in the same layer and have degrees kA
and kB with kA > kB respectively, the up-directed link goes from node B
to node A. This “weak” hierarchical definition is very powerful, because
now each p-node only has up-directed links, which can be mapped in
a 1:1 correspondence with the p-links that the node draws in the graph,
thus answering our first question. We know that the tiebreak rule is not
rigorous, however the number of links for which it is applied is quite low
and does not affect the results too much. Figure 6.2.2 shows the CCDF of
the up-directed degree distribution for our dataset, where the degree kup
of each node is equal to the sum of its up-directed links. The distribution
is heavy-tailed, and can be roughly approximated by a power law P1,
with exponent γ1 = 2.2 and a sharp cut-off at k1 = 60. Although the
real distribution is not exactly a power-law, the simple approximation we
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make here yields good results, as will be shown later.
Question 2 Given the nature of the peripheral network and the lack of
community structure, it is clear that the preferential attachment mecha-
nism could be used. When p-nodes are added to the graph, we already
have an existing core network, therefore we need to set some initial pref-
erence for the c-nodes, in order for the p-nodes to attach themselves to
these c-nodes. In the classic PA definition, each node’s preference is equal
to its existing degree. However, as we saw in the analysis in Section 3.3.2
from Chapter 2, while the core is mainly made up of peering links, the pe-
riphery is dominated by customer-to-provider links. From an engineering
standpoint these two phenomena are completely different, therefore we
cannot use degrees obtained though peering links to set up preferences
for customer-to-provider links. For example, within the core Tier-1 ASes
and big Network Service Providers, attracting many customer p-nodes,
coexist with other nodes (Content Providers, etc.) which are mainly inter-
ested in keeping peering relationships with core nodes, and care much
less about customer connectivity. Therefore the high degree of some core
nodes, typically obtained by joining many IXPs, is a bad indicator of their
willingness to attract customers (and therefore have a high preference for
them), thus we have to use a different criteria to set preferences. Determin-
ing the correct preferences for core nodes entails exploiting our dataset in
order to understand what happens to the core after peripheral nodes have
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been added. Figure 6.2.3 shows the “vertical-core degree distribution”,
which is the degree distribution of c-nodes obtained by only considering
the p-links, coming from the periphery (mainly C2P links, represented
by the bold arrow in Figure 6.2.1). This distribution, as shown in Figure
6.2.3, is very different from the “sole-core degree distribution”, which is
the degree distribution of c-nodes obtained by only considering c-links
(mainly P2P links). Due to the fact that we need to lay out the vertical,
customer-to-provider links between the periphery and the core, it is much
more appropriate to extract preferences from a distribution which approx-
imately fits the vertical-core degree distribution, rather than the sole-core
distribution. Figure 6.2.3 shows that a good fit is obtained from a power
law P2 with exponent γ2 = 2 and cut-off k2 = 4000.
6.2.2 P-nodes Addition Algorithm
By answering questions 1 and 2 we now have all the ingredients to under-
stand what happens when a peripheral node joins the graph. The p-nodes
addition algorithm takes as input the core network as generated in Sec-
tion 5.3.1 of previous chapter, and builds as output the whole Internet
topology by adding the periphery.
It is well known that preferential attachment by itself is unable to
generate the “Small-World” effect, as it yields a small diameter but is
unable to produce high values for the clustering coefficient. In order to
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Algorithm 6.1 P-node Addition
1: for n = 0;n < |N |;n++ do ⊲ Set Preferences
2: x =(int)get plaw number(k2,γ2); ⊲ P2
3: add to bag(bag, x, n);
4: end for
5:
6: for n = |N |;n < tot nodes;n++ do ⊲ Attach
7: e =(int)get plaw number(k1,γ1); ⊲ P1
8: while e 6= 0 do
9: m = bag[uniform(0, sizeof(bag))]
10: add edge(m, n)
11: add to bag(bag,m, n)
12: e−−
13: if uniform(0,1) < p then ⊲ Triangle
14: h = select neighbor(m);
15: add edge(h, n)
16: add to bag(bag, h, n)
17: e−−
18: end if
19: end while
20: end for
solve this problem, we exploit an idea that is often used in the literature
(see [LKF05; New01]) and add a further step to the attachment mechanism.
After drawing a link to a c-node, the peripheral node tries to link with
one of its neighbors. This technique ensures the formation of triangles,
which are quite common in the Internet’s graph (e.g. multi-homed ASes),
and produces high clustering values.
The algorithm needs two distributions as further input, which we
both approximate with power laws: the up-directed link distribution P1,
with exponent γ1 and cut-off k1, and the preference distribution P2, with
parameters γ2 and k2.
Algorithm 6.1 performs the following steps:
• assign a preference to each of the c-nodes, extracted from distribu-
tion P2(γ2, k2);
• for each new p-node, assign a number of p-links to be drawn, ex-
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tracted from P1(γ1, k1);
• for each link to be drawn:
– select a nodem from the graph according to its preference and
connect to it;
– with probability p choose a neighbor ofm and connect to it;
– update preferences for the inserted p-node.
The algorithm terminates when the generated graph has size |N |, same as
the Internet’s graph.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 X-CENTR-ITE
The X-CENTR-ITE topology generator is obtained by the serial execution
of the three-step core generation algorithm (X-CENTRIC) presented in the
previous chapter, and the p-node addition algorithm just shown. While
we already carried out a time analysis for the core and its parameters,
here we have to check the behavior of the new parameters introduced. A
temporal analysis of the distributions P1 and P2 reveals that:
• the up-directed link distribution P1 is approximately constant until
2011, then the cutoff grows from 40 up to 60;
• the preference distribution P2 is time-dependent in both the expo-
nent γ2 and cutoff k2. The exponent γ2 is slowly increasing over
time from 1.6 to 2, while the cutoff is approximately constant until
2011, then almost doubles.
This apparently strange behavior, as already stressed in Section 5.4.2 of
Chapter 5 can be attributed to the changing measuring infrastructure. In
the next subsection we test our generator showing how a fine-tuning of
these parameters yields good results. As a matter of fact, the generated
topologies match graph metrics measured for the Internet, thus confirm-
ing the robustness of our method through the analyzed eight-year period.
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We recall that the maximal clique distribution is virtually unaffected by
the addition of p-nodes (except for small cliques), therefore this new step
is irrelevant for this metric. Furthermore, we compare our results with
that of the reference generators in the literature.
6.3.2 Comparison with existing Topology Generators
We compare the measured Internet graph with the results obtained with X-
CENTR-ITE and those obtained using four Internet Topology Generators:
ORBIS, GT-ITM, INET and BRITE. Parameters for X-CENTR-ITE were
chosen as previously described, while for the other generators:
ORBIS [MHK+07] is a topology generator which exploits the concept of
dK degree distributions to construct the network. We extracted the
2K distribution from the measured Internet topology, and directly
used it as input for the generator, so that the generator could yield
its best possible results.
GT-ITM [ZCD97] is a hierarchical generator, which uses the concepts of
“transit” and “stub” so as to generate a multi-tiered topology. The
available parameters enable us to reproduce the network partition-
ing into core/periphery, and to properly configure their sizes and
the edges between them. Therefore we used them to reproduce the
observed Internet structure as accurately as possible.
INET [WJ02] is another hierarchical topology generator, using a pre-built
degree distribution to provide a good fit for this metric. This gener-
ator can be configured through a small set of parameters related to
topological metrics, while it is not possible to configure the network
structure.
BRITE [MLMB01] uses the AS-Level Baraba´si-Albert model, and can be
configured by modifying the parameters already highlighted for the
generalized BA-model presented in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2.
Figure 6.3.1 compares the degree distribution, while Figure 6.3.2 com-
pares the maximal clique distribution. GT-ITM is unable to produce
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Figure 6.3.1: Degree distribution comparison
scale-free degree distributions, therefore this metric is always wrong
with such generator. The BRITE generator is able to reproduce scale-free
distributions, however it is not possible to configure a distribution for
the up-directed links. Therefore, all the produced distributions (Figure
6.3.1a to 6.3.1d) have a correct shape but wrong starting and ending point.
The INET generated topologies provide a fairly good fit for the degree
distribution, especially in the first year (Figure 6.3.1a), while in the last
year (Figure 6.3.1d) the degree can assume very large values that are not
observed in the actual topology. Of course, by using as input the 2K
degree distribution, ORBIS matches perfectly the degree distribution. The
X-CENTR-ITEmodel is able to produce very good fits for the degree distri-
bution, if appropriately tuned. In particular, to generate above results we
used γ1 = 2.2, while other parameters are growing so as to match the in-
creasing average degree of the Internet: k1 = 40→ 60, k2 = 2000→ 4000
and γ2 = 1.6→ 2.
As for the maximal cliques (Figure 6.3.2), BRITE produces tree-like
graphs, therefore the number of maximal cliques produced is negligible.
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Figure 6.3.2: Maximal clique distribution comparison
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Figure 6.3.3: Real vs GT-ITM vs X-CENTR-ITE - 2011
Even GT-ITM, when used to generate the whole Internet, is unable to
build large cliques. However, it is also possible to apply GT-ITM to just
build the core, by setting the appropriate parameters. In this case we
obtain better results, shown in Figure 6.3.3. Even if it is able to generate a
bimodal clique distribution more similar to that of the Internet, GT-ITM
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2006 Real X-CNTR-ITE ORBIS INET GT-ITM BRITE
Degree 5.77 6.05 5.77 5.56 6.02 6.00
Clustering 0.32 0.30 0.13 0.39 0.034 0.003
Knn 506.61 464.65 503.86 1156.73 27.29 23.42
Shortest Path 3.71 3.57 3.44 3.05 4.36 4.53
Betweenness 30731.6 29087 27505 23163.3 37979.2 39944.9
Closeness 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.23 0.22
Coreness 3.00 3.09 2.96 2.81 3.58 3.00
2008 Real X-CNTR-ITE ORBIS INET GT-ITM BRITE
Degree 6.11 6.15 6.11 6.18 6.29 6.00
Clustering 0.30 0.29 0.12 0.49 0.03 0.002
Knn 542.73 534.12 539.49 1802.88 30.51 23.86
Shortest Path 3.72 3.60 3.48 2.96 4.35 4.60
Betweenness 38003.8 36245.9 34440 27339.7 46832.1 50172.6
Closeness 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.23 0.22
Coreness 3.17 3.29 3.14 3.15 3.79 3.00
2010 Real X-CNTR-ITE ORBIS INET GT-ITM BRITE
Degree 6.58 6.55 6.21 7.34 6.91 6.00
Clustering 0.29 0.27 0.11 0.61 0.03 0.002
Knn 567.67 540.26 529.56 3698.65 41.94 24.54
Shortest Path 3.76 3.71 3.52 2.83 4.18 4.69
Betweenness 51616.0 50578.8 43136.4 34054.8 59619.6 68800.1
Closeness 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.21
Coreness 3.40 3.39 3.18 3.84 4.18 3.00
2013 Real X-CNTR-ITE ORBIS INET GT-ITM BRITE
Degree 8.00 8.05 8.01 8.25 8.43 8.00
Clustering 0.32 0.31 0.13 0.65 0.03 0.002
Knn 695.25 724.20 692.25 6317.73 70.58 30.00
Shortest Path 3.72 3.67 3.45 2.72 3.83 4.33
Betweenness 61141.9 59842.1 54928.0 38725.6 63708.3 74865
Closeness 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.37 0.26 0.23
Coreness 4.15 4.20 4.11 4.45 5.07 4.00
Table 6.1: Real vs Models: average metrics comparison
is still way far from the actual maximal clique distribution. Moreover,
this tool is still incapable of capturing the scale-free degree distribution
of the Internet. The INET generator is able to produce larger cliques,
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however the fit is almost always wrong. In particular, the number of
cliques produced in 2008 is very low (Figure 6.3.2a), and while in 2010
it would seem that the distribution is similar to what observed for the
Internet (Figure 6.3.2b), our further analysis reveals that this conjecture is
wrong. In fact, the maximal clique distribution for INET is bell-shaped,
centered around a single value, while the distribution for the Internet is
wider, and with more modes. Furthermore, after 2010 the distribution
for INET starts growing uncontrollably: as shown in Figure 6.3.2c, the
number of cliques is way too high, while in 2013 we were even unable
to perform the computation, due to memory limits, using the algorithm
in [CT12] on a computer with 128-GB RAM. Finally, ORBIS is capable
of fitting a little better the left mode of the clique distribution, however
it is totally unable to capture the existence of large cliques belonging to
the right mode. X-CENTR-ITE provides a fairly good fit for the maximal
cliques, generating a multimodal maximal clique distribution akin to
that of the Internet throughout the whole analyzed time span. This is an
important quantitative indicator of the presence of a community structure
in the model itself.
Even when compared to generators using a far more complex input
such as the joint degree distribution, X-CENTR-ITE provides an almost
perfect fit for the degree, and outperforms other models when looking
at the maximal cliques. Finally, Table 6.1 illustrates how our model is
able to match the graph metrics of the Internet’s topology through time,
outperforming previous generators.
To sum up, although classical models produce topologies that fit well
one metric or the other, none of them provides a good fit for all the ob-
served metrics. These results would seem to confirm that our topology
generator successfully addresses the problem of both representing the
Internet’s structure, in the form of maximal cliques, and matching statisti-
cal metrics such as the degree distribution, clustering coefficient, shortest
path length, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
model that has achieved both these goals.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
The Internet is a complex system that evolved during the past few decades
from a small research network to a worldwide multipurpose network.
A proper understanding of the characteristics and key factors driving
the evolution of the Internet and its structure is a fundamental task from
which many areas can benefit: deployment of CDNs, topology-aware
routing algorithms, prediction of outages and traffic engineering. Being
driven by a mix of technological and economic constraints, the character-
istics of the Internet are hard to be revealed. Despite several attempts by
researchers, much is still unknown and a proper model for the evolving
Internet topology has yet to be given. In this thesis we have addressed
three key problems related to the Internet modeling, since we believe that
any model overlooking them is deemed to fail.
The first key problem is the large-scale heterogeneous nature of the
Internet. Due to the high heterogeneity of the Internet topology, a mo-
del cannot rely on a uniform class of nodes which all exhibit the same
behavior. Therefore, we carried out an in-depth analysis of the topology,
using the concept of maximal clique to identify and discover the different
building blocks of the network. This methodology enabled us to partition
the Internet topology into a small core and a periphery. On the one hand,
the core is a small, very dense network which well represents the most in-
teresting structural properties of the network. On the other, the periphery
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a sparse network of many nodes loosely connected between each other,
representing the “tendrils” of the topology. Please note that while this
technique has been applied specifically to the Internet topology, it is fairly
general and can be applied to any complex network, thus revealing the
existence of heterogeneous zones in the graph.
The second key problem is that network evolution is not dictated
by a central authority, but is mainly the outcome of local economic and
technical constraints. This problem is intertwined with the previous one,
since heterogeneous nodes will have heterogeneous local goals. We high-
lighted the peering/transit dichotomy as the outcome of the emerging
importance of Internet eXchange Points within the core, which are be-
coming the main antagonists of backbone Network Service Providers (e.g.
Tier-1 Networks). Our analysis covers several sides of this aspect, reveal-
ing how good IXP policies enforce cooperation even in an environment
where agents act in a myopic and selfish manner. This analysis enabled
us to think of novel IXP-centric interaction mechanisms that were never
conjectured in previous Internet topology models.
The proposedmodel for the Internet’s evolving core, X-CENTRIC, uses
as ground truth both the structural and behavioral patterns previously
outlined. The model is based on data from real measurements, so it
has to deal with the third key problem: techniques for data gathering
are incomplete and often unreliable. In this sense, we have shown the
robustness of the model through a long time span, highlighting how
changes of the measuring infrastructure are correctly reflected in similar
changes to the modeling parameters. In addition, X-CENTRIC is able
to correctly predict the evolution of the core, in terms of the measured
metrics, in temporal windows where the measuring infrastructure is
stable.
Once the important structural and behavioral patterns within the core
have been captured, the task of adding the periphery becomes relatively
easy, since this part is still characterized by simple transit mechanics
that are well-captured by the preferential attachment mechanism. In the
last part of the thesis we devised a topology generator exploiting the
previously obtained core model together with a simple mechanism for
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attaching the periphery. The generator is able to successfully capture
the Internet’s structure, measured in the form of maximal cliques. As a
matter of fact, this metric captures very well the emerging role of IXPs
in the Internet topology. In addition, the model takes into account all
the other statistical graph metrics, among which the heavy-tailed de-
gree distribution, and outperforms existing topology generators in the
literature.
The ability to represent the Internet as a multi-layer network, study the
interactions between these layers, and deploy a model which takes into
account such interactions, give to the thesis added value, since the analysis
of multi-layer networks is a hot topic of several on-going European and
worldwide projects [CON; MUR].
7.1 Future Work
Revealing the basic driving forces of the Internet is a first important step
for modeling its growth. In this sense, the outcomes of this thesis are of
utmost importance. Nevertheless, many aspects of the inferred model,
such as the network partitioning, the dual layered core, and the different
correlations are “given from above” through the analysis of existing data,
rather than being the result of some kind of direct interaction between the
nodes.
The first possible enhancement for the X-CENTRIC model, is trying
to obtain the multi-layered structure of core and periphery as the result
of a direct interaction between nodes, optimizing a tangled fitness func-
tion which might spontaneously lead to the formation of different tiers,
hopefully similar to those measured for the real Internet. Alternatively,
it might be advantageous to utilize concepts brought from evolutionary
game theory. These tools utilize mix strategies and might be used to
obviate the need to artificially separate the core into multiple layers.
Another important aspect, is deepening the economic analysis carried
out in Chapter 4. First of all, the problem of peering vs transit can be
enhanced using hierarchical Stackelberg models. In this case, we can set
up a scenario where in one level ISPs compete for the best transit, and on
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the second level they try to form coalitions at IXPs. Moreover, while we
currently examine a static situation, both transit and peering costs can be
renegotiated over time. In order to keep into account this phenomenon,
we could add as players the NSPs and IXPs, and then analyze a dynamic
game where their strategies are intertwined with that of ISPs. Finally, in
the model we only focus on the strategic complementarity that ISPs have
by sharing costs at IXPs. Actually, it has been shown that, especially in
asymmetric cases, peering might be detrimental, due to effects of business
stealing [AG09]. This can induce a trade-off between the benefits of
sharing the costs of connectivity and the costs of losing final demand, or
having to charge a lower price for it, that would be interesting to analyze.
Furthermore, a very important point to analyze is network formation
around IXPs. While we studied the contribution of IXPs in fixed topolo-
gies, it is interesting to understand the dynamic that brings customers
to attach to IXPs, so as to devise a model where nodes directly attach to
exchange point customers without a superimposed correlation metric. A
preliminary work on an agent-based model that we are developing to
study network formation around IXPs can be found in [AMG+14].
Finally, we believe that the different network models should be com-
pared using an impartial, standard framework.
In conclusion, the dependence of modeling from accurate data is
indisputable. In the case of X-CENTRIC, removing the biases introduced
by the measuring infrastructure would enable us to predict the future
evolution of the Internet topology, therefore we believe that enhancements
in the field of data gathering are much needed.
156
References
[AA03] E. Altman and Z. Altman. S-modular games and power control in
wireless networks. IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control, 48, 2003. 82, 83,
96
[AAGL14a] Giovanni Accongiagioco, Eitan Altman, Enrico Gregori, and Luciano
Lenzini. A Game Theoretical study of Peering vs Transit in the
Internet. In NetSciCom 2014 INFOCOMWorkshop - To Appear, 2014.
xv, 10, 71
[AAGL14b] Giovanni Accongiagioco, Eitan Altman, Enrico Gregori, and Lu-
ciano Lenzini. Peering vs Transit: a Game Theoretical Model for
Autonomous Systems Connectivity. In IFIP Networking 2014 - To
Appear, 2014. xv, 10, 71
[AAMS12] Giovanni Accongiagioco, Matteo Andreozzi, Daniele Migliorini,
and Giovanni Stea. Throughput-optimal resource allocation in LTE-
Advanced with distributed antennas. In 3th Workshop of Italian group
on Quantitative Methods in Informatics (InfQ), pages 1–8, 2012. 3
[AAMS13] Giovanni Accongiagioco, Matteo Andreozzi, Daniele Migliorini,
and Giovanni Stea. Throughput-optimal resource allocation in lte-
advanced with distributed antennas. Computer Networks, 57(18):3997
– 4009, 2013. 3
[AB99] Re´ka Albert and Albert-La´szlo´ Baraba´si. Emergence of Scaling in
Random Networks. Science, 286(509), 1999. 39
[AB02] Reka Albert and Albert-La´szlo´ Baraba´si. Statistical mechanics of
complex networks. Reviews of Modern Physics, 74, 2002. 39
[ACF+12] Bernhard Ager, Nikolaos Chatzis, Anja Feldmann, Nadi Sarrar, Steve
Uhlig, and Walter Willinger. Anatomy of a large european IXP. In
Proc. of the 2012 ACM SIGCOMM Conference, pages 163–174, 2012.
19, 82, 104
157
[AG09] D’Ignazio Alessio and Emanuele Giovannetti. Asymmetry and
discrimination in Internet peering: evidence from the LINX. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(3):441–448, 2009. 156
[AG10] Mohammad Zubair Ahmad, Ahmad and Ratan Guha, Guha. Impact
of Internet Exchange Points on Internet Topology Evolution. In
Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 35th Conference on Local Computer Net-
works, LCN ’10, pages 332–335, Washington, DC, USA, 2010. IEEE
Computer Society. 19, 114
[AGL13] Giovanni Accongiagioco, Enrico Gregori, and Luciano Lenzini. A
Structure-Based Topology Generator for the Internet’ s Core. In 4th
Workshop of Italian group on Quantitative Methods in Informatics (InfQ),
pages 1–8, 2013. xv, 10, 52, 53, 117
[AGL14a] Giovanni Accongiagioco, Enrico Gregori, and Luciano Lenzini. S-
bite: a structure-based internet topology generator. Submitted to
Elsevier Computer Networks, 2014. xv, 11, 52, 137
[AGL14b] Giovanni Accongiagioco, Enrico Gregori, and Luciano Lenzini. X-
centric: an ixp-centric evolving network model for the internet’ s
core. Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Networking, 2014. xv, 11, 114
[AHDBV06] Jose´ Alvarez-Hamelin, Luca Dall’Asta, Alain Barrat, and Alessandro
Vespignani. k-Core Decomposition: A Tool for the Visualization
of Large Scale Networks. Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, 18, 2006. 27
[AJB00] Reka Albert, Hawoong Jeong, and Albert-Laszlo Barabasi. The Inter-
net’s Achilles’ heel: Error and attack tolerance of complex networks.
Nature, 406:200–0, 2000. 44
[AMG+14] Giovanni Accongiagioco, Eli A. Meirom, Enrico Gregori, Luciano
Lenzini, Shie Mannor, and Ariel Orda. Agent-Based Model for
Internet Hub Formation, 2014. Poster at European Conference on
Complex Systems ECCS’14, Lucca, Italy. 156
[BGP] BGPmon. http://bgpmon.netsec.colostate.edu. 21
[BSS08] Adam Bender, Rob Sherwood, and Neil Spring. Fixing Ally’s Grow-
ing Pains with Velocity Modeling. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM
SIGCOMM Conference on Internet Measurement (IMC ’08), pages 337–
342, 2008. 5, 20
[BW08] Alain Barrat and Martin Weigt. On the properties of small-world
network models. Eur. Phys., 13:1–19, 2008. 38
158
[CAAP06] Hyunseok Chang, Ann Arbor, Park Ave, and Florham Park. To Peer
or not to Peer : Modeling the Evolution of the Internet ’ s AS-level
Topology. INFOCOM 2006. 25th IEEE International Conference on
Computer Communications. Proceedings, 2006. 45
[cai] CAIDA: The Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis. 5,
21
[CGJ+02] Hyunseok Chang, Ramesh Govindan, Sugih Jamin, Shenker Scott
J., and Walter Willinger. On Inferring AS-Level Connectivity from
BGP Routing Tables. Technical Report UM-CSE-TR-454-02, 2002. 22
[CGWJ02] Qian Chen, Ramesh Govindan, Walter Willinger, and Sugih Jamin.
The origin of power laws in Internet topologies revisited. INFO-
COM. Twenty-First Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and
Communications Societies. Proceedings. IEEE, pages 608–617, 2002. 34
[CH03] Reuven Cohen and Shlomo Havlin. Scale-Free Networks Are Ultra-
small. Physical Review Letters, 90(5):5–8, February 2003. 42
[CHK+07] Shai Carmi, Shlomo Havlin, Scott Kirkpatrick, Yuval Shavitt, and
Eran Shir. A model of Internet topology using k-shell decomposition.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 104(27):11150–4, July 2007. 29, 34, 52, 61
[CHK+09] Kimberly Claffy, Young Hyun, Ken Keys, Marina Fomenkov, and
Krioukov Dmitri. Internet Mapping : from Art to Science. CAIDA
Research Report, 2009. 6
[CON] CONGAS EU Project - Dynamics and COevolution in Multi Level
Strategic iNteraction GAmeS. http://www.congas-project.eu. 155
[CRT00] Jacques Cremer, Patrick Rey, and Jean Tirole. Connectivity in the
Commercial Internet. Journal of Industrial Economics, 48(4):433–72,
December 2000. 73
[CSW01] Hyunseok Chang, Jamin Sugih, and Walter Willinger. Inferring AS-
level Internet Topology fromRouter-Level Path Traces. In Proceedings
of Workshop on Scalability and Traffic Control in IP Networks (ITCOM
’01), pages 196–207, 2001. 6, 20
[CT12] Ga´bor Csa´rdi and Nepusz Tama´s. iGraph Reference Manual. 2012.
123, 149
[CZH07] Yan W. Chen, Lu F. Zhang, and Jian P. Huang. The Watts–Strogatz
network model developed by including degree distribution: theory
and computer simulation. Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and
Theoretical, 40(29):8237–8246, July 2007. 43
159
[DD10] Amogh Dhamdhere and Constantine Dovrolis. The Internet is flat:
modeling the transition from a transit hierarchy to a peering mesh.
In Proceedings of the 6th International COnference, Co-NEXT. ACM,
2010. 18, 114
[DD11] Amogh Dhamdhere and Constantine Dovrolis. Twelve Years in
the Evolution of the Internet Ecosystem. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.,
19(5):1420–1433, October 2011. 114
[Dim] DIMES project. http://www.netdimes.org. 5, 21
[DM03] Sergey N. Dorogovtsev and Jose Fernando F. Mendes. Evolution
of Networks: from Biological Nets to the Internet and WWW. Oxford
University Press, USA, 2003. 40
[DMS00] Sergey N. Dorogovtsev, Jose Fernando F. Mendes, and Alexander N.
Samukhin. Structure of Growing Networks: Exact Solution of the
Baraba´si–Albert’s Model. Arxiv preprint cond-mat/0004434, 2000. 40
[ER60] Paul Erdo˝s and Alfre´d Re´nyi. On the evolution of random graphs.
Publ. Math. Inst Hung. Acas. Sci, 5:17–60, 1960. 36
[Eur] European Internet Exchange Association. https://www.euro-
ix.net/services. 19, 119
[fCRVW04] Shih fen Cheng, Daniel M. Reeves, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, and
Michael P. Wellman. Notes on equilibria in symmetric games. In
Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop GTDT, pages 71–78, 2004.
88, 95, 110
[FFF99] Michalis Faloutsos, Petros Faloutsos, and Christos Faloutsos. On
Power-Law Relationships of the Internet Topology. SIGCOMM
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures,
and protocols for computer communication, 1999. 32, 34
[FKP02] Alex Fabrikant, Elias Koutsoupias, and Christos H. Papadimitriou.
Heuristically Optimized Trade-Offs: A New Paradigm for Power
Laws in the Internet. In Proceedings of the 29th ICALP ’02. Springer-
Verlag, 2002. 45
[For10] Santo Fortunato. Community detection in graphs. Physics Report,
486(3-5):75–174, 2010. 29
[FS08] Dima Feldman and Yuval Shavitt. Automatic large scale generation
of internet pop level maps. In Global Telecommunications Conference,
2008. IEEE GLOBECOM 2008. IEEE, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2008. 5
160
[Gao00] L. Gao. On inferring autonomous system relationships in the Inter-
net. In Global Telecommunications Conference, 2000. GLOBECOM’00.
IEEE, volume 1, 2000. 16, 23, 26
[Gil59] Edgar N. Gilbert. Random Graphs. Annals of Mathematical Statistics,
30:1141–1144, 1959. 36
[GIL+11] Enrico Gregori, Alessandro Improta, Luciano Lenzini, Lorenzo Rossi,
and Luca Sani. BGP and Inter-AS Economic Relationships. IFIP
International Federation For Information Processing, pages 54–67, 2011.
16, 23
[GIL+12] Enrico Gregori, Alessandro Improta, Luciano Lenzini, Lorenzo Rossi,
and Luca Sani. On the incompleteness of the AS-level graph: a novel
methodology for BGP route collector placement. In Proceedings of
the 2012 ACM conference on Internet measurement conference, IMC ’12,
pages 253–264, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM. 114
[GILO11] Enrico Gregori, Alessandro Improta, Luciano Lenzini, and Chiara
Orsini. The impact of IXPs on the AS-level topology structure of the
Internet. Computer Communications, 34(1):68–82, January 2011. 19,
72, 114
[GLM12] Enrico Gregori, Luciano Lenzini, and Simone Mainardi. Parallel
k -Clique Community Detection on Large-Scale Networks. IEEE
transactions on parallel and distributed systems, pages 1–11, 2012. 35,
131
[GLO11a] Enrico Gregori, Luciano Lenzini, and Chiara Orsini. k-clique Com-
munities in the Internet AS-level Topology Graph. 2011 31st Interna-
tional Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, pages
134–139, June 2011. 35
[GLO11b] Enrico Gregori, Luciano Lenzini, and Chiara Orsini. k-dense commu-
nities in the internet AS-level topology. 2011 Third International Con-
ference on Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS 2011),
pages 1–10, January 2011. 29, 34
[GMC10] B.H. Good, Y.A. De Montjoye, and A. Clauset. Performance of
modularity maximization in practical contexts. Physical Review E,
81(4):046106, 2010. 29
[Goy07] S. Goyal. Connections: an introduction to the economics of networks.
Princeton University Press, July 2007. 46
161
[GS06] Mehmet H. Gunes and Kamil Sarac. Analytical IP Alias Resolution.
In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications
(ICC ’06), volume 1, pages 459–464, 2006. 5, 20
[GT00] Ramesh Govindan and Hongsuda Tangmunarunkit. Heuristics for
Internet Map Discovery. In Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International
Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM ’00), volume 3,
pages 1371–1380, 2000. 5, 20
[HB96] J. Hawkinson and T. Bates. Guidelines for creation, selection, and
registration of an autonomous system (as). RFC 1930 (Best Current
Practice), March 1996. Updated by RFC 6996. 4
[HK02] Petter Holme and Byung-Ji Kim. Growing scale-free networks with
tunable clustering. Physical Review E, 65(2):026107, 2002. 43
[HRI+08] Hamed Haddai, Miguel Rio, Gianluca Iannaccone, Andrew Moore,
and Richard Mortier. Network Topologies: Inference, Modeling and
Generation. IEEE Communication Surveys, 10(2):48–69, 2008. 34, 44,
47
[Ipl] University of Washington iPlane project.
http://iplane.cs.washington.edu. 5, 21
[Iso] IIT-CNR Isolario project. http://www.isolario.it. 21, 54, 131, 138
[Jac10] M.O. Jackson. Social and Economic Networks. Princeton Univ.Press,
2010. 45, 46
[JHA12] T Jime´nez, Y Hayel, and E Altman. Competition in access to content.
in Proceedings of IFIP Networking, pages 211–222, 2012. 73, 91
[JW96] Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinsky. A strategic model of social
and economic networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 71(1):44 – 74,
1996. 44
[KBS09] Samir Khuller and Barna Barna Sah. On finding dense subgraphs.
In ICALP ’09, pages 597 – 608, 2009. 61
[KE02] Konstantin Klemm and Victor M. Eguiluz. Growing scale-free net-
works with small-world behavior. Physical Review E, 65(5):057102,
2002. 42
[Key10] Ken Keys. Internet-scale IP Alias Resolution Techniques. ACM
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 40(1):50–55, 2010. 5, 20
162
[KYLC] Ken Keys, Hyun Young, Matthew Luckie, and Kimberley C. Claffy.
Internet-Scale IPv4 Alias Resolution with MIDAR. to appear in
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 5, 20
[LCC+09] Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn,
Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts,
and Stephen Wolff. A Brief History of the Internet. ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, 39(5):22–31, 2009. 14
[LDD12] Aemen Lodhi, Amogh Dhamdhere, and Constantine Dovrolis. GEN-
ESIS: An agent-based model of interdomain network formation, traf-
fic flow and economics. 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, pages
1197–1205, March 2012. 45
[LJKL09] Yixiao Li, Xiaogang Jin, Fansheng Kong, and Jiming Li. Linking
via Social Similarity : The Emergence of Community Structure in
Scale-free Network. Web Society. SWS ’09. 1st IEEE Symposium on,
2009. 44
[LKCS] Tian Lan, David Kao, Mung Chiang, and Ashutosh Sabharwal. An
axiomatic theory of fairness in network resource allocation. INFO-
COM ’10. 90, 91
[LKF05] Jure Leskovec, Jon Kleinberg, and Christos Faloutsos. Graphs over
Time : Densification Laws , Shrinking. Physical Review, 2005. 43, 143
[LRMH10] Conrad Lee, Fergal Reid, Aaron Mcdaid, and Neil Hurley. Detect-
ing Highly Overlapping Community Structure by Greedy Clique
Expansion. Workshop on Social Network Mining and Analysis, 10, 2010.
30, 35
[LWY12] Miao Li, Hui Wang, and Jiahai Yang. Flattening and preferential
attachment in the internet evolution. In APNOMS, pages 1–8. IEEE,
2012. 114
[Mat] Mathworks. Matlab - http://www.mathworks.it/products/matlab/.
86
[MDFL12] Murtaza Motiwala, Amogh Dhamdhere, Nick Feamster, and
Anukool Lakhina. Towards a cost model for network traffic. ACM
SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., 42(1):54–60, January 2012. 79
[MHK+07] Priya Mahadevan, Calvin Hubble, Dmitri Krioukov, Bradley Huf-
faker, and Amin Vahdat. ORBIS: Rescaling Degree Correlations
to Generate Annotated Internet Topologies. SIGCOMM Comput.
Commun. Rev., 37(4):325–336, August 2007. 46, 138, 145
163
[MJR+04] Zhuoqing M. Mao, David Johnson, Jennifer Rexford, Jia Wang, and
Randy H. Katz. Scalable and Accurate Identification of AS-level
Forwarding Paths. In Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE International Confer-
ence on Computer Communications (INFOCOM ’04), volume 3, pages
1605–1615, 2004. 6, 20
[MLMB01] Alberto Medina, Anukool Lakhina, Ibrahim Matta, and John Byers.
BRITE: Universal Topology Generation from a User’s Perspective.
Technical report, BU, 2001. 47, 138, 145
[MM65] J. W. Moon and L. Moser. On cliques in graphs. Israel Journal of
Mathematics, 3(1):23 – 28, 1965. 58
[MMO13] Eli A. Meirom, Shie Mannor, and Ariel Orda. Formation Games and
the Internet Structure. CoRR, abs/1307.4102, 2013. 46
[MRWK03] Zhuoqing M. Mao, Jennifer Rexford, Jia Wang, and Randy H. Katz.
Towards an Accurate AS-level Traceroute Tool. In Proceedings of
the 2003 Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and
Protocols for Computer Communications (SIGCOMM ’03), pages 365–
378, 2003. 6, 20
[MUR] US MURI Project - Multi-Layer and Multi-resolution Net-
works ofInteracting Agents in Adversarial Environments.
https://wiki.engr.illinois.edu/display/MuriHMAN/. 155
[MWA02] Ratul Mahajan, David Wetherall, and Tom Anderson. Understand-
ing BGP Misconfiguration. SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev.,
32(4):3–16, August 2002. 16
[N06] Economides N. The Economics of the Internet Backbone. Handbook
of Telecommunications Economics, Majumar, S., Vogelsang, I., Cave, M.
(Eds.):374–412, 2006. 73
[New01] Mark E. J. Newman. Clustering and preferential attachment in
growing networks. Physics Review E, 64:1–13, 2001. 43, 143
[New03] Mark E. J. Newman. Random graphs as models of networks. Hand-
book of Graphs and Networks: From the Genome to the Internet, (1), 2003.
37, 43
[New04] Mark E. J. Newman. Fast algorithm for detecting community struc-
ture in networks. Physical Review E, 69(6):066133, 2004. 29
[Nor10a] William B. Norton. A Study of 28 Peering Policies. Technical report,
Dr. Peering White Paper, 2010. 16, 22, 72
164
[Nor10b] William B. Norton. Internet Transit Prices - Historical and Projected.
Technical report, Dr. Peering White Paper, 2010. 17, 72, 77, 78, 99
[Nor10c] William B. Norton. The Art of Peering - The IX Playbook. Technical
report, Dr. Peering White Paper, 2010. 19, 72, 77, 87
[Nor11] William B. Norton. The 2013 Internet Peering Playbook. 2011. 14, 15,
16, 18, 20, 72, 78
[ORS93] Ariel Orda, Raphael Rom, and Nahum Shimkin. Competitive rout-
ing in multiuser communication networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions
on Networking, 1(5):510–521, October 1993. 72, 77, 80
[OW10] Ricardo Oliveira and Walter Willinger. The (In)Completeness of the
Observed Internet AS-level Structure. IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, 18(1):109–122, February 2010. 6, 22
[PCH] Packet Clearing House. http://www.pch.net. 21
[PDFV05] Gergely Palla, Imre Dere´nyi, Ille´s Farkas, and Tama´s Vicsek. Uncov-
ering the overlapping community structure of complex networks in
nature and society. Nature, 435(7043):814–8, June 2005. 30, 35
[pee] PeeringDB - http://www.peeringdb.com. 17, 22, 23, 66
[Por] University of Pisa Portolan project. http://portolan.iet.unipi.it. 5,
21
[Pos81] Jon Postel. RFC 791 Internet Protocol - DARPA Inernet Programm,
Protocol Specification, September 1981. 4
[PSV04] Romualdo Pastor-Satorras and Alessandro Vespignani. Evolution
and Structure of the Internet: a Statistical physics approach. Cambridge
Univ. Pr., 2004. 14, 23, 28, 33, 36, 44
[RFT13] Ryan A. Rossi, Sonia Fahmy, and Nilothpal Talukder. A Multi-Level
Approach for Evaluating Internet Topology Generators. In IFIP
Networking, pages 1–9, 2013. 28
[rip] Routing Information Service (RIS) at RIPE Network Coordination
Centre. 21
[RLH06] Yakov Rekhter, Tony Li, and Susan Hares. RFC 4271 - A Border
Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), 2006. 6, 21
[Rou] University of Oregon Route Views Project.
http://www.routeviews.org. 21
165
[RWM+11] Matthew Roughan, Walter Willinger, Olaf Maennel, Debbie Perouli,
and Randy Bush. 10 Lessons from 10 Years of Measuring and Mod-
eling the Internet ’ s Autonomous Systems. IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, 29(9):1810–1821, 2011. 7, 44, 67, 127
[SBS08] Rob Sherwood, Adam Bender, and Neil Spring. Discarte: a Dis-
junctive Internet Cartographer. In Proceedings of the 2008 Conference
on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer
Communications (SIGCOMM ’08), pages 303–314, 2008. 5, 20
[SCCH09] Huawei Shen, Xueqi Cheng, Kai Cai, and Mao-Bin Hu. Detect over-
lapping and hierarchical community structure in networks. Physica
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 388(8):1706–1712, April
2009. 30, 35
[SLH06] Lung-de Shyu, Seng-yong Lau, and Polly Huang. On the Search
of Internet AS-level Topology Invariants. Global Telecommunications
Conference, 2006. GLOBECOM ’06. IEEE, 2006. 23
[SMW02] Neil Spring, Ratul Mahajan, and David Wetherall. Measuring ISP
Topologies with Rocketfuel. In Proceedings of the 2002 Conference
on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer
Communications (SIGCOMM ’02), pages 133–145, 2002. 5
[SS06] Srinivas Shakkottai and R. Srikant. Economics of Network Pricing
with Multiple ISPs. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., 14(6), December 2006.
73
[STB09] S. Sesia, I. Toufik, and M. Baker. LTE, The UMTS Long Term Evolution:
From Theory to Practice. Wiley InterScience online books. Wiley, 2009.
3
[STF06] Georgos Siganos, Sudhir Leslie Tauro, and Michalis Faloutsos. Jel-
lyfish: A conceptual model for the AS Internet topology. Journal of
Communications and Networks, 8(3):339–350, 2006. 52
[SYK09] Kazumi Saito, Takeshi Yamada, and Kazuhiro Kazama. The k-Dense
Method to Extract Communities. Studies in Computational Intelligence,
165:243–257, 2009. 29, 34
[V0´3] Alexei Va´zquez. Growing network with local rules: Preferential
attachment, clustering hierarchy, and degree correlations. Physical
Review E, 67(5):1–15, May 2003. 43
[VCDS74] Vincent Vinton Cerf, Yogen Dalal, and Carl Sunshine. RFC 675
- SPECIFICATION OF INTERNET TRANSMISSION CONTROL
PROGRAM, 1974. 14
166
[WAD09] Walter Willinger, David Alderson, and John C. Doyle. Mathematics
and the Internet: A Source of Enormous Confusion and Great Poten-
tial. Notices of the American Mathematical Society, 56(5):586–599, 2009.
44
[WGJ+02] Walter Willinger, Ramesh Govindan, Sugih Jamin, Vern Paxson,
and Scott Shenker. Scaling phenomena in the Internet: critically
examining criticality. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
of the United States of America, 99 Suppl 1:2573–80, February 2002. 34
[Wika] Wikipedia - Network Formation. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Network formation. 36
[Wikb] Wikipedia - Tier 1 network. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Tier 1 network. 16, 17
[WJ02] JaredWinick and Sugih Jamin. Inet-3.0: Internet Topology Generator.
Technical report, University of Michigan, 2002. 47, 138, 145
[WL10] XiaomingWang andDmitri Loguinov. Understanding andModeling
the Internet Topology : Economics and Evolution Perspective. IEEE
Transactions on Networking, 18(1):257–270, 2010. 43
[WS98] Duncan J. Watts and Steven H. Strogatz. Collective dynamics of
’small-world’ networks. Nature, 393(6684):440–2, June 1998. 30, 38
[WS04] Avishai Wool and Gonen Sagie. A clustering approach for exploring
the Internet structure. Proceedings of 23rd IEEE Convention of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers in Israel, pages 149 – 152, 2004. 61
[Yao95] David D. Yao. S-modular games, with queueing applications. Queue-
ing Systems, 21(3-4):449–475, September 1995. 82
[ZCD97] Ellen W. Zegura, Kenneth Calvert, and M. Jeff Donahoo. A Quan-
titative Comparison of Graph-based Models for Internet Topology.
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, December 1997. 47, 138, 145
[ZLWX09] Cheng Zhang, Yanheng Liu, Jian Wang, and Minhui Xia. Modeling
Router-Level Internet Topology. 2009 International Workshop on Chaos-
Fractals Theories and Applications, pages 331–335, November 2009. 6


